Dahua Suffers Second Major Vulnerability, Silent [Finally Acknowledges]

Author: Brian Karas, Published on Jul 25, 2017

Less than 3 months ago, Dahua received DHS ICS-CERT's worst score of 10.0 for their backdoor.

Now, Dahua has received another 10.0 score for a new vulnerability. Despite that, Dahua has remained silent.

In this note, we examine the vulnerability, Dahua's poor handling of this, compared to competitors Axis and Hikvision, and the potential impact to Dahua.

[Update: After the publication of our report, Dahua has finally acknowledged the vulnerability]

**** **** * ****** ***,***** ******** *** ***-****'* ***** ***** ** **.**** ***** ********.

***, ***** *** ******** ******* **.* ***** *** * *** vulnerability. ******* ****, ***** *** ******** ******.

** **** ****, ** ******* *** *************, *****'* **** ******** of ****, ******** ** *********** **** *** *********, *** *** potential ****** ** *****.

[******: ***** *** *********** ** *** ******, ***** *** ******* acknowledged *** *************]

[***************]

Vulnerability ********

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*** ****** **** **** ***** *** ******** ****** * ****** ago, ** *** *** ** ***.

Models ********

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Fix **********

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Researcher **********

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******

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Vote / ****

******

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Comments (34)

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***** ****** **** *** ******* ****** ******* ***** ** ******* they ****** **** *** *********** ********** ** ******* ******* **.

* ***** *** ******* ******* ** **** *** *** ******** poor ** ** *** ********** ******** ********.

* ***** *** **** ***** ** ** - **** ** you ***** ** ***** ******** *** ********?

******: "**** ** *** ***** **the ******* ** Dahua security and response?".

***'* **** ** ***** *** ****** ***** ** ** *************** found ** ** ******* *** ** *******. **** ** *** nature ** * ******** ***** ******* *** *** *** **** people *** ***** **** ** **** ***** *** ***** *********** harm. ******* *** *************** *** ********** ** *** ************ ** a ***** *** ****** *** **** ** **** ********** ** safe ** ********. *** **** ******** *** *** ********* ** a ************, *** * ***'* **** ***** *** ******, ** how **** ****** *** ********* *** *** **** **** ****** the *********. ************* **** ** **** ***** *** ***** **** their ** ** ***** *** ******* *** ********** **** **** of *** *****. ** ** **** ** **** ********* ******** want-to-be ********* *** ****** ***** *********, ** ******* ** ******** IP ****** ************. * ***** ********* *** ****** **** ** these ********* ***'* **** ** ******* ******* *** *********** ** due ** *** **** **** ****'* ******** *** ************* ********** and ***'* **** ***** **** ****'* ** **** ******** ******* and **** **** *** **** ***** **** *** ***************. ***'* face ** *** **** ******** *********, ** ** *** *** own **** ******* **** ***** *** *** *** ***.

*******, * ***** **** *** ***** *** ********** ** ********** "******* *** **********".

*******, * **** ***** **** *************** ****** ** ********* ***** on *** *********** *** **** **** *** ** *******. **** Dahua, **** ** * *** **** ** *** *****. ***** recent *************** **** ** ** ***** ****** **** ******* ****** skill ** *******. **** ***** **** **** ********* ** **** as ****** ** **** *********** ******** **** *****'* ******** **** vulnerabilities **** *** ******* ** ******* ** **** ********* **.

****** ***** *** ** *********** *********. * ********* ** ***** about *** ******** ******** *** *** **** * ***** ** to *** ** ** **** ***** ******** * *** *** I *** ********** ******* ** *** * *** ******** ** do **. ** ***** *** ****** ***** ****** ** ***'* something **** ***** ** ****** ***** ********* ** ** **** average ******** ****.

* ********* ** ***** ***** *** ******** ******** *** *** what * ***** ** ** *** ** ** **** ***** products * *** *** * *** ********** ******* ** *** I *** ******** ** ** **.

*****,**** ** *** ****** ** *** / ******* *** ***** backdoor. **'* ****** ** ****** *** **'* ***** ******** ******* to ***. **'* *** **** *** ** **** ** *********** on ******** ******** ****.

** ***'* ********* **** ***** ** ****** ***** ********* ** by **** ******* ******** ****

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***** ********. ******** ************** ** ***** ** * **** ***** mistake ** **** :(

***

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...*** ***** ***** *** *** ***** ********, ** *** **** first **** *** *** **** ********** ** *** ******, **** not ******** ***** **** ******...

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*** **** *********** **** ********** *** ******** ******?

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****, **** ******** ******* **** ******* ** ******** ****...***** *'** sold **** *-* ** ** * ***** ****? *****'* **** like **'** ****** *** **** ******** *******...** ***

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**** *** ******* ** **** ******* ********* *** *****

#*, ******. *** *** ********* ** **** '*********' *** '*****' are *** *** **** ****** / ******?

**,

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**** **** ****** ** ****** *** ******, ****/***** ******, *****, RTSP, ***** *******... ***, ** ***** - **'* *** *** binary **** ****** ****** ********** ********* ********** ******** *** ********.

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**** ** *** **** **** ******** ********, ** ********* * ***** *** ** ********* **** **** flaw ***** ** **** ********* *** *****, *** ** ************ exploited *** **** ****** **** (** *** *********/***** ******** **** as ****).

*******, ***** ***** ** * ********** ** *** **** **** for ******** - ***** *** **** **** *****, *** ***** exist ***** ********* *) ******, *) ***** ***** **** *** 3) ***, *** ** ***** ****** **** ***** ** ******** who ******* "***", *** **** ***** ****** **** *** ********** devices.

******, **** ***** **** * *** ** **** *** "*****" binary.

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******! **** *******.

***, ******** *******, ** *** ******** ****************:

***** (*** *****) *** ***** (*** ******/********) ** **** *** name ** * ****** **** **** ******** **** *** *** and *** ***/*********** ********* ** *** ***/***/***.

**** **** **** *********** ** *****. ** *** ***** ***** is * ***** ***** ** ******* *** ********? *** *** sense ** **** *** ******* **** **?

**** ***********, ***** **** **** ** ** **** *********, ***** and ***** ***** **** ****.

*** *** ** *** ******** ***** ** "*** ********" ********* Hikvision, *** - **** **** ** **** *** ****** **** provides **** ******** (***** *******), *** ** ******** ** **** Dahua *********/***** *** ********* *******, * **** *** ***** **** davinci ***** **** **** ** *********/***** - *** ****** *** quite **** ** ***** **** ********* **** **** ***, ** maybe **** **** ** *** **** ******* **** *** (*********** now, ** * **** *** ***** ** *** *** *** binary *** ******** *** ******** ******* - *** **** ***).

*** **** ** ****** **** * ********* ***.

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****, **** **** ******* ******* *****? *** ****.

** * ****** **** *** **** *** **** **** ********* or **** **** ** ** **** **** **** *************. *****?

***, ** ***** ** ** ****** ****** ** *** *** interface ** *** **** **** *** ****** ** **** **** this ************* ***** ******** ********.

****, **** **** ******* ******* *****? *** ****.

**** **** ****** ******* **** **** * ***** ************* ** your ******* *** ***** ** ** *****. ** ** ******** gains ****** **** ******* ******, **** **** *** *** **** vulnerability ** **** ****** ** *** *****, **** *******, ***.

***, ** ***'* ** ******** ** **** ******* *** ******** remotely **********, *** *** *******'* **** ****** **.

**'* *** ******** ** *** ** **** ******** ******. *** when *** *** ** *** ****** *** *********** *** ***'* give * **** ******* ** **** *********... **** **** ** just ***** *************. **** **** ***** *** ******, **** **** has ***** **** **** *** *********. ***** ***, **** ****, this *** ***** ****** ** ***** ************* ** * ***** period ** ****.

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*** *********.

******:***** *** *** ****** * ***** ********* *** ******* ************* *** *************, ****** ** **** ******* 4 ** ***** ****** *** **** * ******** ******* ** not *** *********:

***** *** ******** ** ***** **** *** **** *** ****, this *** *** **** ** ***** ******* ***** *** ****.

***** ** ***** ** ******** ** ****** ** *** ***** International ******* ***** ******* ** ***** ******** *******.

* ***** ****'* **** ******* *** ******** ******** ** ******* models. *** **** ****** *** ******** ***'* "*********" ** ******** because **** ****'* ******* ** **** ******* **** ***.

*** ****** ****** ** *** ***** ********* *** *** ***** complete/international **** *** **** **** *** *** ******** (******* **** the ******* *** ********* ** ** **********).

*** **** ****** *** ******** ***'* "*********" ** ******** ******* they ****'* ******* ** **** ******* **** ***.

*********** **** ************* *** *** **** ****** *** ** ****, Dahua ****** **** *** *** **** ******* ********* ** *** same ****, ** ****** * ***, ** *** *** *******.

***, **** *** **** ***** *** ****, **?

*** **'* **** ****... **********!

**, ** ** ***** *** * "*******" ******** ********... *** many ****** ***** ** **** ** **** ***** ** *** of ***** ****** ********* ** ***** *** *** ********???

***** *** ****** *** ********?

**** ***** **** ** *****...

***** ****** * ****** ***** *** ******** **** ** ************* series **** *****, ** * ********** **** *** ***** ***** was *** **** ****** ************* ** ******** ************ ***** ******************.

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