The $100 Fingerprint Reader Tested

Author: Brian Rhodes, Published on Jun 11, 2014

Want to add biometrics but avoid spending nearly $1,000 per door for it?

When it comes to fingerprint readers, there are lots of options that all claim to perform the same. However, the ZKTeco F7 Fingerprint Reader is the least expensive Wiegand/Fingerprint Reader on Amazon, available for ~$80 from several sellers, and generally less than $120 from any of them.

While this unit is commonly rebranded as an OEM and is resold under countless model numbers, it is far less expensive that premium brand offerings.

[Note: this is our first test in a series on fingerprint readers, which will also include tests on BioScrypt, Morpho and Superma this summer.]

Below is the first of 4 videos inside this report that show our test findings:

**** ** *** ********** *** ***** ******** ****** $*,*** *** door *** **?

**** ** ***** ** *********** *******, ***** *** **** ** options **** *** ***** ** ******* *** ****. *******, ********* ** *********** ****** ** *** ***** ********* *******/*********** ****** ** ******, ********* *** ~$80 **** ******* *******, *** ********* **** **** $*** **** any ** ****.

***** **** **** ** ******** ********* ** ** *** *** ** resold ***** ********* ***** *******, ** ** *** **** ********* **** premium ***** *********.

[****: **** ** *** ***** **** ** * ****** ** *********** *******, ***** **** **** ******* ***** ** *********, Morpho ************** ******.]

***** ** *** ***** ** * ****** ****** **** ****** that **** *** **** ********:

[***************]

Key ********

*** *** ******** ** *** **** *******:

  • ***** ***** **** (******/**********): ****. ***** ******** ****** ** ************ *****, *** **** of ******* ********** ******** ***** *** **** ** **** *** single **** ** **** ***** *******.
  • ******* ****** (****** **** *** ***** **********):***. ******* ***** ** ******, ** ***** *** **** ******** with *** ***** ***********.
  • *********: *****. ** *********** ** *******, *****, ** **** ** reading ****** ** ********* *****.
  • ****** ********: ** ******** *** ****** ***** ***** **** ***** ******** ****. After *** *********** ***** **** ***** ******** (** ***** **** each *******), *** **** ******** ** *** ** *** ******* reads, **** ** ******** '***** ********' ***** **** ** ******* generating **** ******. ***** **** **** '***** ********' ***** *********.
  • ******** (******* *******): *******. *** ******** ******** ** *** *********, ****** ********** in **** *******, *** ********* ******** ****** *** **** **********.
  • ****** **: ** ******* *** **** ***** '**********' *** ****** *** instead ***** *** **** ********** **. ***** **** ***** **** availability *** ***** ********, **** **** ***** **** ***** *********** and ********** ******* ****** ******* ****. ***** *** ********** *********** cost ** *******, ** **** ** ****** **** **** *********** units, *** *** ****** ***** ** *** ****** ***** ** a ****** ** ***** ********* ** **** *****.

** ******* **** ** ***** ******* ** *** ******** **** follow.

Product ********

**** *** *** ******* ****** ** *************** ** ***** **** important:

  • ******* ******:*** **** ****** ** *** ** **** ** '****** ****' configuration ******** ** ***** *********** **********, *****, ** ***** *************.  *******, ** *** ** ******* in ******* **** ******* ******** *******.
  • **, *** *** ***:*** **** *** ** ********** *** *******, *** **** ** externally ******* ** * ****** ** *** @ ** ***** supply.
  • ******** ******:************, ************* ******* **** ** ********** ** ***** **** ********. The **** **** *** **** **** * '*** ******' *********** that ******* ****** *********.
  • ****** ****:*** ** ** ******** **** ** ******* ****** **** ******** 'liveness' ******** *** **********. *** ******* ** *************, *** ****** ***** ******* ********** **** ****** *** ********* range ** **** ************.
  • ***** **********:*** ****'* ****** *** ** **** ** *** ************ ** the **** *******, ******* ** ********* * ******** *** ********* sensor ******** ** **** *****.

*******, ********** *** * ****** ***** ******, *** *** ** options *** ***** ******* ** ********** ** ****. *** ******* is **** ****** *** *** ********** **** '*******' **** ****** display, **** ******* ****** ******, *** ***** ******** *******.

Performance *******

***** *** ***** ***** ***** ** ********* *** ******** **** knowing *** ******* ** *** *** **** *** ** **** of ******* ** ************:

** *******, ******* ******** ************ ********* **** '***** ****' ** 'Place ****** ** ******', ********** ***** *** **** ********** ****** to ********* *** *** ****** ** **** *****. ***** *** unit ******** **** '*:*' *** '*:*' **** ********, ***** ****** is ********** ** *** ***** ** *** ******'* *** *** only ******* **** ****** ** *** ****** *** ** ********* in ******* *** **** **** ** ***** ** *** ******.

The ***********

***** *** **** ****** ** **** ** ****** '**********' ** '3rd *****' *****, ** ***** ** ****** **** **** ** worked **** *** *** **********. 

**** **** ******* *** ******** ******** **** ******** ******** ** the ****, **** ********/******** ********. **** ******** ******** **** '************' are ********* ** ********** ****, *** *** **** *** *** fail ** ******* ** **** *************.

*******, **** ****** **** *** **** *****, *** ****** *** not **** ** **********.  ***** ********** ********* ****** ****** **** **** *** ***** ****** **** *** reader ** **********, **** **** *** *** ********* ********* ** defined ** *** *******, ** *** ******** ****** ****** ** differ **** *** ** *** ********* ** *** ************ *****. 

* ******* *** ********* ** *** ************* *** **** ************* ******** ** ****** **** **** ****, **** **** *** same ****** ** ****. **** ********** *********** ********:

 

**** **** ****** ** * **************** *****, *** **** ** clear **** ***** *** ** ***** **** ******* ********** ****, this ***** ** * *** ******* ** *** *****.

*************

*******, **** *** *********** *** ******** ** *** ************* *********************** ** **********. **** ***** ****** ******** ** *** *** unit ** ********** ** *** ******** ******:

*** ************* **** ** **** ****** *** **** ******, ** by ********** **** ******* ** *** ****'* ******. ***** ** no '*** ******' *** *** ******* ************* *******.

*** ************ *** ****** **** ********* **** *** **** ** a **, *** ***** *** **** ** **** ** ******* of *****, **** **** *** ******** ******* ** *** ** model, **** *** **** ***** ******** ** ***** *****. ***** are **** ********* ****** ************, *** *** **** **** *** of ******* ***** ******* ** *** **** *** ** ** to ******* *********** ** *** ************ ***** **** *** ****** being **********.

The *******

***** **** **** ** ****** ***********, *********** **** **** ** spent ****** ** *** ** ******* **** **** ****** *******. We ** *** ********* ***** ** **** *** ***** ***********.

*** **** *** ** ****** *** *********** * ***** ****, but **** *** ****** ********** ******** *** * ***** ******** curve ** ****** ********, **** ******-**** ******* ********** ******** **** ************** ***** **** *********** ** **** ****.

Shootout ******

** **** ******** ******* *********** *******, *********** ** * '********* Shootout' ****** ***** **** ****. ** **** **** ********** ********* from ******, *******, *** *** ** ******* ******* **** ****.

 

Comments (6)

Brian,

As part of your shootout, I would like to see how strong the products are in deterring spoofing. Now I don’t expect you to cut off your enrolled finger to test the product’s ‘life detection” capabilities, as it would severely delay your ability to type up the report, that many of us are anxious to read! But, if you could look at other spoof techniques were a fingerprint, or the data points the sensor is looking for, can be lifted and transferred to a model of a finger.

I think that would be useful to know if these products can be depended upon to reject simple spoof attacks. I suspect there may be sophisticated spoofs, which can defeat a product’s spoof detection algorithms, that deep-pocketed crooks, state actors, or Hollywood might deploy; but, I am more interested in the type of spoofing that would be in the budget (time, money and opportunity) of the more common criminal.

BTW if you do figure out a spoof technique, don’t tell us the how, just that you were able to do it. We don’t need to augment a thief’s R&D efforts.

Rob

Hello Rob:

Thanks for the feedback, and we're right there with you. "Liveness" detection is a part of our tests. I made a latex rubber model of my index finger for this. No giggling:

It is an exact 'replica' of my fingerprint, albeit in relief. Optically it looks the same as my finger, but there is no flesh or heartbeat behind it.

We have a full 'biometric shootout' report upcoming where we test the fingerprint sensors against basic exploit attempts like the one above. It is coming soon!

Brian,

Now you are scaring me! Did you grow up in Transylvania? You say your faux finger has no heartbeat… but how do we really know you are not creating some kind of anti-mortal creature in your basement?

I swear I saw the Frankenfinger move a hair, like an inch worm...

Whew! It's just a re-animated gif. ;)

"move a hair, like an inch worm..."

Good, at least now we know where that finger has been...

thanks for the review. next time you hit wiegand output issues could you please use a "data wedge" to get the values...

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