**** *********** *** ***** *** ***** ****** used , *** ***** **.** *** ********** is ** ********* *** ****** *** not **** ******.
** **** ******, ** **** * deeper **** **:
*** ** **** ***** *** *** Formats
***** **.** *** ******* *** ********* (So ***) *** ******* **.** ***** ***** ****** Used
*** ** ******* *** *********** ********* *** ******* ** ***** ******* **** ******* **** *** **** ********** ****** ****** ***** ** ****** ******* ***** ** ***** ***** ****** ******.
125 *** ******** ** ***
***** *** ************* ** ******** **.** MHz ******* ** *****, ***** *** kHz *** ****** ********** ** ********* copying **** ***** *** ****** ********* components. ** ******* *** **** ** our **** **** ****** ******* **** **** $30 *** ****** **** ****** ****, *** **** *** ** ******* the ************* **** *********** ****** ****** ******* ********* ***** .
Common *** *** ******* *** ********
*** **** ** **********, *********** *** kHz ******* **** ** ****** ** substantial, ****** ******** **** ******** ** credentials ***** ** *** *****. *** common ******* *******:
Formats *** *** *******
*** **** ** ******* ****** ******* currently *** ******* ** ****** ** small *** ******** ***** **** *****:
*** ****** ****
***'* ****** **.** *** ****** *** yet ** ** ****** *** ********* as ******* ***** ********** *****.
*** *** ******** ******* *** ******* 'factory ***', *** ** ***** ***** ****** ****** , ** ******* *** *********** ***** to *** ***-******* ******-******** (***) **** for *** ********, ******* ********** ******** of **** ******* ***********.
****** ******* *** (********* ****)*******?
**** ******** *** **.** *** ****** has **** ****** ******* ******* ***** America, ** ***-********** ****** ******* *******, and **** ****-********* ****-******* ****** *********** and *******, *** **** ***-*** *** encryption *** ******* **** *******.
****** ** *** ******** **** **** distributed ** *** ****/*** ****** ***********, but *** **** ** ****** *** been ********** **** ******* ******, **** exploit ***** ******* ** *********** ***** potential ****** *****, *** ********* ***** for ****** ***:
*** **** ************ *** ****** ********** resellers, *** ******* ******* *** **** replaced ** *** ******* *********** **** when *** ******* ********** ** ***.
****** ******* *** (********* ****)
**** '****-***' *** ****** ****** ** offer ******** ********** ******* ** *** information ** ********** ** *** ********** but **** *** *********** ******** ************.
** *******, ******* ******** ** *** EV1 *** **** **** ***, ******** the *** *********** ** **** *** the ********* ** ********* ** ****** systems.
** ****, ** ******/****** ** ******** have **** *********** *** *** ******* DESFire ** ********** ******.
Formats ************ *******
*** ******* ****** ** ******** ** not ****** ******** ** *********** *** end-users. *** ******* ***** **** ** many ** ******* **** **** ******, but *********** **** ** '******' ** access *************:
****** ******* *******
********* ********* ****** ******* ******* *** exploited ** ****, **** *** *** **** widely ********** ** *** **** ******, with **** ***** ******** *** **.** MHz ********* ****** ** ****.
*******, *** ****** ** ********** ******** security **** ******** *** ******* ** discontinue **********. *** ****** ** ***** available **** *********** *******.
*** ****** ***** (***-**/**** *******)
*** ****** ** ********** '****' **** HID's ******** **.** *** ****** ***** multiple ******* *** ***** *** *** publicized ******* ** *** '***** ** ******** ' *****.
**** ******** ********** ********** *********** *** be ******* ** *** *****. *** still ***** ***** ********** ***********, ******** the **** ****** **/**** ****** *** a ********* ****** *** ******** ****** of ********** ** ******* ******* ********.
No ******* *** ***********
******* ** ****** ** '**********' ** 'unbumpable' ***** **** *** ***** ********* given **** *** ******** ** *** public, ** ********** ******* ****** ** viewed ** '***********'.
***** *** ********** ******** **** ******* and ********* ******* *** ********* ** breaking ******* *********** '******* *** ***** locked' ** ********* *****, ******* ** hack **** *** ******* *** **********.
** ****** ****, *********, ** ********** should ****** ******* *********** ******, *** planning ********-****** ************** *** ******** ********* ** *******.
Cracking ********* ******* ** ****** *********
*** ********* *** ****** ****** ** crack ********* ******* ********* *** ******** bench *********** **** ******* ******** ***********, electrical ***********, *** ********* ***** ** code.
*** ** *** **** ******* ********** RFID ******* *****, *** ****-****************, *** **** ********** ** *** ***** wiki:
** ****** ** ******* *** ***** early **** *** ********* ** *** really *** *********. ** *** *** not ******* ****** ******** **** ***********, embedded ***********, **** ** ****** *** ISO *********, **** ****** **** ******** bring *** **** *********** **** ******** else ! ***** **** ** *** understand *** ***** ********** ****** **** may **** ********** ***** *** ******.
*** ***** ******* *** *** **** powerful *****, **** ****** *** ****** a '***** *** *****' **** ******, but ****** * *** ** ********** that ******* **********, ********, *** ******** that **** ** ********** ******** *** access ********** *******:
**** *** ***** *********** *** *** formats, *** *****, *****-****, *** **** to *** ******* *********, **** ***$** **** *** *** ****** ** ****** **** ********* *******:
*******, *** *** '***** *** *****' copiers *** ***** ** ****** *******. For *******, ** ****** ********** (**.*****) ****** **** *** *** **** **** ****** access *******, ******* *** ****** ** copying ********, ********* *******:
Another ****** ******: *******
****** ***** ****** ****** ** ********** to *** **** ** ******* ******* when ******** *** ********* ** *** reader. *** **** *********** **** ********* can **** ** **** ** ****** identical ****** ** ***** ***** ** to ****** ***** ******* ******* ** systems ********* ******* ********.
*******, ** ******* ***** *****, ******** access *** ************ ** ********* ** needed.
*** *******, *** ** *** **** commonly **** ******* ** ********** ******* keys **** ****** ******* ******** ********** wiring * ******* ** ******** *** output **********, *** ******* ******** *** installed *** **** ***:
*** **** ****** *******, *** ********** and **** ****** ** *** **** method ** * **** ************* ********* the ****, ** *** ****** ***** be ****** ******** ** ***********.
*** **** ******** *** **** ******* often ***** ***** ** **********. **** methods *** **** ** *** ** 5 ******* (**** *********** *** ), ***** ****** **** ******** ***** or **** **** (**** ******** ***** **** ******* **** ).
Wiegand ******* *****
*** *******,*** ****** , ************ ***** ***** ** *******, can ** **** **** *** ******/********* side ** *** ****, *** ** undetectable ** *** ****** *** ****** managers.
*** ***** ***** ***** *** ***** skimmers *** ********* *********:
******* ******** *** **** *** *********** to ***, **** **** **************** ~$** - $** ****** .
Cracks ***** ********* ** ***** *******
*** *** *********** ** **** **** the **** ***** *** ******* ****** need ** ***** ********** *******, *** biggest **** ** ********** ****** ******* of ******** *** ******* ***** ***** takes ****.
*******, *** $** *** *** ****** can ** **** ** ******* *** semi-covertly, ** ***** ******* ****** ** avoided. *** *** **.** *** *******, even ***** ******* ******, ***** ** time, ******** ****, *** ******** ************ of ******* ** ***** ********.
*** **** ********* ******* ******* *******: maintain ***** ************** ******* ** **** keys, '**** ***' **** **** ********, do *** ******* ***********, *** **** sharp **** **** *** ********* ** installed ******* *** ***********.
The ******* ********* ** *****
******* ** *** '*********' ********* ** hobbyists ********** ** ******* ********** *****, there *** ********* ****** *** ******** participate *** ********** ** ******* ****** credentials.
*** ** *** ****** ****** ***** these ***** ****** ** *********** ********** ********* , **** ********* ** ***** *** hundreds ** ***** ***** *****, ***** collaborative ******* ** ******* ******** *** methods *** ******** ******* (********* ******, MIFARE, *****, *** *** ***********) **** place.
***** ****** *********, ****-****** ********* *** easy ** ******. ******** ******* ******** can ** ***** ** ******, * large *** ***** ****** ************* ****** of ***** ************. ***** ***** *** many ******** ** ********** ********, ** example *** ***:
******* *******
Comments (6)
Allan Bleakley
While some may argue that the most solid defense against this is a 4 digit PIN, or even a fingerprint or hand geometry, I would argue that this hacking is rare, and not a large issue.
Create New Topic
Brian Rhodes
[Update: SEOS Clarified]
We've edited the post above to remove sources re: attempted SEOS hacks, because after further examination the claims were unclear or mistaken to which generation of iClass was being targeted.
Those performing the attempts are often mistaken/wrong as to which product they are trying to break, especially given several generations are all named 'iClass'.
This report's findings are unchanged, we just eliminated confusing details.
Create New Topic
Samy Kamkar
Great info, thanks!
I'd note that neither DESFire EV1 (nor EV2) have any publicly known vulnerabilities. The video titled "New Attacks On The MIFARE DESFire EV1..." are not attacks on EV1, but rather two attacks on the original DESFire protocol and a third attack on the implementation (incorrect order of operations) by the transport system.
Also although OSDP introduced cryptography, unfortunately it is quite broken from a security standpoint, even in the latest rev of OSDP 2.1.7.
Create New Topic