Vulnerability Directory For Access Credentials

By: Brian Rhodes, Published on Feb 20, 2020

Knowing which access credentials are insecure can be difficult to see, especially because most look and feel the same.

**** *********** *** ***** *** still ****** ****, *** ***** **.** MHz ********** ** ** guarantee *** ****** *** not **** ******.

** **** ******, ** take * ****** **** at:

  • *** ** **** ***** 125 *** *******
  • ***** **.** *** ******* are ********* (** ***)
  • *** ******* **.** ***** Still ****** ****
  • *** ** ******* *** Uncrackable
  • ********* *** ******* ** Hacks
  • ******* **** ******* **** Too
  • **** ********** ****** ******
  • ***** ** ****** ******* Hacks

** ***** ***** ****** inside.

125 *** ******** ** ***

***** *** ************* ** specific **.** *** ******* is *****, ***** *** kHz *** ****** ********** to ********* ******* **** cheap *** ****** ********* components. ** ******* *** risk ** ******* **** ****** ******* With **** $** *** 125kHz **** **********, *** **** *** to ******* *** ************* with *********** ****** ****** ******* Migration *****.

Common *** *** ******* *** ********

*** **** ** **********, unencrypted *** *** ******* used ** ****** ** substantial, ****** ******** **** millions ** *********** ***** in *** *****. *** common ******* *******:

Formats *** *** *******

*** **** ** ******* access ******* ********* *** claimed ** ****** ** small *** ******** ***** main *****:

*** ****** ****

***'* ****** **.** *** format *** *** ** be ****** *** ********* as ******* ***** ********** tools.

*** *** ******** ******* the ******* '******* ***', and ** ***** ***** ****** ******, ** ******* *** encouraging ***** ** *** non-default ******-******** (***) **** for *** ********, ******* tightening ******** ** **** version ***********.

****** ******* ***(********* ****)*******?

**** ******** *** **.** MHz ****** *** **** widely ******* ******* ***** America, ** ***-********** ****** control *******, *** **** less-expensive ****-******* ****** *********** and *******, *** **** 128-bit *** ********** *** onboard **** *******.

****** ** *** ******** have **** *********** ** red ****/*** ****** ***********, but *** **** ** attack *** **** ********** mass ******* ******, **** exploit ***** ******* ** unconcerned ***** ********* ****** hacks, *** ********* ***** for ****** ***:

*** **** ************ *** access ********** *********, *** version ******* *** **** replaced ** *** ******* credentials **** **** *** overtly ********** ** ***.

****** ******* ***(********* ****)

**** '****-***' *** ****** claims ** ***** ******** advantages ******* ** *** information ** ********** ** the ********** *** **** not *********** ******** ************.

** *******, ******* ******** to *** *** *** also **** ***, ******** the *** *********** ** read *** *** ********* is ********* ** ****** systems.

** ****, ** ******/****** of ******** **** **** distributed *** *** ******* DESFire ** ********** ******.

Formats ************ *******

*** ******* ****** ** exploits ** *** ****** realized ** *********** *** end-users. *** ******* ***** used ** **** ** systems **** **** ******, but *********** **** ** 'secure' ** ****** *************:

****** ******* *******

********* ********* ****** ******* Classic *** *********** ****, **** *** not **** ****** ********** in *** **** ******, with **** ***** ******** the **.** *** ********* format ** ****.

*******, *** ****** ** extracting ******** ******** **** prompted *** ******* ** discontinue **********. *** ****** is ***** ********* **** aftermarket *******.

*** ****** ***** (***-**/**** Formats)

*** ****** ** ********** 'keys' **** ***'* ******** 13.56 *** ****** ***** multiple ******* *** ***** and *** ********** ******* in *** '***** ** ********' *****.

**** ******** ********** ********** information *** ** ******* on *** *****. *** still ***** ***** ********** credentials, ******** *** **** recent **/**** ****** *** a ********* ****** *** multiple ****** ** ********** to ******* ******* ********.

No ******* *** ***********

******* ** ****** ** 'unpickable' ** '**********' ***** that *** ***** ********* given **** *** ******** to *** ******, ** credential ******* ****** ** viewed ** '***********'.

***** *** ********** ******** from ******* *** ********* looking *** ********* ** breaking ******* *********** '******* the ***** ******' ** countless *****, ******* ** hack **** *** ******* and **********.

** ****** ****, *********, or ********** ****** ****** formats *********** ******, *** planning ********-****** ***************** ******** ********* ** prudent.

Cracking ********* ******* ** ****** *********

*** ********* *** ****** needed ** ***** ********* formats ********* *** ******** bench *********** **** ******* software ***********, ********** ***********, and ********* ***** ** code.

*** ** *** **** popular ********** **** ******* tools, *** ****-****************,*** **** ********** ** the ***** ****:

** ****** ** ******* out ***** ***** **** the ********* ** *** really *** *********. ** you *** *** ******* fairly ******** **** ***********, embedded ***********, **** ** design *** *** *********, this ****** **** ******** bring *** **** *********** than ******** **** ! Users **** ** *** understand *** ***** ********** behind **** *** **** difficulty ***** *** ******.

*** ***** ******* *** the **** ******** *****, they ****** *** ****** a '***** *** *****' card ******, *** ****** a *** ** ********** that ******* **********, ********, and ******** **** **** be ********** ******** *** access ********** *******:

**** *** ***** *********** 125 *** *******, *** cheap, *****-****, *** **** to *** ******* *********, like ***$** **** *** *** copier** ****** **** ********* success:

*******, *** *** '***** and *****' ******* *** risks ** ****** *******. For *******, ** ****** a********* (**.*****) ********** *** *** **** with ****** ****** *******, despite *** ****** ** copying ********, ********* *******:

Another ****** ******: *******

****** ***** ****** ****** is ********** ** *** risk ** ******* ******* when ******** *** ********* in *** ******. *** card *********** **** ********* can **** ** **** to ****** ********* ****** of ***** ***** ** to ****** ***** ******* signals ** ******* ********* readers ********.

*******, ** ******* ***** chips, ******** ****** *** modification ** ********* ** needed.

*** *******, *** ** the **** ******** **** methods ** ********** ******* keys **** ****** ******* involves ********** ****** * harness ** ******** *** output **********, *** ******* Sniffers *** ********* *** same ***:

*** **** ****** *******, the ********** *** **** needed ** *** **** method ** * **** significantly ********* *** ****, as *** ****** ***** be ****** ******** ** authorities.

*** **** ******** *** many ******* ***** ***** hours ** **********. **** methods *** **** ** few ** * ******* (with *********** ***), ***** ****** **** multiple ***** ** **** days (**** ******** ***** **** ******* unit).

Wiegand ******* *****

*** *******,*** ******, ************ ***** ***** 60 *******, *** ** done **** *** ******/********* side ** *** ****, and ** ************ ** the ****** *** ****** managers.

*** ***** ***** ***** how ***** ******** *** typically *********:

******* ******** *** **** and *********** ** ***, with **** **************** ~$** - $** online.

Cracks ***** ********* ** ***** *******

*** *** *********** ** that **** *** **** skill *** ******* ****** need ** ***** ********** formats, *** ******* **** to ********** ****** ******* of ******** *** ******* cards ***** ***** ****.

*******, *** $** *** kHz ****** *** ** used ** ******* *** semi-covertly, ** ***** ******* should ** *******. *** for **.** *** *******, even ***** ******* ******, hours ** ****, ******** keys, *** ******** ************ of ******* ** ***** required.

*** **** ********* ******* against *******: ******** ***** administrative ******* ** **** keys, '**** ***' **** keys ********, ** *** reissue ***********, *** **** sharp **** **** *** tampering ** ********* ******* and ***********.

The ******* ********* ** *****

******* ** *** '*********' community ** ********* ********** in ******* ********** *****, there *** ********* ****** who ******** *********** *** contribute ** ******* ****** credentials.

*** ** *** ****** forums ***** ***** ***** gather ** *********** ********** *********, **** ********* ** users *** ******** ** posts ***** *****, ***** collaborative ******* ** ******* progress *** ******* *** multiple ******* (********* ******, MIFARE, *****, *** *** credentials) **** *****.

***** ****** *********, ****-****** resources *** **** ** locate. ******** ******* ******** can ** ***** ** Github, * ***** *** often ****** ************* ****** of ***** ************. ***** there *** **** ******** to ********** ********, ** example *** ***:

******* *******

Comments (5)

Avatar

Allan Bleakley

02/21/20 01:25am

***** **** *** ***** that *** **** ***** defense ******* **** ** a * ***** ***, or **** * *********** or **** ********, * would ***** **** **** hacking ** ****, *** not * ***** *****.

Avatar

Brian Rhodes

IPVMU Certified | In reply to Allan Bleakley | 02/21/20 01:33am

* ***** ******** *** far **** ********* ****** is ******* ******** ** by ******** ***** ******** with * **** ** exploiting * ******* ****.

*******, ***** *** **** and (**********) ********* ******** *** *** ******, *** ****** ** still *****.

**, ** ******** *************, we *** ******* ********* on *** **** ***** of ***** *** ******** potentials ***** ** ******** choices.

Undisclosed #1

In reply to Allan Bleakley | 02/24/20 07:42pm

* * ***** *** isn't ********** ****** ** any ********.

Avatar

Brian Rhodes

IPVMU Certified | 02/21/20 05:35pm

[Update: **** *********]

**'** ****** *** **** above ** ****** ******* re: ********* **** *****, because ***** ******* *********** the ****** **** ******* or ******** ** ***** generation ** ****** *** being ********.

***** ********** *** ******** are ***** ********/***** ** to ***** ******* **** are ****** ** *****, especially ***** ******* *********** are *** ***** '******'.

**** ******'* ******** *** unchanged, ** **** ********** confusing *******.

Avatar

Samy Kamkar

Openpath | 03/30/20 08:58pm

***** ****, ******!

*'* **** **** ******* DESFire *** (*** ***) have *** ******** ***** vulnerabilities. *** ***** ****** "New ******* ** *** MIFARE ******* ***..." ************* ** ***, *** rather *** ******* ** the ******** ******* ******** and * ***** ****** on *** ************** (********* order ** **********) ** the ********* ******.

**** ******** **** ********** cryptography, ************* ** ** quite ****** **** * security **********, **** ** the ****** *** ** OSDP *.*.*.

Login to read this IPVM report.
Why do I need to log in?
IPVM conducts unique testing and research funded by member's payments enabling us to offer the most independent, accurate and in-depth information.

Related Reports

HID Releases Lower-Cost Signo Readers on Mar 06, 2020
HID Global is releasing a new line of readers called Signo they claim read farther, are mobile-ready, and automatically adjust for better reads on...
Access Credential Form Factor Tutorial on Feb 10, 2020
Deciding which access control credential to use and distribute, including form factor, can be a difficult task. Knowing the limitations and...
Directory of Access Reader Manufacturers on Nov 27, 2019
Credential Readers are one of the most visible and noticeable parts of access systems, but installers often stick with only the brand they always...
Fingerprints for Access Control Guide on Sep 09, 2019
Users can lose badges, but they never misplace a finger, right? The most common biometric used in access are fingerprints, and it has become one...
How To Troubleshoot Wiegand Reader Problems - Inverted Wiring on Jul 16, 2019
Wiegand is the dominant method of connecting access readers, but problems can arise for installers. In fact, one of the most difficult reader...
Nortek Blue Pass Mobile Access Reader Tested on Jul 11, 2019
Nortek claims BluePass mobile readers are a 'more secure and easy to use approach to access', but our testing uncovered security problems and...
HID Mobile Tested on Jun 21, 2019
HID Global is one of the largest access brands, but their mobile access has had challenges. Indeed, the company has already restructured their...
Farpointe Data Conekt Mobile Access Reader Tested on Jun 13, 2019
California based Farpointe Data has been a significant OEM supplier of conventional access readers for years to companies including DMP, RS2, DSX,...
OSDP Access Control Guide on Jun 04, 2019
Access control readers and controllers need to communicate. While Wiegand has been the de facto standard for decades, OSDP aims to solve major...
Startup GateKeeper Aims For Unified Physical / Logical Access Token on Apr 04, 2019
This startup's product claims to 'Kill the Password' you use to keep your computers safe. They have already released their Gatekeeper Halberd...

Most Recent Industry Reports

YCombinator AI Startup Visual One Tested on Apr 02, 2020
Startup Visual One, backed by Silicon Valley's powerful Y Combinator, aims to be "Your 24/7 Watchman" with advanced analytics and object...
Free IPVM Memberships For The Unemployed on Apr 02, 2020
IPVM is giving 3-month free memberships (regular price $99) for the unemployed, no questions asked. To get it, just contact us, your request...
Dahua Faked Coronavirus Camera Marketing on Apr 01, 2020
Dahua has conducted a coronavirus camera global marketing campaign centered around a faked detection. Now, Dahua has expanded this to the USA,...
Video Surveillance Trends 101 on Apr 01, 2020
This report examines major industry factors and how they could impact video surveillance in the next 5 - 10 years. This is part of our Video...
USA's Seek Scan Thermal Temperature System Examined on Apr 01, 2020
This US company, Seek, located down the road from FLIR and founded by former FLIR employees is offering a thermal temperature system for the...
Terrible Convergint Coronavirus Thermal Camera Recommendation on Apr 01, 2020
A week after Convergint disclosed falling revenue, pay and job cuts, Convergint is touting 'extensive research' that is either grossly incompetent...
The IPVM New Products Online Show April 2020 Opens With 40+ Manufacturers on Mar 31, 2020
IPVM is excited to announce the first New Products Online show, with 40+ manufacturers, to be held April 14 to the 16th, free to IPVM members,...
USA's Feevr Thermal Temperature System Examined on Mar 31, 2020
This US company has burst on to the scene, brashly naming itself 'feevr' and branding itself as a "COVID 19 - AI BASED NON CONTACT THERMAL...
JCI Coronavirus Cuts on Mar 31, 2020
JCI has made coronavirus cuts, the company told employees in an email that IPVM has reviewed. Inside this note, we examine the cuts made, the...
Add Door Operators To Fight Coronavirus on Mar 31, 2020
IPVM recommends that integrators advocate and end-users consider adding door operators to fight the spread of coronavirus. This delivers...