Dahua Suffers Second Major Vulnerability, Silent [Finally Acknowledges]

By: Brian Karas, Published on Jul 25, 2017

Less than 3 months ago, Dahua received DHS ICS-CERT's worst score of 10.0 for their backdoor.

Now, Dahua has received another 10.0 score for a new vulnerability. Despite that, Dahua has remained silent.

In this note, we examine the vulnerability, Dahua's poor handling of this, compared to competitors Axis and Hikvision, and the potential impact to Dahua.

[Update: After the publication of our report, Dahua has finally acknowledged the vulnerability]

**** **** * ****** ago,***** ******** *** ***-****'* worst ***** ** **.**** ***** ********.

***, ***** *** ******** another **.* ***** *** a *** *************. ******* that, ***** *** ******** silent.

** **** ****, ** examine *** *************, *****'* poor ******** ** ****, compared ** *********** **** and *********, *** *** potential ****** ** *****.

[******: ***** *** *********** of *** ******, ***** has ******* ************ *** vulnerability]

[***************]

Vulnerability ********

*****'* *** ********* ** vulnerable ** ***** ****** overflow, ********* ** ****, sponsored ** *** ** DHS. ************, *** ***** field *** *** ***** password, ** *** **** first **** *** *** when ********** ** *** camera, **** *** ******** input **** ******. **** can ** **** ** an ******** ** ****** excessively **** **** ** the ******** *****, *** trigger * ****** ******** in *** ****** **** that ********* *** *****.

****** ********* *** ** exploited ** ***** ** attacker ** ******* *** device, **** **** ******, or ********* ********** *** unit. ******* **** ************* exists ** *** ***** page ******, ** ************** is ******** ** ******* it, *** *** ****** with ****** ****** ** at **** ** *******.

*** ****** **** **** Dahua *** ******** ****** 2 ****** ***, ** the *** ** ***.

Models ********

***** ***** ** ****** that *** ******** *** that ***** *** ******** a ******** ***, *********:

*******, ** ** *** clear *** **** ***** models *** ********. *** example,***** **** **********, **** ****** *****, in ******* *******, **** North *******, **** ******* are ******* *** *** same *********** ********. ********, as *** ***** **** the ***** ********, ***** Dahua ****** **** ****** various *****, **** ***** models ***** ** ********.

No ********** / ** ******

***** *** **** ** official ********** *** ****** of **** **********, ***** is ******** ** ***** matters ** ** ******* below *** *****'* ***********.

**** *** ******* *** to ******** ******** ** Dahua *** *** ******** no **-***-****** ******** ***** this ****** *************

Fix **********

*** *** **** ************* report ******** * **** to ******** ** *****'* international **** **** ***** fix *** *************. *** that ****, *** **** of *****'* ************* ***** are ****, ********* *** errors:

******: ***** ** *****, the **** / ***** are *** ******.******** ******** ** *** the ************* ****.

*****'* ***** ******* ******* is **********, *** *** no ********* ** **** vulnerability, *** **** ************* update ***** **** ***** 2017:

**** *** ******** ************* notices **** **********, ** it **** ****** ** models ******* ***** ***** far **** ****** ********.

Researcher **********

*** **** ******* *********** *****, ** ***** ******** firm******** ************, *** **** ******** (no ****/*********** *****) **** the ********* ** *** vulnerability. ******** ************ ******* to ******* ********** ******* of *** *************.

Violates ******** *********

*** **********, **** ** how **** *** ********* have ******* ***************:

*********'* ******* ************** ***** ********** ***** most ****** *************, *** links ** ******** *******:

**** ******** ******* ** known ***************, *** ***** to ********, ** ************ ************:

**** ** ***** ******** to *****'* **** ** acknowledgement, **** ** ********, and ** *** **** of **** ***********, **** of **** ********** ********.

******

*** ******* ** **** Dahua ********* ** **** an ********* **** ***** record, **** **** ******* vulnerabilities *** **** ******* to ******** ****** *** inform ***** *********. ** that ***, ** ** not *** **** ********* Dahua **** *****, ** some *****, **** ** business ** ***** *** Dahua. *******, ** **** show *** ********* ** unwilling ***** ** ** acknowledge *************** **********, *** deliver ******** **** ********* can *****.

Vote / ****

******

****** **** ****:***** *** *** ****** a ***** ********* *** ******* ************* the *************, ****** ** only ******* * ** their ****** *** **** a ******** ******* ** not *** *********:

***** *** ******** ** dated **** *** **** and ****, **** *** not **** ** ***** website ***** *** ****. The ************* *** ****** publicly ** **** **** 18th *** *** **** report **** ***** *** notified ** *** **.

***** ** ***** ** document ** ****** ** the ***** ************* ******* press ******* ** ***** security *******.

Comments (34)

***** ** *** **** obvious **** *** ******** people ** *** ****** that ***** ** **.

**** ** * ******* that ****** ~$* ******* in ****** *******, **,*** or ** ********* *** repeatedly ***** ** ** even *** ****** *****.

***** ****** **** *** Chinese ****** ******* ***** up ******* **** ****** lack *** *********** ********** to ******* ******* **.

* ***** *** ******* ******* ** **** *** *** ******** poor ** ** *** ********** ******** ********.

* ***** *** **** ***** ** ** - **** ** you ***** ** ***** ******** *** ********?

******: "**** ** *** ***** **the ******* ** Dahua security and response?".

***'* **** ** ***** are ****** ***** ** be *************** ***** ** IP ******* *** ** devices. **** ** *** nature ** * ******** which ******* *** *** too **** ****** *** there **** ** **** these *** ***** *********** harm. ******* *** *************** are ********** ** *** manufacturer ** * ***** hat ****** *** **** to **** ********** ** safe ** ********. *** real ******** *** *** integrity ** * ************, and * ***'* **** which *** ******, ** how **** ****** *** situation *** *** **** they ****** *** *********. Manufacturers **** ** **** facts *** ***** **** their ** ** ***** and ******* *** ********** take **** ** *** issue. ** ** **** is **** ********* ******** want-to-be ********* *** ****** great *********, ** ******* or ******** ** ****** manufacturer. * ***** ********* the ****** **** ** these ********* ***'* **** to ******* ******* *** effectively ** *** ** the **** **** ****'* discover *** ************* ********** and ***'* **** ***** they ****'* ** **** thorough ******* *** **** then *** **** ***** find *** ***************. ***'* face ** *** **** mistakes *********, ** ** how *** *** **** mistake **** ***** *** who *** ***.

*******, * ***** **** you ***** *** ********** of ********** "******* *** **********".

*******, * **** ***** that *************** ****** ** evaluated ***** ** *** fundamental *** **** **** are ** *******. **** Dahua, **** ** * big **** ** *** issue. ***** ****** *************** tend ** ** ***** issues **** ******* ****** skill ** *******. **** makes **** **** ********* as **** ** ****** to **** *********** ******** with *****'* ******** **** vulnerabilities **** *** ******* or ******* ** **** advantage **.

****** ***** *** ** experienced *********. * ********* to ***** ***** *** previous ******** *** *** what * ***** ** to *** ** ** some ***** ******** * had *** * *** completely ******* ** *** I *** ******** ** do **. ** ***** the ****** ***** ****** it ***'* ********* **** could ** ****** ***** advantage ** ** **** average ******** ****.

* ********* ** ***** about *** ******** ******** and *** **** * could ** ** *** in ** **** ***** products * *** *** I *** ********** ******* at *** * *** supposed ** ** **.

*****,**** ** *** ****** to *** / ******* the ***** ********. **'* ****** ** Github *** **'* ***** straight ******* ** ***. It's *** **** *** we **** ** *********** on ******** ******** ****.

** ***'* ********* **** could ** ****** ***** advantage ** ** **** average ******** ****

*** ******* *********, ** even ****** ******, ***** there *** ******* ******** worldwide, ***** ****** **** advantage ** **.

***** ********. ******** ************** on ***** ** * very ***** ******* ** 2016 :(

***

** **** ******** **** * **** **** ******* ** **** this ** ******* ** ***** **** *** ****** ***** *******, when ** ***** **** *** ***** ** ***** ** *** last **** *** * ****.

**** ** *****'* ****** vulnerability **** * **.* CERT *****, *** **** the ****** *** **** year. *** ******** ***, the***** *********** *********** **** ********, as ** *** ********** easy ** *******, ******** a ***** ****** ** devices, *** **** ******** sensitive **** (*********).

**** ******* ******** ********** Dahua ***************, ***** ** **** update ** *********** ******* *********** ****.

...*** ***** ***** *** the ***** ********, ** the **** ***** **** you *** **** ********** to *** ******, **** not ******** ***** **** length...

**** ** *****'* ****** vulnerability **** * **.* CERT *****, *** **** the ****** *** **** year. *** ******** ***, the ***** ********...

**** **** *** **** be *** ***** *********...

*****'* ****** ************* ****, including *** ******** *** link, *** **** **** at ***** * ***** now.

*** *** **** ***** the ****** ** ** but ******* ** *** been ************* ** ****** such **** ** ****** find / ****** *** pages.

********** **** **** *** it *** ** ** hard ** ********** *** a ******** ****** ********** company ***** **** **** issues.

******: ***** (** *****) 13 *****, *** **** / ***** *** *** active.******** ******** ** *** the ************* ****.

****** ** ******* ****** and ****** ******** ;)

******. **'** ***** ******* better *** *** ********. Joy ******!

**** ********** - *'* not ******** * ****** employee...

** ***** ********** *** firmwares ** ********, ** this ** ***** ******* this *** ** **** isolated ** **** ******** chipset ******. *'** *** what **** * *** dig ** ** ** off ****.

****, ** **** ** Sonia ******* ** *** bulletin *******, **** ** not ****** *** *** interface (***** ** ******* in * ********* ********** of *** ********)...

*** **** *********** **** ********** *** ******** ******?

***** ** *** ** the *********, **** *** IPCs **** *'** ****. Not * ************ ***** file ** **'* *** the **** ******* ****** all ** ****.

****, **** ******** ******* only ******* ** ******** cams...which *'** **** **** 2-3 ** ** * whole ****? *****'* **** like **'** ****** *** many ******** *******...** ***

**** *** ******* ** code ******* ********* *** Sonia, * ***** *** be ********* ** *** flaw ***** ** ****. I ***** *** **** way ** **** *** if **** ** *** case, ** ** *** into ******* *** ** exploit *** ** *****, or **** ** *** on ********* ** ******* and *** ** ****** from *****. ******** **** that *** *********** **** provide **** ******** ************* list ** *** ****** than ***** ******.

**** *** ******* ** code ******* ********* *** Sonia

#*, ******. *** *** elaborate ** **** '*********' and '*****' *** *** how **** ****** / differ?

**,

********* *** ***** ** the *** **** ******** into *****'* *******, ***** the ********** ** **** (more ** ****) *** naming ** *** ******** itself, ********* **** "*******" they **** **** ******* and ******** ***.

**** **** ****** ** handle *** ******, ****/***** server, *****, ****, ***** console... ***, ** ***** - **'* *** *** binary **** ****** ****** everything ********* ********** ******** and ********.

*** *********** ***** **, when **** *** ***** same ****** **** *** are ******** *** ********* "chipset" ** ************ (***/****... or ********), *************** ***** in *** ************/******* *** most ****** ** ***** in *** ****** ** well (*'**).

**** ** *** **** with ******** ********, ** ********* * would *** ** ********* that **** **** ***** in **** ********* *** Sonia, *** ** ************ exploited *** **** ****** root (** *** *********/***** binaries **** ** ****).

*******, ***** ***** ** a ********** ** *** used **** *** ******** - ***** *** **** lays *****, *** ***** exist ***** ********* *) base64, *) ***** ***** hash *** *) ***, and ** ***** ****** only ***** ** ******** who ******* "***", *** that ***** ****** **** the ********** *******.

******, **** ***** **** a *** ** **** the "*****" ******.

~ # ** ** | **** *****
*** **** ***:** /***/***/***** AEWB
*** **** *:** **** sonia
~ #

~ # ******* -*** | **** *****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * ***.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * ***.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::***** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::***** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.*.**:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.*.**:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*****
**** * [ ] DGRAM *** ***/***** /***/***/**************-******
**** * [ ] DGRAM ***** ***/***** /***/***/************-*

******! **** *******.

***, ******** *******, ** The ******** ****************:

***** (*** *****) *** Sofia (*** ******/********) ** just *** **** ** a ****** **** **** provides **** *** *** and *** ***/*********** ********* to *** ***/***/***.

**** **** **** *********** of *****. ** *** think ***** ** * Sofia ***** ** ******* For ********? *** *** sense ** **** *** sharing **** **?

**** ***********, ***** **** well ** ** **** Challenge, ***** *** ***** share **** ****.

*** *** ** *** comments ***** ** "*** Register" ********* *********, *** - **** **** ** have *** ****** **** provides **** ******** (***** davinci), *** ** ******** of **** ***** *********/***** and ********* *******, * have *** ***** **** davinci ***** **** **** as *********/***** - *** Rapid7 *** ***** **** of ***** **** ********* some **** ***, ** maybe **** **** ** the **** ******* **** did (*********** ***, ** I **** *** ***** to *** *** *** binary *** ******** *** Hardware ******* - *** also ***).

*** **** ** ****** from * ********* ***.

# # ******* -***
****** ******** *********** (******* and ***********)
***** ****-* ****-* ***** Address ******* ******* ***** PID/Program ****
*** * * *.*.*.*:** 0.0.0.0:* ****** ***/********
*** * * ***.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ****** ****/********
*** * *** ***.***.*.**:** 192.168.5.120:52896 *********** ****/********
*** * * :::**** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * :::** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * :::** :::* ****** ***/********
*** * * ::*:***** :::* ****** ****/********
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** 0.0.0.0:* ***/*******
*** * * :::*** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::**** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::***** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::**** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::***** :::* ***/*******
*** ***** * :::** :::* ** ***/*******

** * ****** **** not **** *** **** port ********* ** **** then ** ** **** from **** *************. *****?

****, **** **** ******* cameras *****? *** ****.

** * ****** **** not **** *** **** port ********* ** **** then ** ** **** from **** *************. *****?

***, ** ***** ** no ****** ****** ** the *** ********* ** any **** **** *** should ** **** **** this ************* ***** ******** executed.

****, **** **** ******* cameras *****? *** ****.

**** **** ****** ******* that **** * ***** vulnerability ** **** ******* can ***** ** ** issue. ** ** ******** gains ****** **** ******* source, **** **** *** use **** ************* ** gain ****** ** *** video, **** *******, ***.

***, ** ***'* ** critical ** **** ******* are ******** ******** **********, but *** *******'* **** ignore **.

**'* *** ******** ** all ** **** ******** issues. *** **** *** sit ** *** ****** old *********** *** ***'* give * **** ******* to **** *********... **** that ** **** ***** disrespecting. **** **** ***** one ******, **** **** has ***** **** **** its *********. ***** ***, like ****, **** *** their ****** ** ***** vulnerability ** * ***** period ** ****.

**** ******* * ***, just ******* ***** *** exploit ***** **** ********* make ***** ******* **** secure, ** ***** ****** them * ******.

******* * ***** *** on ********* ********** *****'* make ** ** ****.

*** *********.

******:***** *** *** ****** a ***** ********* *** ******* ************* the *************, ****** ** only ******* * ** their ****** *** **** a ******** ******* ** not *** *********:

***** *** ******** ** dated **** *** **** and ****, **** *** not **** ** ***** website ***** *** ****.

***** ** ***** ** document ** ****** ** the ***** ************* ******* press ******* ** ***** security *******.

* ***** ****'* **** listing *** ******** ******** US ******* ******. *** only ****** *** ******** isn't "*********" ** ******** because **** ****'* ******* an **** ******* **** yet.

*** ****** ****** ** the ***** ********* *** for ***** ********/************* **** and **** **** *** PAL ******** (******* **** the ******* *** ********* in ** **********).

*** **** ****** *** firmware ***'* "*********" ** probably ******* **** ****'* compile ** **** ******* copy ***.

*********** **** ************* *** now **** ****** *** 10 ****, ***** ****** have *** *** **** version ********* ** *** same ****, ** ****** a ***, ** *** PAL *******.

***, **** *** **** ***** *** ****, **?

*** **'* **** ****... **********!

**, ** ** ***** *** * "*******" ******** ********... *** many ****** ***** ** **** ** **** ***** ** *** of ***** ****** ********* ** ***** *** *** ********???

***** *** ****** *** ********?

**** ***** **** ** *****...

***** ****** * ****** ***** *** ******** **** ** ************* series **** *****, ** * ********** **** *** ***** ***** was *** **** ****** ************* ** ******** ************ ***** ******************.

Login to read this IPVM report.
Why do I need to log in?
IPVM conducts unique testing and research funded by member's payments enabling us to offer the most independent, accurate and in-depth information.

Related Reports

LifeSafety Power NetLink Vulnerabilities And Problematic Response on May 20, 2019
'Power supplies' are not devices that many think about when considering vulnerabilities but as more and more devices go 'online', the risks for...
Inside Look Into Scam Market Research on May 17, 2019
Scam market research has exploded over the last few years becoming the most commonly cited 'statistics' for most industries, despite there clearly...
Verkada False Allegations Against Avigilon Exposed on May 08, 2019
Verkada has leveled false allegations against Avigilon, as part of their aggressive marketing tactics against the 'dinosaurs' in the 'ancient'...
Registration Closed - Spring 2019 IP Networking Course on May 02, 2019
Register now for the Spring 2019 IP Networking course here - Closed. Last chance now.   This is the only networking course designed specifically...
Verkada Salesman: IPVM "Stuck In A The Stone Age" on Apr 25, 2019
Verkada is 'tackling dinosaurs' and battling those, like IPVM, who are 'stuck in a the stone age'. Verkada's recent sales recruiting promotion...
The Embarrassing Story of ISC West's Best New IP Camera on Apr 24, 2019
A sad but simple situation: Only 2 companies paid SIA the thousands of dollars required to compete for the best new 'cameras IP' The judges...
Locking Down Network Connections Guide on Apr 23, 2019
Accidents and inside attacks are risks when network connections are not locked down. Security and video surveillance systems should be protected...
Securadyne CEO: IPVM 'Entertaining For An Ignorant Few' on Apr 16, 2019
Securadyne's CEO Carey Boethel is unhappy with IPVM's report - Failed Integrator Rollup, Securadyne Sells to Guard Giant Allied. Indeed, he...
Silicon Valley Cybersecurity Insurance Startup Coalition Profile on Mar 20, 2019
Many industry people believe cybersecurity insurance is not worth it, as the voting and debate in our Cybersecurity Insurance For Security...
Hikvision Favorability Results 2019 on Mar 18, 2019
Hikvision favorability results declined significantly in IPVM's 2019 study of 200+ integrators. While in 2017 Hikvision's favorability was...

Most Recent Industry Reports

NJ Law Requires Apprenticeship For Public Works Integrators on May 24, 2019
Few integrators do a formal apprenticeship program. However, now a NJ law is requiring any integrator on public works projects (such as state...
Security / Privacy Journalist Sam Pfeifle Interview on May 24, 2019
Sam Pfeifle is best known as the outspoken former Editor of Security Systems News. After that, he was publications director at the International...
Verkada Video Quality Problems Tested on May 23, 2019
Verkada suffers from numerous video quality problems, not found in commercial IP cameras, new IPVM testing of Verkada vs Axis and Hikvision...
Average Frame Rate Video Surveillance 2019 on May 23, 2019
What is the average frame rated used in video surveillance systems? In IPVM's 2011 statistics, the average was 6-8fps increasing to ~10fps in...
Access Control Job Walk Guide on May 22, 2019
Significant money can be saved and problems avoided with an access control job walk if you know what to look for and what to ask. By inviting...
ASCMA / Monitronics Declares Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Plan on May 22, 2019
Monitronics is entering into Chapter 11 bankruptcy. The company, also called Ascent Capital Group Inc., aka ASCMA, aka Brinks Home Security,...
US Considers Sanctions Against Hikvision and Dahua on May 22, 2019
The US government is considering blacklisting "up to 5" PRC surveillance firms, including Hikvision and Dahua, Bloomberg reported, with human...
Dahua USA Celebrates 5 Years of Errors on May 21, 2019
Dahua USA is, in their own words, 'celebrating' 5 years in North America or as trade magazine SSN declared: Dahua Technology finds success in...
Axis ~$150 Outdoor Camera Tested on May 21, 2019
Axis has released the latest in their Companion camera line, the outdoor Companion Dome Mini LE, a 1080p integrated IR model aiming to compete with...
Covert Facial Recognition Using Axis and Amazon By NYTimes on May 20, 2019
What if you took a 33MP Axis camera covering one of the busiest parks in the US and ran Amazon Facial Recognition against it? That is what the...

The world's leading video surveillance information source, IPVM provides the best reporting, testing and training for 10,000+ members globally. Dedicated to independent and objective information, we uniquely refuse any and all advertisements, sponsorship and consulting from manufacturers.

About | FAQ | Contact