4 Main Weapon Detection Approaches Explained

Published Dec 19, 2022 16:03 PM

The 4 main approaches for weapon detection are active magnetic, passive magnetic, active imaging, and passive imaging.

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In this guide, we explain the differences between each approach with examples from different providers.

See our Research Report - Weapons Screening 24 Competitors Comparison Guide for a more in-depth comparison of specific companies.

Active ******** *********

****** ******** *********, ******** ** ************ metal ********* *** **** ** *** newer "******* *********", ** ***** ** receiving * ******** ******** **** * metal ****** ******* ******* *** ******. The ******** ******** ** ****** ** electromagnetic ********* - * ******** ********** that ** * **** *** **** devices ** *** ****** ***** (**** wireless ******** ** ********). ****** ************ ***** ********* ******* * ******** *********** ** *************** induction.

***** ************ ****-******* ***** ********* *** the ******** ****** ********* ******* ** this **** (*** *** *** **** for ** ****** ** * ****** of ******** *******), **** ******** **** high ***** ****** *** ********* ******* a **** ***** ** ********** *** thus **** * ******** ****** *****.

***** ********* *** ** ******** ** not ***** ***** ** ****, **********, belts, *** ***** ***** ********* *****, however, ** ********** ******* ***** ******* to ****** ******* (********* ******), ** IPVM's ******** ***** (*,*) ******. **** ***** ***** ***** and *** ****** ** ****** ******* is * *****-*** **** ********* ** the ******** ******** ******** ***** *******.

************, ** **** *** ********-***** ********* solutions, ****-******* ***** ********* *** ****** only ******** ****** *******, ***** ******* technologies **** *** ********** ** ****** both ******** *** ***-******** *******.

New ********** ****** ******** ******* - "******* *********"

***** ************ ***** ********* *** ***** widely ****, **** ********* **** ****** already ********* ** *** ********* ********** a *** ********** "****** ********" ** "smart ***** ********". **** ** ****, for *******,***** ************** ********, *** ********* **** ** **** schools, ********, *******, ***.

**** ************** **** **** ************ ****-******* metal ********* ** ***** ******** ******** signal **********, ***** ***** ** ****** discrimination ************. (******** ** * ******* ***** ********, Not * "******* ********"*** * ******** *********** ** *** signal ********** **** ***** **** *** how ** ***** **** ****** **************.)

***** **** ******** **********, **** ********* have *** ********** ** ************ ******* benign *******, ******** *** ****** ** false ******. ***** ***** ******* *** CEIA ******** ****** **** ******* ***** alarm *****, **** ***** ****** **** a ****** ** ***** ***** ******, see:

************ ********* ******** "******* *********" *** at ***** ~** **** ********* ******** to ************ ***** *********, *** **** generally **** ***** ***** ****** ****, higher **********, *** ********* ****** ******* experience - *** ** *** ******* selling ****** *** ***** *********. ****, some ** ***** ******* **** **** available ************ **** ***, ****** *******, etc., *** **** ******** ******* ********* compared ** ************ ***** *********.

"Weapons ********" ** * ********

**** *** ***** ********** ************ ****** their ******* ** "******* *********". **** CEIA *** ***** ******* *** ************ based, ********* **** *** **** ** detect **** ******** *******, ***** ** only **** ** *******. ************, **** regularly ***** ** ***********, *********, *******, etc. - ******* **** **** ******* properties ** ******* (**** ** ***** and ****). ****, ***** ******* *** taking ** ******** *****, ****** **** knowing **** ** * ****** *** what ** * ****** ******.

********* ***** **** *** ********** ** Manchester**** ************* ******** ****** ************** *** magnetic ************ ** ********* ********** * "Smart ***** ********" **** *** ******** companies, ********* *** ********. ** ******* that "***** ***** ********" ** * more ******** ********** *** **** *******.

Passive ******** *********

***** ****** ******** ********* ******* **** electromagnetic ********* ** ******** * ******** from ** ******, ******* ******** ********* systems *** *****'* ******** ***** *** its ************* ****** ** ***** ******* inside *** ********. (********** *** ****** ********* ******************* ******** ********* ******* ******* ********** * ******** *********** ** *** these ******* ****.)

*** ** *** **** ********* *********** that *** ******* ******** ********* ******* suffer **** ** ***** ******* ** detect **** ************* *****. *** ******** of ************* ********* *** ******* *********, i.e., ********* **** ******* **** ** them. ****** **** ** ********, ****, and ****** *** ***-******* *** ***-*************, and **** ********* ***'* ***** ** them. *** **** ******, ******* ******** devices *** ********* ******** ** ** "ferromagnetic *********".

** ******* ******** ********* ******* **** on *** *****'* ******** *****, ** limits *** ********* ***** **** ** used *** ****** ********, ***** *** have * ******** ****** ** *** system's ******* ** ******** *******. ******, many ******* ******** ********* ******* **** limited ****** ************** ************ (*.*., ******/***-******). Both ************ ****-******* ***** ********* *** "weapons *********" *** ******** ***********/********* ****** to ****** **** **** ** *** scanned ******. **** **** **** ** fed ** *** ******* ***** * more ************* ******** ** *** ****** of *** ******.

** *** ***** ****, *** **** of **** ** ******* *************** ********* offers ******* *********** ** ************ ** some ** *** ********* *** *******-******* and *** ** ********* ** **** frames, ***********, ***.

Active ******* *******

******* ** *** ********-***** ********, ****** imaging **** *** ******** ************ *** conventional *-*** *** ********** **** **** scanners ** ******** *** ** ****** the **** ******* ******* *** ****** screening.

*** *** ********* *** ********** ** how ****** ******* ******* ****:

****** ************ ** ******** **** ********, like******* *******'******** ****, *** *** ************, **** as *****-****-********* ****** **** *******&*************** ************, ********* * ******* ******* ** active ******* ********* *******.

******* ** ****** ******** ********* *******, active ******* ******* **** **** *************** radiation (**** ********* *********** ******) *** analyze *** ********* ******** **** * screened ******. *** ********* ***** ** then ******** *** ********* ** ********** data.

****** ******* ******* ****** ** *** intensities *** ********* ****** ** *** emission. *** *********** ***** ** *************** waves ******* ******** *** ***** **** is ****** ********* ** ***** *******. For *******, ***** *** ******** ** imaging ******* **** * **** ***** penetration ***** ** ***** **** *** therefore *** **** *** ******* ********* under ********, **** ******* *-*** *************** waves **** ** ************ *-*** **** scanners *** ********* ***** **** *** scan **** ******** ** ****.

Passive ******* *******

******* ******* ******* *** *** ****** branch ** ******* *******, *** ****** in *** ****** ******* ********, ***** are ** ********* **** ***** ******* and **** **** ******* ********* ********* emissions **** ******* ** *** *****. There ** **** *** ********* ***** to **** **** *** ** **** for ****** *** ******* ********* - passive ********* *******.

*** ***** **** ***** *************** ***** in *** ********* ****** (******* ** how ***** ****** **** ******** *********) and ***** ******* ******* ********* ******* this ******** *** ******* ** *** contrast ** *** ******* ****** ** different ********* **** ********* *******.

*** ********** ** **** ********** ** bad ******* ********** *** *** ***** quality. *******, ** * **** ****, there ** ** ******** *** **** other ******* **********, ** *** ****** both ******** *** ***-******** *******. ******** ***** / "******" ********* *********** * ******** *********** ** ******* terahertz *******, *** ********** *** *************, and *** ** ******** ** ******** imaging.

Trade-Offs **** ******* ******* *** ******* *********

***** *** ******* ******** *** ** applied ** ******* *********, ** **** have ******** ********* ************, ***** *** some ******* **** ***** ***** ***** use ** * **** **** *** crowded ***********. ***** ******* *** ********* to ****** ******** ****** ** * time *** *** **** ***** ** divestment ***** ********, ***.

******* ******* *** **** ** ****** both ******** *** ***-******** *******, ***** is *********** *** **** ******* ******** and ********** *********. *******, **** ****** and ******* ******* ******* (*** *** most ****) *** ***-**-*-**** ******* *** therefore **** ***** **********.

* **** ***** ** ********** ** another *********** ********** ** **** ******* systems, ** ****** ************** ************ *** limited **** **** *******. **** ****** spatial ********** **** **** ******* ********** is ******* ****** ** ******* *** object's ***** (******* ********** *** ** as ******* ** * ****** ** millimeters), **** ********* ** *** *** an ******'* ***** *** ******/***-****** *********.

*****&******* **** **** **** ***** ***** for ****** ************** *** **** ** inaccuracies (*** *******, * **** *** explosive *** **** **** * ******, an ******** *** **** **** * pipe ****, ***.). ******* *** **** reason, *****&******* **** *** ********** ***** scanners ** "******* *********" *** ****** "person-borne ********* *********", ******** ********, ********* ********* ******* **** ****:

** ** *** **** ** ********** our ******** ******** ** “******* *********”. This ***** **** **** * ********* term, *** *** * **** ******* category. *** ******** ********* ****** ******-***** anomalies. *** ********: **** * ******* knife **** ***** ** ** *****, so ***** * ******* ** *****, a **** ** *****, ** * bag ** **********. *** ******** ******* does *** *********** ** *** ******* is * ******, ** **** ******* [if] ** ** *** *** ******** material ** ******* ** * ***** body.

*** ********* ** **** ******* **** bags/backpacks ** ******* ********** ** ******* only ** ********* ** * ***** body. *** ** *** ****** ******* companies ******'* *****, **** ****** ****** **** * claim ***** ******** ******* ** *********, however, *** **** *********** ******* ** be ****. *** **** **** ***** decrease ******** ***** (*** ********* ******** the **********) ** ******* **** ** remove ****, *** **** ***** ** a **** ****** ** ******** ********** screening ******* *** **** ** **** more ********* (********** **** ** ** additional ******* *** ** ***-****).

******, **** ******* *******, **** ** ones ********* ** ****** (** ************), Liberty *******, *** *****&******* ******* ******* to **** ****** *** *********. **** further ********* ********** *** *** **** lead ** ******* ***************.

Imaging ** ******* *** ********

***** **********, ********** ************, *** ***** limitations ********* ***** *** *** *********** for ****** **** ****-******** ************ *** close ** ** ******* ********** ************ (i.e., *******, ********, ************ **********, *** high-security **********). ***** ***-***** *** ***** the ***** ** ********* **** ******* devices, *** *******, *****, ***** *******, Leidos, ***. ***** ***** ******* *** prisons *** ********. ** *** ***** hand, ********** ** ****** ******* **** prevention, *******, **** **** **** ***** for ********, ******, ***.

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