Dahua Suffers Second Major Vulnerability, Silent [Finally Acknowledges]

Author: Brian Karas, Published on Jul 25, 2017

Less than 3 months ago, Dahua received DHS ICS-CERT's worst score of 10.0 for their backdoor.

Now, Dahua has received another 10.0 score for a new vulnerability. Despite that, Dahua has remained silent.

In this note, we examine the vulnerability, Dahua's poor handling of this, compared to competitors Axis and Hikvision, and the potential impact to Dahua.

[Update: After the publication of our report, Dahua has finally acknowledged the vulnerability]

**** **** * ****** ***,***** ******** *** ***-****'* ***** ***** ** **.**** ***** ********.

***, ***** *** ******** ******* **.* ***** *** * *** vulnerability. ******* ****, ***** *** ******** ******.

** **** ****, ** ******* *** *************, *****'* **** ******** of ****, ******** ** *********** **** *** *********, *** *** potential ****** ** *****.

[******: ***** *** *********** ** *** ******, ***** *** ******* acknowledged *** *************]

[***************]

Vulnerability ********

*****'* *** ********* ** ********** ** ***** ****** ********, ********* ** ****, ********* ** *** ** ***. ************, the ***** ***** *** *** ***** ********, ** *** **** first **** *** *** **** ********** ** *** ******, **** not ******** ***** **** ******. **** *** ** **** ** an ******** ** ****** *********** **** **** ** *** ******** field, *** ******* * ****** ******** ** *** ****** **** that ********* *** *****.

****** ********* *** ** ********* ** ***** ** ******** ** disable *** ******, **** **** ******, ** ********* ********** *** unit. ******* **** ************* ****** ** *** ***** **** ******, no ************** ** ******** ** ******* **, *** *** ****** with ****** ****** ** ** **** ** *******.

*** ****** **** **** ***** *** ******** ****** * ****** ago, ** *** *** ** ***.

Models ********

***** ***** ** ****** **** *** ******** *** **** ***** has ******** * ******** ***, *********:

*******, ** ** *** ***** *** **** ***** ****** *** impacted. *** *******,***** **** **********, **** ****** *****, ** ******* *******, **** ***** *******, part ******* *** ******* *** *** **** *********** ********. ********, as *** ***** **** *** ***** ********, ***** ***** ****** code ****** ******* *****, **** ***** ****** ***** ** ********.

No ********** / ** ******

***** *** **** ** ******** ********** *** ****** ** **** disclosure, ***** ** ******** ** ***** ******* ** ** ******* below *** *****'* ***********.

**** *** ******* *** ** ******** ******** ** ***** *** has ******** ** **-***-****** ******** ***** **** ****** *************

Fix **********

*** *** **** ************* ****** ******** * **** ** ******** on *****'* ************* **** **** ***** *** *** *************. *** that ****, *** **** ** *****'* ************* ***** *** ****, returning *** ******:

******: ***** ** *****, *** **** / ***** *** *** active.******** ******** ** *** *** ************* ****.

*****'* ***** ******* ******* ** **********, *** *** ** ********* to **** *************, *** **** ************* ****** ***** **** ***** 2017:

**** *** ******** ************* ******* **** **********, ** ** **** listed ** ****** ******* ***** ***** *** **** ****** ********.

Researcher **********

*** **** ******* *********** *****, ** ***** ******** ************ ************, *** **** ******** (** ****/*********** *****) **** *** ********* of *** *************. ******** ************ ******* ** ******* ********** ******* of *** *************.

Violates ******** *********

*** **********, **** ** *** **** *** ********* **** ******* vulnerabilities:

*********'* ******* ************** ***** ********** ***** **** ****** *************, *** ***** ** firmware *******:

**** ******** ******* ** ***** ***************, *** ***** ** ********, on ************ ************:

**** ** ***** ******** ** *****'* **** ** ***************, **** of ********, *** ** *** **** ** **** ***********, **** of **** ********** ********.

******

*** ******* ** **** ***** ********* ** **** ** ********* poor ***** ******, **** **** ******* *************** *** **** ******* to ******** ****** *** ****** ***** *********. ** **** ***, we ** *** *** **** ********* ***** **** *****, ** some *****, **** ** ******** ** ***** *** *****. *******, it **** **** *** ********* ** ********* ***** ** ** acknowledge *************** **********, *** ******* ******** **** ********* *** *****.

Vote / ****

******

****** **** ****:***** *** *** ****** * ***** ********* *** ******* ************* *** *************, ****** ** **** ******* 4 ** ***** ****** *** **** * ******** ******* ** not *** *********:

***** *** ******** ** ***** **** *** **** *** ****, this *** *** **** ** ***** ******* ***** *** ****. The ************* *** ****** ******** ** **** **** **** *** the **** ****** **** ***** *** ******** ** *** **.

***** ** ***** ** ******** ** ****** ** *** ***** International ******* ***** ******* ** ***** ******** *******.

Comments (34)

***** ** *** **** ******* **** *** ******** ****** ** the ****** **** ***** ** **.

**** ** * ******* **** ****** ~$* ******* ** ****** revenue, **,*** ** ** ********* *** ********** ***** ** ** even *** ****** *****.

***** ****** **** *** ******* ****** ******* ***** ** ******* they ****** **** *** *********** ********** ** ******* ******* **.

* ***** *** ******* ******* ** **** *** *** ******** poor ** ** *** ********** ******** ********.

* ***** *** **** ***** ** ** - **** ** you ***** ** ***** ******** *** ********?

******: "**** ** *** ***** **the ******* ** Dahua security and response?".

***'* **** ** ***** *** ****** ***** ** ** *************** found ** ** ******* *** ** *******. **** ** *** nature ** * ******** ***** ******* *** *** *** **** people *** ***** **** ** **** ***** *** ***** *********** harm. ******* *** *************** *** ********** ** *** ************ ** a ***** *** ****** *** **** ** **** ********** ** safe ** ********. *** **** ******** *** *** ********* ** a ************, *** * ***'* **** ***** *** ******, ** how **** ****** *** ********* *** *** **** **** ****** the *********. ************* **** ** **** ***** *** ***** **** their ** ** ***** *** ******* *** ********** **** **** of *** *****. ** ** **** ** **** ********* ******** want-to-be ********* *** ****** ***** *********, ** ******* ** ******** IP ****** ************. * ***** ********* *** ****** **** ** these ********* ***'* **** ** ******* ******* *** *********** ** due ** *** **** **** ****'* ******** *** ************* ********** and ***'* **** ***** **** ****'* ** **** ******** ******* and **** **** *** **** ***** **** *** ***************. ***'* face ** *** **** ******** *********, ** ** *** *** own **** ******* **** ***** *** *** *** ***.

*******, * ***** **** *** ***** *** ********** ** ********** "******* *** **********".

*******, * **** ***** **** *************** ****** ** ********* ***** on *** *********** *** **** **** *** ** *******. **** Dahua, **** ** * *** **** ** *** *****. ***** recent *************** **** ** ** ***** ****** **** ******* ****** skill ** *******. **** ***** **** **** ********* ** **** as ****** ** **** *********** ******** **** *****'* ******** **** vulnerabilities **** *** ******* ** ******* ** **** ********* **.

****** ***** *** ** *********** *********. * ********* ** ***** about *** ******** ******** *** *** **** * ***** ** to *** ** ** **** ***** ******** * *** *** I *** ********** ******* ** *** * *** ******** ** do **. ** ***** *** ****** ***** ****** ** ***'* something **** ***** ** ****** ***** ********* ** ** **** average ******** ****.

* ********* ** ***** ***** *** ******** ******** *** *** what * ***** ** ** *** ** ** **** ***** products * *** *** * *** ********** ******* ** *** I *** ******** ** ** **.

*****,**** ** *** ****** ** *** / ******* *** ***** backdoor. **'* ****** ** ****** *** **'* ***** ******** ******* to ***. **'* *** **** *** ** **** ** *********** on ******** ******** ****.

** ***'* ********* **** ***** ** ****** ***** ********* ** by **** ******* ******** ****

*** ******* *********, ** **** ****** ******, ***** ***** *** clearly ******** *********, ***** ****** **** ********* ** **.

***** ********. ******** ************** ** ***** ** * **** ***** mistake ** **** :(

***

** **** ******** **** * **** **** ******* ** **** this ** ******* ** ***** **** *** ****** ***** *******, when ** ***** **** *** ***** ** ***** ** *** last **** *** * ****.

**** ** *****'* ****** ************* **** * **.* **** *****, and **** *** ****** *** **** ****. *** ******** ***, the***** *********** *********** **** ********, ** ** *** ********** **** ** exploit, ******** * ***** ****** ** *******, *** **** ******** sensitive **** (*********).

**** ******* ******** ********** ***** ***************, ***** ** **** ****** ** *********** ******* *********** ****.

...*** ***** ***** *** *** ***** ********, ** *** **** first **** *** *** **** ********** ** *** ******, **** not ******** ***** **** ******...

**** ** *****'* ****** ************* **** * **.* **** *****, and **** *** ****** *** **** ****. *** ******** ***, the ***** ********...

**** **** *** **** ** *** ***** *********...

*****'* ****** ************* ****, ********* *** ******** *** ****, *** been **** ** ***** * ***** ***.

*** *** **** ***** *** ****** ** ** *** ******* it *** **** ************* ** ****** **** **** ** ****** find / ****** *** *****.

********** **** **** *** ** *** ** ** **** ** comprehend *** * ******** ****** ********** ******* ***** **** **** issues.

******: ***** (** *****) ** *****, *** **** / ***** are *** ******.******** ******** ** *** *** ************* ****.

****** ** ******* ****** *** ****** ******** ;)

******. **'** ***** ******* ****** *** *** ********. *** ******!

**** ********** - *'* *** ******** * ****** ********...

** ***** ********** *** ********* ** ********, ** **** ** Sonia ******* **** *** ** **** ******** ** **** ******** chipset ******. *'** *** **** **** * *** *** ** in ** *** ****.

****, ** **** ** ***** ******* ** *** ******** *******, this ** *** ****** *** *** ********* (***** ** ******* in * ********* ********** ** *** ********)...

*** **** *********** **** ********** *** ******** ******?

***** ** *** ** *** *********, **** *** **** **** I've ****. *** * ************ ***** **** ** **'* *** the **** ******* ****** *** ** ****.

****, **** ******** ******* **** ******* ** ******** ****...***** *'** sold **** *-* ** ** * ***** ****? *****'* **** like **'** ****** *** **** ******** *******...** ***

**** *** ******* ** **** ******* ********* *** *****, * would *** ** ********* ** *** **** ***** ** ****. I ***** *** **** *** ** **** *** ** **** is *** ****, ** ** *** **** ******* *** ** exploit *** ** *****, ** **** ** *** ** ********* FW ******* *** *** ** ****** **** *****. ******** **** that *** *********** **** ******* **** ******** ************* **** ** the ****** **** ***** ******.

**** *** ******* ** **** ******* ********* *** *****

#*, ******. *** *** ********* ** **** '*********' *** '*****' are *** *** **** ****** / ******?

**,

********* *** ***** ** *** *** **** ******** **** *****'* devices, ***** *** ********** ** **** (**** ** ****) *** naming ** *** ******** ******, ********* **** "*******" **** **** been ******* *** ******** ***.

**** **** ****** ** ****** *** ******, ****/***** ******, *****, RTSP, ***** *******... ***, ** ***** - **'* *** *** binary **** ****** ****** ********** ********* ********** ******** *** ********.

*** *********** ***** **, **** **** *** ***** **** ****** code *** *** ******** *** ********* "*******" ** ************ (***/****... or ********), *************** ***** ** *** ************/******* *** **** ****** to ***** ** *** ****** ** **** (*'**).

**** ** *** **** **** ******** ********, ** ********* * ***** *** ** ********* **** **** flaw ***** ** **** ********* *** *****, *** ** ************ exploited *** **** ****** **** (** *** *********/***** ******** **** as ****).

*******, ***** ***** ** * ********** ** *** **** **** for ******** - ***** *** **** **** *****, *** ***** exist ***** ********* *) ******, *) ***** ***** **** *** 3) ***, *** ** ***** ****** **** ***** ** ******** who ******* "***", *** **** ***** ****** **** *** ********** devices.

******, **** ***** **** * *** ** **** *** "*****" binary.

~ # ** ** | **** *****
*** **** ***:** /***/***/***** ****
*** **** *:** **** *****
~ #

~ # ******* -*** | **** *****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * ***.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * ***.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::***** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::***** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.*.**:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.*.**:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
*** * * ***.***.***.***:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*****
**** * [ ] ***** *** ***/***** /***/***/**************-******
**** * [ ] ***** ***** ***/***** /***/***/************-*

******! **** *******.

***, ******** *******, ** *** ******** ****************:

***** (*** *****) *** ***** (*** ******/********) ** **** *** name ** * ****** **** **** ******** **** *** *** and *** ***/*********** ********* ** *** ***/***/***.

**** **** **** *********** ** *****. ** *** ***** ***** is * ***** ***** ** ******* *** ********? *** *** sense ** **** *** ******* **** **?

**** ***********, ***** **** **** ** ** **** *********, ***** and ***** ***** **** ****.

*** *** ** *** ******** ***** ** "*** ********" ********* Hikvision, *** - **** **** ** **** *** ****** **** provides **** ******** (***** *******), *** ** ******** ** **** Dahua *********/***** *** ********* *******, * **** *** ***** **** davinci ***** **** **** ** *********/***** - *** ****** *** quite **** ** ***** **** ********* **** **** ***, ** maybe **** **** ** *** **** ******* **** *** (*********** now, ** * **** *** ***** ** *** *** *** binary *** ******** *** ******** ******* - *** **** ***).

*** **** ** ****** **** * ********* ***.

# # ******* -***
****** ******** *********** (******* *** ***********)
***** ****-* ****-* ***** ******* ******* ******* ***** ***/******* ****
*** * * *.*.*.*:** *.*.*.*:* ****** ***/********
*** * * ***.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ****** ****/********
*** * *** ***.***.*.**:** ***.***.*.***:***** *********** ****/********
*** * * :::**** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * :::** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * :::** :::* ****** ***/********
*** * * ::*:***** :::* ****** ****/********
*** * * :::*** :::* ****** ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:***** *.*.*.*:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*******
*** * * *.*.*.*:**** *.*.*.*:* ***/*******
*** * * :::*** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::**** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::***** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::**** :::* ***/*******
*** * * :::***** :::* ***/*******
*** ***** * :::** :::* ** ***/*******

** * ****** **** *** **** *** **** **** ********* or **** **** ** ** **** **** **** *************. *****?

****, **** **** ******* ******* *****? *** ****.

** * ****** **** *** **** *** **** **** ********* or **** **** ** ** **** **** **** *************. *****?

***, ** ***** ** ** ****** ****** ** *** *** interface ** *** **** **** *** ****** ** **** **** this ************* ***** ******** ********.

****, **** **** ******* ******* *****? *** ****.

**** **** ****** ******* **** **** * ***** ************* ** your ******* *** ***** ** ** *****. ** ** ******** gains ****** **** ******* ******, **** **** *** *** **** vulnerability ** **** ****** ** *** *****, **** *******, ***.

***, ** ***'* ** ******** ** **** ******* *** ******** remotely **********, *** *** *******'* **** ****** **.

**'* *** ******** ** *** ** **** ******** ******. *** when *** *** ** *** ****** *** *********** *** ***'* give * **** ******* ** **** *********... **** **** ** just ***** *************. **** **** ***** *** ******, **** **** has ***** **** **** *** *********. ***** ***, **** ****, this *** ***** ****** ** ***** ************* ** * ***** period ** ****.

**** ******* * ***, **** ******* ***** *** ******* ***** help ********* **** ***** ******* **** ******, ** ***** ****** them * ******.

******* * ***** *** ** ********* ********** *****'* **** ** go ****.

*** *********.

******:***** *** *** ****** * ***** ********* *** ******* ************* *** *************, ****** ** **** ******* 4 ** ***** ****** *** **** * ******** ******* ** not *** *********:

***** *** ******** ** ***** **** *** **** *** ****, this *** *** **** ** ***** ******* ***** *** ****.

***** ** ***** ** ******** ** ****** ** *** ***** International ******* ***** ******* ** ***** ******** *******.

* ***** ****'* **** ******* *** ******** ******** ** ******* models. *** **** ****** *** ******** ***'* "*********" ** ******** because **** ****'* ******* ** **** ******* **** ***.

*** ****** ****** ** *** ***** ********* *** *** ***** complete/international **** *** **** **** *** *** ******** (******* **** the ******* *** ********* ** ** **********).

*** **** ****** *** ******** ***'* "*********" ** ******** ******* they ****'* ******* ** **** ******* **** ***.

*********** **** ************* *** *** **** ****** *** ** ****, Dahua ****** **** *** *** **** ******* ********* ** *** same ****, ** ****** * ***, ** *** *** *******.

***, **** *** **** ***** *** ****, **?

*** **'* **** ****... **********!

**, ** ** ***** *** * "*******" ******** ********... *** many ****** ***** ** **** ** **** ***** ** *** of ***** ****** ********* ** ***** *** *** ********???

***** *** ****** *** ********?

**** ***** **** ** *****...

***** ****** * ****** ***** *** ******** **** ** ************* series **** *****, ** * ********** **** *** ***** ***** was *** **** ****** ************* ** ******** ************ ***** ******************.

Login to read this IPVM report.
Why do I need to log in?
IPVM conducts unique testing and research funded by member's payments enabling us to offer the most independent, accurate and in-depth information.

Related Reports

No GDPR Penalties For UK Swann 'Spying Hack' on Nov 20, 2018
The UK’s data protection agency has closed its investigation into Infinova-owned Swann Security UK, the ICO confirmed to IPVM, deciding to take “no...
Axis: "No One Wants To Buy A Camera" on Nov 09, 2018
Axis has, in its own description, made a bold declaration: The industry is changing so rapidly that the following statement might seem bold but...
Winter 2019 IP Networking Course on Nov 05, 2018
This is the only networking course designed specifically for video surveillance professionals.  Lots of network training exists but none of it...
HID: Stop Selling Cracked 125 kHz Credentials on Nov 05, 2018
HID should stop selling cracked 125 kHz access control credentials, that have been long cracked and can easily be copied by cheap cloners sold on...
"New Zealand Govt Uses Chinese Cameras Banned In US", Considers Security Audit on Oct 12, 2018
Newsroom NZ has issued a report: "NZ Govt uses Chinese cameras banned in US": This comes after the US federal government banned purchases of...
China Hacks Video Servers Causing Uproar on Oct 05, 2018
An incident causing an international uproar is hitting home in the video surveillance industry as a Bloomberg report, "The Big Hack: How China...
Genetec Takes Aim At 'Untrustworthy' 'Foreign Government-Owned Vendors' on Sep 24, 2018
Genetec is taking aim at 'untrustworthy' 'foreign government-owned vendors'. This is not a new theme for Genetec as nearly 2 years ago, Genetec...
Hikvision FIPS 140-2 Cybersecurity Certification Examined on Aug 27, 2018
A week after the US government passed a law banning Hikvision, Hikvision announced it had obtained a FIPS 140-2 certification from the US...
Sony Gen 5 IP Cameras Critical Vulnerabilities on Jul 26, 2018
Cybersecurity vulnerabilities remain prevalent in video surveillance devices. Now Talos researchers have discovered multiple vulnerabilities in...
Hikvision Covers Up Racial Profiling And AI Error on Jun 25, 2018
Faced with global scrutiny, led by the US government-funded Voice of America (VOA), Hikvision has covered up evidence showing their racial...

Most Recent Industry Reports

2019 Access Control Book Released on Dec 12, 2018
This is the best, most comprehensive access control book in the world, based on our unprecedented research and testing has been significantly...
Huawei Hisilicon Quietly Powering Tens of Millions of Western IoT Devices on Dec 12, 2018
Huawei Hisilicon chips are powering, at least, tens of millions of Western IoT devices, such as IP cameras and surveillance recorders, a fact that...
FLIR Launches Body Cameras Unified With VMS (TruWitness) on Dec 11, 2018
While FLIR is best known for their thermal cameras, now they have expanded into body cameras, launching TruWITNESS, a public safety focused body...
Startup Sunflower Labs' Autonomous Drone Security System on Dec 11, 2018
Startup Sunflower Labs is claiming a unique design on a home security system, combining autonomous drones and 'Sunflower' sensors. Imagine an...
The 2019 Video Surveillance Industry Guide on Dec 10, 2018
The 300 page, 2019 Video Surveillance Industry Guide, covers the key events and the future of the video surveillance market, is now available,...
Multi-Factor Access Control Authentication Guide on Dec 10, 2018
Can a stranger use your credentials? One of the oldest problems facing access control is making credentials as easy to use as keys, but restricting...
Top 2019 Trend - AI Video Analytics on Dec 10, 2018
160+ Integrators answered: What do you think the top industry trend will be in 2019? Why? AI / video analytics was the run-away winner with...
AV Tech Company Profile on Dec 07, 2018
Taiwanese manufacturer AV Tech's revenue declined ~70% since 2012. Planning a comeback, AV Tech spoke to IPVM about their opportunities and...
Ubiquiti $79 Flex IP Camera Tested on Dec 07, 2018
U.S. Manufacturer Ubiquiti has released a 1080p, integrated IR IP camera, selling it directly for $79, making this one of the least expensive IP...
Infinova's Xinjiang Business Examined on Dec 07, 2018
As pressure mounts for companies to stop doing business in China’s Xinjiang region amid a severe human rights crisis, IPVM has found Infinova sold...

The world's leading video surveillance information source, IPVM provides the best reporting, testing and training for 10,000+ members globally. Dedicated to independent and objective information, we uniquely refuse any and all advertisements, sponsorship and consulting from manufacturers.

About | FAQ | Contact