Vulnerability Directory For Access Credentials

By: Brian Rhodes, Published on Feb 20, 2020

Knowing which access credentials are insecure can be difficult to see, especially because most look and feel the same.

IPVM Image

**** *********** *** ***** *** still ****** ****, *** ***** **.** MHz ********** ** ** guarantee *** ****** *** not **** ******.

** **** ******, ** take * ****** **** at:

  • *** ** **** ***** 125 *** *******
  • ***** **.** *** ******* are ********* (** ***)
  • *** ******* **.** ***** Still ****** ****
  • *** ** ******* *** Uncrackable
  • ********* *** ******* ** Hacks
  • ******* **** ******* **** Too
  • **** ********** ****** ******
  • ***** ** ****** ******* Hacks

** ***** ***** ****** inside.

125 *** ******** ** ***

***** *** ************* ** specific **.** *** ******* is *****, ***** *** kHz *** ****** ********** to ********* ******* **** cheap *** ****** ********* components. ** ******* *** risk ** ******* **** ****** ******* With **** $** *** 125kHz **** **********, *** **** *** to ******* *** ************* with *********** ****** ****** ******* Migration *****.

Common *** *** ******* *** ********

*** **** ** **********, unencrypted *** *** ******* used ** ****** ** substantial, ****** ******** **** millions ** *********** ***** in *** *****. *** common ******* *******:

Formats *** *** *******

*** **** ** ******* access ******* ********* *** claimed ** ****** ** small *** ******** ***** main *****:

*** ****** ****

***'* ****** **.** *** format *** *** ** be ****** *** ********* as ******* ***** ********** tools.

*** *** ******** ******* the ******* '******* ***', and ** ***** ***** ****** ******, ** ******* *** encouraging ***** ** *** non-default ******-******** (***) **** for *** ********, ******* tightening ******** ** **** version ***********.

****** ******* ***(********* ****)*******?

**** ******** *** **.** MHz ****** *** **** widely ******* ******* ***** America, ** ***-********** ****** control *******, *** **** less-expensive ****-******* ****** *********** and *******, *** **** 128-bit *** ********** *** onboard **** *******.

****** ** *** ******** have **** *********** ** red ****/*** ****** ***********, but *** **** ** attack *** **** ********** mass ******* ******, **** exploit ***** ******* ** unconcerned ***** ********* ****** hacks, *** ********* ***** for ****** ***:

*** **** ************ *** access ********** *********, *** version ******* *** **** replaced ** *** ******* credentials **** **** *** overtly ********** ** ***.

****** ******* ***(********* ****)

**** '****-***' *** ****** claims ** ***** ******** advantages ******* ** *** information ** ********** ** the ********** *** **** not *********** ******** ************.

** *******, ******* ******** to *** *** *** also **** ***, ******** the *** *********** ** read *** *** ********* is ********* ** ****** systems.

** ****, ** ******/****** of ******** **** **** distributed *** *** ******* DESFire ** ********** ******.

Formats ************ *******

*** ******* ****** ** exploits ** *** ****** realized ** *********** *** end-users. *** ******* ***** used ** **** ** systems **** **** ******, but *********** **** ** 'secure' ** ****** *************:

****** ******* *******

********* ********* ****** ******* Classic *** *********** ****, **** *** not **** ****** ********** in *** **** ******, with **** ***** ******** the **.** *** ********* format ** ****.

*******, *** ****** ** extracting ******** ******** **** prompted *** ******* ** discontinue **********. *** ****** is ***** ********* **** aftermarket *******.

*** ****** ***** (***-**/**** Formats)

*** ****** ** ********** 'keys' **** ***'* ******** 13.56 *** ****** ***** multiple ******* *** ***** and *** ********** ******* in *** '***** ** ********' *****.

**** ******** ********** ********** information *** ** ******* on *** *****. *** still ***** ***** ********** credentials, ******** *** **** recent **/**** ****** *** a ********* ****** *** multiple ****** ** ********** to ******* ******* ********.

No ******* *** ***********

******* ** ****** ** 'unpickable' ** '**********' ***** that *** ***** ********* given **** *** ******** to *** ******, ** credential ******* ****** ** viewed ** '***********'.

***** *** ********** ******** from ******* *** ********* looking *** ********* ** breaking ******* *********** '******* the ***** ******' ** countless *****, ******* ** hack **** *** ******* and **********.

** ****** ****, *********, or ********** ****** ****** formats *********** ******, *** planning ********-****** ***************** ******** ********* ** prudent.

Cracking ********* ******* ** ****** *********

*** ********* *** ****** needed ** ***** ********* formats ********* *** ******** bench *********** **** ******* software ***********, ********** ***********, and ********* ***** ** code.

*** ** *** **** popular ********** **** ******* tools, *** ****-****************,*** **** ********** ** the ***** ****:

** ****** ** ******* out ***** ***** **** the ********* ** *** really *** *********. ** you *** *** ******* fairly ******** **** ***********, embedded ***********, **** ** design *** *** *********, this ****** **** ******** bring *** **** *********** than ******** **** ! Users **** ** *** understand *** ***** ********** behind **** *** **** difficulty ***** *** ******.

*** ***** ******* *** the **** ******** *****, they ****** *** ****** a '***** *** *****' card ******, *** ****** a *** ** ********** that ******* **********, ********, and ******** **** **** be ********** ******** *** access ********** *******:

IPVM Image

**** *** ***** *********** 125 *** *******, *** cheap, *****-****, *** **** to *** ******* *********, like ***$** **** *** *** copier** ****** **** ********* success:

IPVM Image

*******, *** *** '***** and *****' ******* *** risks ** ****** *******. For *******, ** ****** a********* (**.*****) ********** *** *** **** with ****** ****** *******, despite *** ****** ** copying ********, ********* *******:

IPVM Image

Another ****** ******: *******

****** ***** ****** ****** is ********** ** *** risk ** ******* ******* when ******** *** ********* in *** ******. *** card *********** **** ********* can **** ** **** to ****** ********* ****** of ***** ***** ** to ****** ***** ******* signals ** ******* ********* readers ********.

*******, ** ******* ***** chips, ******** ****** *** modification ** ********* ** needed.

*** *******, *** ** the **** ******** **** methods ** ********** ******* keys **** ****** ******* involves ********** ****** * harness ** ******** *** output **********, *** ******* Sniffers *** ********* *** same ***:

IPVM Image

*** **** ****** *******, the ********** *** **** needed ** *** **** method ** * **** significantly ********* *** ****, as *** ****** ***** be ****** ******** ** authorities.

*** **** ******** *** many ******* ***** ***** hours ** **********. **** methods *** **** ** few ** * ******* (with *********** ***), ***** ****** **** multiple ***** ** **** days (**** ******** ***** **** ******* unit).

Wiegand ******* *****

*** *******,*** ******, ************ ***** ***** 60 *******, *** ** done **** *** ******/********* side ** *** ****, and ** ************ ** the ****** *** ****** managers.

IPVM Image

*** ***** ***** ***** how ***** ******** *** typically *********:

******* ******** *** **** and *********** ** ***, with **** **************** ~$** - $** online.

Cracks ***** ********* ** ***** *******

*** *** *********** ** that **** *** **** skill *** ******* ****** need ** ***** ********** formats, *** ******* **** to ********** ****** ******* of ******** *** ******* cards ***** ***** ****.

*******, *** $** *** kHz ****** *** ** used ** ******* *** semi-covertly, ** ***** ******* should ** *******. *** for **.** *** *******, even ***** ******* ******, hours ** ****, ******** keys, *** ******** ************ of ******* ** ***** required.

*** **** ********* ******* against *******: ******** ***** administrative ******* ** **** keys, '**** ***' **** keys ********, ** *** reissue ***********, *** **** sharp **** **** *** tampering ** ********* ******* and ***********.

The ******* ********* ** *****

******* ** *** '*********' community ** ********* ********** in ******* ********** *****, there *** ********* ****** who ******** *********** *** contribute ** ******* ****** credentials.

*** ** *** ****** forums ***** ***** ***** gather ** *********** ********** *********, **** ********* ** users *** ******** ** posts ***** *****, ***** collaborative ******* ** ******* progress *** ******* *** multiple ******* (********* ******, MIFARE, *****, *** *** credentials) **** *****.

***** ****** *********, ****-****** resources *** **** ** locate. ******** ******* ******** can ** ***** ** Github, * ***** *** often ****** ************* ****** of ***** ************. ***** there *** **** ******** to ********** ********, ** example *** ***:

******* *******

Comments (5)

Avatar

Allan Bleakley

02/21/20 01:25am

***** **** *** ***** that *** **** ***** defense ******* **** ** a * ***** ***, or **** * *********** or **** ********, * would ***** **** **** hacking ** ****, *** not * ***** *****.

Avatar

Brian Rhodes

IPVMU Certified | In reply to Allan Bleakley | 02/21/20 01:33am

* ***** ******** *** far **** ********* ****** is ******* ******** ** by ******** ***** ******** with * **** ** exploiting * ******* ****.

*******, ***** *** **** and (**********) ********* ******** *** *** ******, *** ****** ** still *****.

**, ** ******** *************, we *** ******* ********* on *** **** ***** of ***** *** ******** potentials ***** ** ******** choices.

Undisclosed #1

In reply to Allan Bleakley | 02/24/20 07:42pm

* * ***** *** isn't ********** ****** ** any ********.

Avatar

Brian Rhodes

IPVMU Certified | 02/21/20 05:35pm

[Update: **** *********]

**'** ****** *** **** above ** ****** ******* re: ********* **** *****, because ***** ******* *********** the ****** **** ******* or ******** ** ***** generation ** ****** *** being ********.

***** ********** *** ******** are ***** ********/***** ** to ***** ******* **** are ****** ** *****, especially ***** ******* *********** are *** ***** '******'.

**** ******'* ******** *** unchanged, ** **** ********** confusing *******.

Avatar

Samy Kamkar

Openpath | 03/30/20 08:58pm

***** ****, ******!

*'* **** **** ******* DESFire *** (*** ***) have *** ******** ***** vulnerabilities. *** ***** ****** "New ******* ** *** MIFARE ******* ***..." ************* ** ***, *** rather *** ******* ** the ******** ******* ******** and * ***** ****** on *** ************** (********* order ** **********) ** the ********* ******.

**** ******** **** ********** cryptography, ************* ** ** quite ****** **** * security **********, **** ** the ****** *** ** OSDP *.*.*.

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