Hacked Dahua Cameras Drive Massive Cyber Attack

Author: Brian Karas, Published on Sep 27, 2016

Cyber attacks are accelerating and IP cameras are behind many of them.

Worse, last week, a 'massive' attack was carried out using numerous Dahua (and their OEMs) cameras. 

In this report we look at two recent attacks, the likelihood of similar future attacks and why IP video surveillance devices are increasingly at the core of these attacks.

***** ******* *** ************ *** ** ******* *** ****** **** of ****.

*****, **** ****, * '*******' ****** *** ******* *** ***** ******** ***** (and ***** ****) *******. 

** **** ****** ** **** ** *** ****** *******, *** likelihood ** ******* ****** ******* *** *** ** ***** ************ devices *** ************ ** *** **** ** ***** *******.

[***************]

CloudFlare ******** ******

************ *** ** *** ******* ********* ******* *********** ******-**-******* (****) *******.

* ********** ********** ********* **** ******* **** **** ** * massive ******: 

********, ** ****** *********** ** ** ****** *** ***** ***** **** devices ** **** ************. ***** *********** **** * *****-******* ** in *** *******, ** **** ** ****** ****** * *****-**** ** ** *******:

***** **** **** ** ** "****'* ****" ******* ********, ***** could **** ********** *-*** **************** **** *******, ** ******** ********* *******, ** *** ****** ** ***** ******/****.

Akamai ******** ******

**** *** *** ****** ***** ****** ****** ** ****** ******* in *** **** ****.

***** ******* *** ** *** **** ****-***** ************* ***********, *** ** too *** ******** *********:

**** ****** *** ** ***** **** *** **** / **** protection ****** *** ***:

******'* ***** ******** *******, **** *****, ********** *** ******* ***** ** ****** **** ****** *******:

***** ***’* *** ************ **** ** *** * ******* ** hijacked ******* **** ********* *** ******* ** *******, ******* *** team ** ***** ********* *** ******, ** ****, *** **’* one ** *** **** ********. ** ****** **** ********* ****** cameras ***** ****** **** ****** ******** ********* ** *********** ** small **********, ** ****. “**’* ******** *** * ****** *** office ******** **** * ******* ** *******, *** ********* **** if ******* **** ** **** *** *** ****** * *** and ********* ** ** ***** * ***** ******,” ** ****.

**** ****'* ******* *** ******* ******* ** ** **** ** ******** cameras ** **** ** **** ******, *** ******** *** *** physical ******** ********.

Why *******/*** ******* *** ********

*** **** *** ** *** ****** *** *** ** ** increase ** **-******* ******* *** ***'*/***'* ***** *********. **** ******** ** these ******* ********* ** *** ********, *** * ********** ************ of ***** ************ ************* ** ***** ********, **** ****** **** targets *** *******. ****** ** **** *****, **** *** **** *******, *** ******* *** ******** **** ** *** ********* *** implemented **** ***** ****-********* **** ****** *********.

****** ************* **** *** ********** ****** ******** ** *** ******* of ****** ********* *******, *** ** ******* **** *** ******* all ** *** ******* ******* **** *** ** ****, ******* their ******* **** *******.

*** ******* **** **** **** ******* *** **** *** ******* users *** ** **** ****** ** ****** ** ************ ****** right ****, ******** *** ****** ** ***** *** ******** ******* without *** **** ******** ** ****.

Profits ****** **** ********

*********** ** ****** ******* *** ****** ********* ** ********* *********** **** **** ***, ********* *** ******* ******* ******* in ******** *** *****. **** ** **** ******, *** ********** of *** **** ******* ***** * ******* ** *** ******* with *** ****** ******, *** **** **** **** *** ******** a ***** (** **** ******, ********).

Camera-Based ******* ****** ** ********

**********, **'* **** ******** ****** ** ******** **** *******, *** as ** ********* ******* **** ****** **** ******, ******* **** turned ** ***** *********** ******* **** *******. **** **** ****** lead ** * ***** ** ******* ***** *********, *** **** patched ** ***** *************, **** ***** **** ******* ***** ***** they *** ****** ****** ** ********* **** ******* *******, ** customers ******* ******* **** ****** ****-********** ** ******* *** **** can ** * ****** ******.

UPDATE: ***** ********

***** *** *********:

** ** ***** ***** *** ****** ***** ** * ************* that *** **** ******** * ***** ***** ** ***** ** cameras. ** ***** ****** **** **** ************* ******** *** ******** cameras ** *** ************ **** ***** ************ *** *******’ ******* capabilities. ** ***** **** ****** **** **** ************* ** ******* only ** ******* **** *** ********* ** *** ******** *** running ******** ******** (***-******* ****).

** *** ******* **** ******* **** **** ********, ****** ***** check **** ******** ** **** **** *** *** ******* *** most ** ** **** ******** *********. *** ******* *** **** ******* ******** ****** ** **** ********* ** **** **** ******** ** ** date ** *** ** **** *******. ************, ** ********* **** forwarding ***** **** ******* ******** ****. *** **** **** ** how ** ***** *** ************* ** **** *******, ************* *** ************* **** ** *** *******.

***** ** ********** *** ************* **** **** ************* *** **** work ** ****** **** **** ***** ******** **** *** ******, securely, *** ** ********. ***** **** ******* *** ******* ** has, *******, ** *** **** *** ********* ** ********, ****** do *** ******** ** ******* *** ************* **** ** *************@******.*********.***.

**** ***** *** ******* **** ***** ********** *** ***** **********.

** **** ***** ***** ** ******* **** ******** ************* ******* **** was ********* ** *** ******* **** ******** *******.

Comments (70)

** **** *****'* ********, ******* ** ****** *************, **** **** really ***** ***** ************ ************* ** ******* ****? **** ** not **** ****** ******** **** ************* *** **** ******* ****** with **** **** ********* ************? *.*., *** ***** ****** ************, *** ********, **** ********** *****...

* ******** ***** *** **** ****** *** *** ** *** largest ****** *** *** ******* **** ******* **** ****** ****** could ********** * ******* *** *** ******* ********** ******* *******. The ************* ** *** ******* ** ****** ****** ** ****** too **** *** *******, ** *** ******* ** *** ***** ever ***** ** *** ******* **** **** ***** ** *** next “*****” ******.

* ******** ***** *** **** ******

*, ******. *** *** *** **** **? ** *** ********* it ** ***** ****** ** *** ********?

* ***** *** *** ******* *** ** *** ************* ******, it ** ********* ********* **** ********* **** *** ** ****.

** ** ****** ******* ** *** *********** ***** ****** **** the **** ***** *** *** ** ****** ********* ** ******. If ******* ***'* ******* ****** **** ****** ** **** ***** they ***** ** **** ***** **** ** **** *****.

*, *** ***, *** ****** *** *** **** *** *********** track?

*********, ** ** **** * **** ****** ****** ** ***** of *** **** ** ******* *** *** ******** ***** ******** to ****** ******* ***** ** ** ***** *** **** **** venue ** *** *** ****** **** **** *****. ** *** are ** *** ******* **** ***** ***'* ******** **** **** out *****.

*** ***** *** **** ** *** ***** **** ** *** RSA **********, * *****'* **** ** ** *** * ** planning ** ********* ** ****. **** **** * **** ** is **** **** * *** ** **** **** **-*** ********* each ****.

****, ***** *** ** ****** *** ***** ** *** *****/******** to ** ** *** ***** (*.*., ************* / *********** *********). It ** **** *********** *** ***********... *** ** ******* * bit ****** ** *** **** ***** **** *** **. ******* every **** (*** **) ** *** *****... **** ** ***!

******* ***** **** (*** **) ** *** *****... **** ** fun!

*** **** **** ** ****?

** **** **** ****** *****?

*** *** **** *** **** ****: *****://***.********.***/**-**/************.****#*******

******, **** ******. * **** **** **** ** ** *** they **** **** ******* *** ** ****** ****.

****** ****-********** ** ******* *** **** *** ** * ****** battle.

** ****'* *** ************** ***** ***, ** **** ********** *** stick ** ***'* *** ****** ******?

** ***** ** **** *****; ** ****** ************ ** ******. Are *** ******* **** **** **** ****** ** * ******* network ***** *** **** ***** ** ****** ** *** ******* world ** ******* *** ****** ***** *** *** ** *******? Or *** ***** ******* ******** ********* ** *** ******** ***** default ******** *********** *** ******* *****.

*** ** ** ********** *** ** *** ****** ****** *** customers, * ***** **'* ********* ** ********** *** ***** ******* are ********* *** *** *** ******* *** *****. ** ** one ** ******* ****** ***** ***-******* ***********, **** ** **** to **** **** ***.

* ******* **** ** * *********** ******** *** *** **** I ***** ***** *** ************ ********, *** **'* ***************, *** more ******** * **** ** **.

*'* **** **** *****, ** ***** ** **** ******* ** know **** ***** *** ***** ******* *** ***** ***********. ** they **** ** **'* **** ******* **** ******* **/** ******* to *** ******** *** **** *****? **** ** **** *** industry ** ******* ********** *** **** ***** ***** ** ****** my **** ********.

**** **** *** **/** *****, *** *** **** ******** ** executing **** ** *** ******* ******* *** *** *********? ********** here ** **** *** ***** **** ***** ** *******, ** how *** **** ******** ********* *** ******* ** *** *** attacks *****? **** ******* ***** ** ** **** *** ********* shouldn't **** * *** ***** *** ****** *** ********. ** they *** ******** ***** ** *** ********* *** ********, **** maybe *** ************* ****** **** ***** ******* ** ********* *******. Or ****** ***, ****** * ****** ********** **** ** ***** servers ** **** **** ******** ** **********. **** ****** ****** won't **** **** *** **** *****, *** ***** ***** *** gray ****** ******** ** ****** ****.

** ***** **** ** ********* *** ** *** **** ***** machine **** *** ****** **** ********** ***** ** *** ******* to **** ******* **** ***?

*'* **** ** **** ***, *** ** ** **** ** a ****** *** **** ***********? **** * ****** ******** ****** fix **?

********** **** ** **** *** ***** **** ***** ** *******, so *** *** **** ******** ********* *** ******* ** *** the ******* *****?

*** *** *** *** ** *** ** **** **, ******* http, ******, ***** *** * *****, *** ****, **-****** ****, reboot.

****** *** ****** *** *** **** ***** ******** *****, ***** are *** ********* *******.

**** ** ******** **** **** ** ** ********* ** *** camera ** ***** ****, ** *** **** ******* ** ******* local ****. ** **** ******* **** ******** ******* **** *** camera ***'* *********.

***** *** **** ****** ****** ** *******, ** **** ** the ********** ******* ** ** ****.

**** ** ******** **** **** ** ** ********* ** *** camera ** ***** ****, ** *** **** ******* ** ******* local ****.

**, ** *****'*. * ** ****** *** ****** *** **** that *** ** ******* ** ** ** ** (** ******** port *** ****** ** ***** *** ****).

***** ** ******* ****, ** *** *** ** *** ** the ***?

******** *****, ********** **** *** *** *** ***, *** ***** left **** ******* ** *** **********/******* ** ******* ** ***** time *******.

* **** *** ****** ***** **** *** **** *** ******* running ***** **** ******** **** ************ ***********, *** **** ** not.

**** ** * **** ****** *** ******* ******** ** *** web **** ****** **** ** ********** ******* *** *** ******** which ****** ** *** ** *** ******** ******. *** *** main ****** **** **** ** **** *** *** ******** ****** option *** *** ***** ******. **** ** ***** ***** ** more ********* *** ******* ********* ** *** ******** ** ** infected.

** ****'* *** ************** ***** ***, ** **** ********** *** stick ** ***'* *** ****** ******?

** * ******* *****, ***** ***. **** * ********* ********** you ****** ******* **** ** **** ** *********.

* ******* ************** *** *** ******** ** ******** *** ******* of ******* ** ** ***** ******** **** ****** *******. **** means ******, ** **** ** ********, *** ****** ** ******* that *** ** ******** ******** ******* ********* ********* **** * VPN ** ******-***** ******* **** ********* ********* ******.

*** * ******* ** ******* *** *** ****** **** ****** surface ** ********** ** *** (** ******* ******) **** ******** access ** ******** ******* ******* * ******* ********* *** ***** credential. **** ***** **** *** **** **** ******* "******", *** if ** **** *** *********** *** **** ******* *** ******* power ********* ** *** ******** (**** ** ******** *** ******** wants ** *** *** ****** *** * **** ** ******* purpose), *** *** **** **** ******* *** ****** ** ****-**** cleanup *** **** ** ** (*******/********* *** ****** ******* ** 16).

********, **** ***(****) ****** ****** ******* **** **** **** **** of ************* **** *** ************ **** ***** ** *** ********* some ****** ** ***** *** ******* *** *** ********* ****** known *******. **** ** *** * ********* **** ** ** unhackable *******, *** ** ***** **** ** ***** *** *** it ****** ** **** ** ********* ****** ** ******** ****** efforts.

** *** ****** ** *** ********* (*** ** **** *****, most **** ******** *** ** *********) *** *** **** **** time ** **** *** ********** *** ******* ******** *** ** * ********** ***** ** ***** ** *** passes **** ***** **** ******. *** *** ** **** ** find ********* **** **** ******** ************* *** ** **** ****** than *******.

** **** ***** *** *** ******** ** *** *** ** percentile ** ******* *******, ******* **** **** ******* ** ***** to ** ****** ** ********* **** **** ******. ******* **** is * **** ** *******/******, *** ********* ******* ** ******* devices **** *** ** ****** ** **** ** **** ** possible. ** **** ********** ** *** **** "***********" ** **** from * ****** ****, *** ***** * ****** ****** **** are ****** **** ********.

*** *** ******** **** * ***** **** ******* **** ***** by ********** * ******** **** *** *****/********* ***** ****** ** IPs, *********** ** *********** ** *** ********* ********. ** * ******* *** *** ******** ***** *** ** ranges **** ******** *********** **** ** *** ********* ** **** local ******. **** ** ** *** ******* **** **** ***** are ****** ** ** ********** ***** ** **** **** ********* devices ********.

*** ***** **** ******, *** *** **** ** ****** *** blocklist ** **** ******* ******* (******, *****, ***. (****** ** course *** *** ** ******...)), ** ******* *** *** ** a *** **** *** **** ** "******". **** ***** ** more ********** ** ******** ***** ** ****** **** ** *** time, *** **** **** ** *** *** **** ***'** ***** remote.

* **** ****** *** **** ** * ******** **** *** automatically ****** *** ***** **** *****, ** *********** **** * device **** **** *********** ********, ***** *** **** ******* ** * ***** ***** *** look *** ****** ******* ********. **** ** ******** ******* *** non-enterprise ************ ******.

****'* * *****, *** ** **** ** ***** *** **** questions.

*****, ***** ****** *** * ********** ***** (*** ** **** it ** ********* ** ************ ** ******** *** ** ********.)

*** ******* ****** ** * ************** **** ** ***-******** ** our ******* *********. *** ***’* *** **-******* *** ******* *** the ******* ******. *** ******* ** **** ********** ** *** and *** ******* ******* * ******** ******** / ********** ******* to ******* *** ******* **** (*** ****).

** **** ** ***’* **** *** ********* ******* ** *** trying **** **** ** **** **** ***** ** ********** ******.

****** *** *** ********/****, ****** **** *** **** ****** ****** well ****** ****.

**** *** *** ******** ** **** ******* ** * ****** behind **** ********, ***'** ** ********** ********* ****** ****** ** said ****** *** ** *** ******* ************ ** **** * publicly ********** ******** ******. **** ********** ******** ************** ** **** part **** ** *** ******* ****** ************* *** ******* ***********, monitoring *** ****. ** ********** ********* **** **% ***** ***** of *** ******** *** ** ******* ** ********* ***** *** not ********. ** *******, **** * ****** *** *** ****** internet *** (***************!) ***'** ****** *** ************* ** * ****** site **** *** *** ************ *******.

(*********, **'** ******** * *** ***** *** *************** ***** ********* here--that *** ******* **** ********** ** *** ****** ******** *** port ********** ** *********)

**** ******, *****, ** *****. *** ****** ** ** *********? It's *** ** ***'** ******* * **** ** *** ****** that *****'* ****** **** **** ************* ***** *** ****** ******.

**** *******--**** * ***** ************ ** "****" *** *******--******* ******** from ****** * *** *** ********* * ********** ** * cloud-based ******* ***** **** **** **** *** ******** ** ****** an **** *** *** ********** *** ******* *************. *** ***-**** interacts **** *** ****** **** **** *****-***** ******* ** ** intermediary. ** ******** ***** ********. ******** *** ******* ******** ********* a ****** ***********, ***** ** ****** ** *** ****** ******* area ** *** ****** ** *** ***-**** ********'* *******.

**** ** *** **** ** *** ******* *'* ***** ** IoT **** *****. *** ******** ** ******* *** ****** ****** a ******** **** ****** ***** ** *** ******** ** ** anachronism. * ********** *** **'* ***** **** *********, ***** *** needs ** *** ******* **** ********* ***** ********* *** *** state ** *** ********* **** ******** *************. *** ************ ** the ****** ***** *** ****** ****** **** ****** ** *** future.

*** ***** ** *******; ************* **** ** ** ****** ******* vulnerabilities ******* *** ********** **** ** ****** *** ******** **** these ******* *** **.

********** **** ** ****** *** ******** **** ***** ******* *** on

**** **** **** ****? *** ** ** **** **** ****** steps ** *** **** **** ****** **** ** ****** * true ** ******** ************?

** ***** ******** ***** ** ** *** *** ********** *** devices ** ** ** *******, *** ****** ** ** *****.

**** ****, * ******** **********, ************ ******** **** ***** * majority ** *** ******. ******* ** ***%, ** *** ** not ********** *** ****** ** *** ********. *** *** *** restrict ***** ***** **** ****** ** *** ****** *******. *** can **** ******** *** ******** ******* **** *** ****** ******* as ****.

*** *** **** ******** *** ******** ******* **** *** ****** network ** ****.

****, ******** ******* ** ******/******* ******** ***** ** **********, ****** in ****** ** **** ****** ** ****** ** *********** *** to ** *********** ******* **** ****** ***** **** ******* *********** has ******* ****** **. ********** **** ***** ** ********* *******, but **** ******** ******* ***** ** ******** ** **** ***** networks (***** ***** * ********** ** **** **** ********** ****) and *** *** **** *** * *********** ****** ******).

*******, ******** ******** ******* **** **** *** **** ********** ** blocking ******* *******, *** **** ** **** *** ***** *** of ******** ** ***** **** ********* ******** ******* ********** *** ability *** *** ******** ** ****** *** *** ******.

** *** ** ******* ** *** ********** **** ***** ******* weren't *********** ****** *******? **** **** *****'* ********* **** ******** firmware? ** **** *** **** **** **** **** ******** **** post *******?

***.

*** *** **** ***** * ***** **** ** * **** assumption, **** **** *** ****** ** *** ******* ** ********* in * ******** *****.

**** ** ********* * ********* ********, *** * ***** ** you *** ****** ******* ***** **** ******* ******** **** ********* firmware *** **** ** **** * ********* ******.

***, **** ** *** ****.

** ******** **** ***** ***** ********, *** ***** ************* ***** do ** ***** * **** ** ****-********-**-*-*******.

**** ********** * ******* *** ** ****** ****** ****** ** ******* a *** ** ****** ******** **** "*****" ** * ********. If *** ******** ****** *** ***** ********, *** ******** ***** a ****. **** ** **** * "****** *****".

*** ****** ***** ******* **:

****** ****** ** ***** ** **** ** ** *********** ** only ***** ******* **** * ****** **, ***** ** ** IP ******* ********** **** * ***** ****** *** ************ ********.

*** ************* *** *** *** ***** *******/**** *** *****, *** is ********** ** ***** **** * ******* ** *** ***** server *** ************ *********. **** ******* *********** ****: ** ******* IP ** *.*.*.* *** * **** ** ****** *** ****** known ** "**** ***" **** "********/********". ** *** **** ****** out, *** ************ ***** ****** ***** **** ** *** **-**** NVR (*** *** *****-****** **) **** **** "***** ** ******** connection **** *.*.*.* ** **** *" (*** **** * **** is *********** ********). ***** **** *******, *** ***** ****** ***** a ******** ** *** *** **** **** "**, ** ***** and ******* ** **** *".

*** ***** ********* **** ***** ** **** *** *** ***** auto-expire **** ****** ******* ***** **** ****** ** **** ***/** inactivity.

**** **** *** ***** **** * *********** ******* ** *********, without ******* ** ****** **** *** ******** ** *** "***" internet. ** ***** ***** *** ******** ** ****** *******/********, **** very ****** ******** ** *** ***** ****** ***** *** *** not ******* *** ***** ******* *** *****, **** ** ******* connection *******.

****** ****** ** ***** ** **** ** ** *********** ** only ***** ******* **** * ****** **, ***** ** ** IP ******* ********** **** * ***** ****** *** ************ ********.

**** ** ***** ** ****-*****, *** ********* *******, **?

***, *** ***** ******** ***** * ****** ***** **** ************ and ***, *** **** ***** *** **** **** *** ** restriction?

* ***** ******** ** ** ** ***** ********** (*** ********** encryption) ******* *** ***** ****** *** *** ****** ******. ** would ** * ****** **** ********, *** ***** ***-*** (*** just * ****** "**** **** **** *** *.*.*.*"), *** **** TCP. **** ***** ****** **** ********* *** ****** ** ***** the ** ** *** ***** ****** *** **** ** ******** connection ************* *******.

***** *** ******** **** **** **** ***** ** ***********, *** it ***** *** ******* * *********** ** (*** *** ******* risks/issues *** *** ************ ** ***** ** ******* **** ** that **). ******* ** ***** * *********** ** *** *** initial ******** ******* *** **** *** *** ****** ****** *********** to *** ****** **** ********.

** *** **** ****** ***, *** ************ ***** ****** ***** info ** *** **-**** *** (*** *** *****-****** **) **** says "***** ** ******** ********** **** *.*.*.* ** **** *" (the **** * **** ** *********** ********). ***** **** *******, the ***** ****** ***** * ******** ** *** *** **** says "**, ** ***** *** ******* ** **** *".

*** **** *** *** **** *** ******'* ******** ** * arbitrary **** ******** *********** ** ***** *** **********?

*** *** ** ******* *** *** ******** (********).

*** ****** ** ********** **** * ****-********** *****, *** *****-***** to ******* ******* ** *** ***. *** *** ** ***** to **** * **** ** **** *****.

****** **** *** ******* **********, *** ******* **** ***** *** be ******** ** ****** *** **** **** ********** ********.

*** *** ** ******* *** *** ********...

******. * ****'* ********** *** *********** ******* *** ********* ** first.

****, *'* *** ************* *** *** ******** ** ***********. *** you ****** **** *** ***** ****** *********** ******* * ***** sequence ** ***** **** ** ********* ** ****** *** ******?

** *********** ****-******** *** ****** ***** * ****** ** "******" (essentially ******* ** * ***-********** ******** ** *****) *** **** the ****** ***** ** * ******* **** *** * ******** service, **** ***.

** ** ******** *** ****** ***** * ***** ** ***** to * *** ***** ***** ******. **** ****** ******** *** "knock" *** **** ***** * ******* ** *** *** ** open ** * **** *** ****** ** ******** ********** **** the ****** ** ** *** ******** ******.

**'* ****-******** **** * ******-***.

**, *** * ** ************* ******. **** * ****** *********:

*** **** *** ****** **** **** *** ******** ** ** port ***** ****?

*** ***** ** ** **** ******?

********...*****'* **** ***** *********** **** ***** ** ** **** **** for ********* ** *** *****/************** ******?

******'* ******* ** *** ****** ** **** ** ******* *** authentication ******* *** ********* **** *** **********?

** **'** *********** *******, ** **** ** ***** ***** ****** jobs ** ** ********.

* *** ******* **** **** ** ** ** ***** ***. It ***** *** *** **** **** **** *** *&* **********. Especially, ** * *** **** ** **** ** ** *** enough ** *** *** ** ****** ******** *********** ** * cam **** *** ******** **** ** **** ** *** *** cure ** **** ******** ****. ***'* *** *** *** ***** the ***** ****** * ** ********* ** ****** ** ****** up ** *** ** ** ** :*

***'* *** *** *** ***** *** ***** ****** * ** referring ** ****** ** ****** ** ** *** ** ** me :*

** ******!

** ** **?

**...* **** ****** *** ******** * ****** ** ** *** of **** *** *** **'* *** ** *********** ** ****, lol.

**** *** ** *** ** ** **** ***** ****.

*** ** *** *** **** ** **** @ *********, **** hi *****! :*

**'* *** ** *********** ** ****...

********, **'* *** ***********.

**** ****! *** ****** *** *******. *'* ******** *** ******* that **** *** ******** ******** ********** ** *** **** **** he ********** ** **** ***** ** *******?

**** ***** ** ********** ** **** ** ****** ***....

**** ** ******* ** ***?

** **** *'* ******** *** *** *******?

*** **** ******? * *** ********** **** ******** ****** ***** over ***** *** ** ***** **** ****. **** * *** to **** ****** ** **** **** *****.

**, ** *** ** *** **** ****** *** ***** **** on ** ********** *** *** ***** ** ** ***** ** deck. *'* ****** **** *'** **** ** ****** ***/*** ** me.

** *** ** *** **** ****** *** ***** **** ** me ********** *** *** ***** ** ** ***** ** ****...

** **** **, *** **** **, *** *** **' ***!

*** ******, ********* **** ******** *'* ******* ***** *********.

**** ****, *** **** **** *** *** **** **** ** *** only *** **** ******* *** *** *** *******.

** **** **** ** ******* *** *** **** ****** ******, what ******'* **** ******?

*** ******* ***'* **** ** **** ******.... *** **** ** that *** **** *** *** ******* ****. ** ** *** meant *** ****** ** *** ***/***?

*** ******* ***'* **** ** **** ******.... *** **** ** that *** **** *** *** ******* ****. ** ** *** meant *** ****** ** *** ***/***?

*'* **** ****** ** **** ** ********** ******** *** *** many ****** ******* ***** **** *** ******** ********* *** ** NTSC *******.

** *** *****-*** *** *** ****** **** ****** ****** **** is * ********* ** *** *** ***** **** **** ** to **, **** ***** **** ** ***** **.

** ******* ***** *** ***** **** ** **** *** ******** by ***** **** **** *** *** ******** ******** ******.

** *** **** *** ******* *** ** *** ***'* **** your *** ******* ******** *** **** ** *** ******** **** you *** *** ****:*****://***.******.***/*/********-****-****-****-************-********

****'* ** *** **** *** **** *****/****** ** ****.

****: *** **** ****, *** **** ****. **** **** ** all ** **** ******** ***** ******* ** * *** ***** reference.

***** *******. *** ******** ****** **** ** ******** ********* *** or **** ******** ** ** **.

*** ******** ****** **** ** ******** ********* *** ** **** dictates ** ** **.

*********, ******?

*****'* *** **** "*******" *** ***** ****?

** *** ****************? **** *** ***'* *********?

** ***** ***** ** *** ***** *** *** *** ***** for ****.

*** ***** *** ***** *********** ** *** *** ******** **** used **** ** ******* ** * ****** **** **** (***-**** analog *******)?

***, *** ****** *** ******.

***** ***********, ****** **** *****, *** ******** ****** *** **********. For * **** ******* ******, *'** **** ** **** **** Dahua ** **** **** ********. *'** ***** **** *** ********* when **** *******.

**** *** ** *** ****** ***** ** *********, **** ******* is **** **** ** ****-**-***, *******? * ***** ** *** WOL ***** **** *** ****** "***** *******".

**** ** ********* *****'* **** ******* ** *** ****** *** server ** *** *********** *** **** ** ********* ** ******* in ********* ******* ** **** *** **** *******...

*** ******* ** ********** *** ****** *** **** *******. *** to *** *** *** *** ******** ***** *** ****** ** not **** **** ** ******* *** ****** ** *** ** for ********** *************** *******.

**** *** *** ********/******* ** ********** ***** **** *******? *** it ***** *** ** ***** ** ** **** *** ** offer **** ***** ******* **** ***** **** *******?

**** ********, *** ** ***** **** **** ** **** *** customers. ** *** ** *** *** * ***** ** **** and ****** **** ***** ** *** *** **** *** ****.

**** *** * ********* ******* ** *** ****** ** *** target ** *** ******?

********* *******, *** **** ******** ** ********* ** *** *** AWS ****** *** ***********, *** **** **** **** ****** ** a ****** *** ** ***** **** ** *** **** **** was ***** **.

** ***** ** ******* ** **** **** **** **** *** specifics ** ***** **** ******** *** ******** *** *******?

**** ** ** ** ************* **** ******** **** **** ********* with ******* ******** ********* *** ****** ** **** **** ******* run **** *** *******?

**** ** *** ******* *** ** ******* ** **** *** cameras ******* ******** **** *** *** ***** ** *** *** and *** **** ******* ****** ** **** ** ******* **** the ****** *** ******** ******. **** **** ** ************* **** this ***** ****?

***** *** *********:

** ** ***** ***** *** ****** ***** ** * ************* that *** **** ******** * ***** ***** ** ***** ** cameras. ** ***** ****** **** **** ************* ******** *** ******** cameras ** *** ************ **** ***** ************ *** *******’ ******* capabilities. ** ***** **** ****** **** **** ************* ** ******* only ** ******* **** *** ********* ** *** ******** *** running ******** ******** (***-******* ****).

** *** ******* **** ******* **** **** ********, ****** ***** check **** ******** ** **** **** *** *** ******* *** most ** ** **** ******** *********. *** ******* *** **** ******* ******** ****** ** **** ********* ** **** **** ******** ** ** date ** *** ** **** *******. ************, ** ********* **** forwarding ***** **** ******* ******** ****. *** **** **** ** how ** ***** *** ************* ** **** *******, ************* *** ************* **** ** *** *******.

***** ** ********** *** ************* **** **** ************* *** **** work ** ****** **** **** ***** ******** **** *** ******, securely, *** ** ********. ***** **** ******* *** ******* ** has, *******, ** *** **** *** ********* ** ********, ****** do *** ******** ** ******* *** ************* **** ** *************@******.*********.***.

**** ***** *** ******* **** ***** ********** *** ***** **********.

*'** ***** ***** ** ******* **** ******** ************* ******* **** was ********* ** *** ******* **** ******** *******.

** *** **** *********, **** **** ** *** *** ** will ***** ** *****.

* ***** **** ** **** ** **** **** ** ********* older ****** **** *** **********. ** *** ****** ******* ******* new ******** *** ****** **** ** ****.

** ** ******** ********* **********; ******** *** ***. ********* ** we ***** **** **** **** ** ***** *** * ******** fix ** *** *****, *** **** ** *** **** **'* just "**** ** ** *** **** *******."

******, **** ** ** ************* ********* **** ****'** ***** ********** in, ** ******* ** ***** ******* * ******** ******* **** them. **** ***** **** *****-******* ***? **** * ********* *** it ***** ** ** ****** **** **** *********** ******* ********...

*'* **** ********** ** *** *** **** ******* *** ****** of ****.

**** * ********* *** ** ***** ** ** ****** **** 145k *********** *******...

********'* *** ** ** **...

** ***** **** ***** *** ** **** ** ***** ***** part ** * ******-******** *****.

***** ****** **** ******* *** ************ ** **** *****, ************* ****** **** ******** **** ****** **** **** ******* hundred ****.

**** * ***** ** ****!

** ***** **'** *** ********* (*** ******* ***)!!!

***'* **** ** **** *** ******* **** ********* ** **** thread ** ******** ** *** ****.

****'* * **** ** *** ******* **** ********** ******* (****** "Mirai") *******. ***** **** * *** ** ****, ***.

*****://***************.***/****/**/***-*****-***-***-******-*****-******/

****** ********* ******* **** ****** ******** **** **** ******** **** Mirai.

* **** ***** ******** *** ******* **** **** *********** *** remote *****, ********* ****** ******** ***** ******* ****** * ****** Wireless *******.

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