"Incite Chaos and Panic": PRC Hacking US Critical Infrastructure Says FBI, CISA Report

Published Feb 15, 2024 15:51 PM

A years-long PRC China government hacking effort obtained access to systems at critical infrastructure sites, including some surveillance camera systems, "in preparation to wreak havoc" on the US if war breaks out, according to a major investigation by intelligence and cyber agencies from the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. This marks a significant escalation in PRC cyber activity against the US and its allies.

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In this report, we examine the investigation's findings, the PRC China hacking group's capabilities and methods, how this escalates PRC hacking efforts, and the implications.

Intergovernmental ****** ******* *****-**** ****** ** ******** **************

** ******** *, ****,* ***** *********************** ***** **** **** ********- *.*. ******** **** *********, ******, New *******, ****** ******, *** ****** Kingdom - ***** **** * *** China ***** ******* ***** ***** **** Typhoon ************** ******** ****-******* ****** ** systems ** ******** ************** *****.

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**** ******* "*********** *** ** ************" of ******** ***** ** *************, ******** on **************, ******, **************, *** ***** utility **************. ***** *** ******** **** the **** ********* *********** ** *** report, ** *** ******** ** *** US's **** *** ***, *** ******* primarily ** ******** ******* ** ** critical **************.

*** *******:*** ** “******** **************” *********** ****** Security

*** ******** ******** **** **** *******'* intentions *** "** ***-******** ********** ** IT ******** *** ********** ** *********** cyberattacks ******* *.*. ******** ************** ** the ***** ** * ***** ****** or ******** **** *** ****** ******."

**** ****** ********* ****** ** * possible ** ******* ** ****** ****** the ********* ** ******;** ******* *********, ********* ***** *** ********* ** protecting *** ******.

** ******** ***** **** **** ******* has ********** "****** *** ********* ****** some ****** ** ************ *** ** least **** *****." ******* ***** ******** compromised *********** *** **** ******** ******* but "******** ******* ********* ** ***********" access:

*** ***** **** ****** ** ***** accounts *** ******** ****** *********** ********, which ********, ****** *** ****-**** ************ persistence. ** ****, *** *.*. ********* agencies **** ******** ******** *********** ** Volt ******* ****** *********** ****** *** footholds ****** **** ****** ** ************ for ** ***** **** *****. **** Typhoon ****** ******* ********* ***-************ ************** to ***** ***** *** ****** ************ and *** ***********; ****** ***** *******, techniques, *** ********** (****) ** *** victim’s ***********; *** ******** ******* ********* to *********** *********** *** ************* *** target *********** **** ****, **** ***** initial **********.

...

***** ************ ******* ****** ** ********** accounts, **** ******* ****** ******* ******* activity ****** *** *********** *********** (****** discovery ** ***** *****), ********** ***** objective ** ** ******** *********** ****** than ********* ************. **** ********** ** supported ** ******** ******** ***** **** Typhoon ************ **-******* *** **** ************* over ******** *******, ***** ******** ******* years, ** ************ ******** *** *********** enhance ***** ************ ********.

***** ******* ******** ********** *-*** ***** in ******* *********, ********* *** ******* and *******.

*** ****** ******* **** ******** ************** organizations **** * ****** ** ********** measures, ********* ********* ******* ****** ********** for *********, *****-****** **************, *** ******** up-to-date ********* *** ********.

Camera ******* ******** ** ******* ******** ************** *****

*** ****** ******** **** **** ******* obtained ****** ** ******** ******* ** critical ************** *****, ********* "** **** cases...camera ************ ******* ** ******** ************** facilities."

**** ****** ******* ********* ***********, **** as ************ *******, ***********, *** *** conditioning (****) ******* ** ****** ***** or ********** ******** ****** *** ***** controls, ******* ** *********** ************** ********(in **** *****, **** ******* ****** *** *** ********** ** ****** ****** ************ ******* ** ******** ************** **********). [emphasis added]

** ******* *********** ** ******** ***** how ******* ******** ************ ****** *******, which *** **** ******** ** ******** from ***** *********** ******* ****** **** by ****** *********.

***********, *** ******* ** ******* ***** the *****-************ *** ******** ******** ***** *** risks ** ********* **** ************ ******* by *** ***** *********** *** **** ***** *** ************* ***** *** ********* over **** ********.

Marks ********** ** *** ***** *******

***** *** ***** ******* ********* ******* countries ** ******* ***, *** ****** assesses **** **** *******'* ********** ********* an ********** ** *****'* ******* ** compromise ** *******.

** *** ****, *** ******* *** focused ** ******** ***********, **** ********** ***********,********** ******, ************** ********. *******, **** *******'* ********** **** resemble ******* **** *****:

**** *******’* ****** ** ******* *** pattern ** ******** ** *** ********** with *********** ***** ********* ** ************ gathering **********, *** *** *.*. ********* agencies ****** **** **** ********** **** Volt ******* ****** *** ***-*********** ********** on ** ********.

FBI, **** **** **** ******* ***** "** ***** *****"

********* ** *** ******** ******, ** government ******* ****** ***** ******** ** PRC ********** ***** ************ ************* ********* ** ******* **, 2024.

*** ******** *********** **** **** **** Volt ******* ** "*********** ** ******** infrastructure ** *********** ** ***** *****." He **** **** ***** ** ******* not **** ** ********** ******* *** military ************ *** ** ****** ************ civilians: "*** ***** ******* ********* *** part ** *****’* ****."

******** **** ****** **** "*** ******** threat ** *** **********."

**** ******** *** ********,********** ** *** **** *******, ****** ******** ****'* ********:

* ***** ******** ******* ****** *** globe ***** **** ******** *** ******** people **** ** **** ******* *** disruption ** *** *** *********; *** pollution ** *** ***** **********; *** severing ** *** ******************; *** ********* of *** ************** *******—*** ******** ** incite ***** *** ***** ****** *** country *** ***** *** ******* ** marshal ******** ***** *** ******* ****.

US ********* **** *******, *** ***** ******

***** ** *** ******'* *******, *** US ******************* ** *** ************* **** ******* **********. *******, **** was ******* ** ** ********** ** remove ******* ****** ** **** ******* collectively ****** ** "* ****** ** hundreds ** *.*.-***** ***** ******/**** ******." They ***** *** "**** ********" **** EOL ***** *** ******* *******.

*******, ** *** ****** ********, **** Typhoon's ********** *** **** ******* *** remain ****** *****. ********** **** ******* on ******* ** ****** ******** ** US ******* ******** ***, ** **********, corporations *********** **** ******** **************. ***** ******* ****** ***** ** stronger ******* *** ****** **********, ** Volt ******* ********* ********* ***** ***********.

Risk ** ******, *********, *** *** *******

*** ****** ********* ** ********** **** the ******** ****** *** ***** ******** (CCCS) **** *** **** ** ****** "is ****** *****" **** ** *** US *** ********** **** ****** ** US ************** **** ****** ****** ****** "due ** *****-****** ***********."

**** ******** **** *** ****** ****** to ******’* ******** ************** **** *** state-sponsored ****** ** ****** ***** **** that ** *.*. **************, *** ****** U.S. ************** ** *********, ****** ***** likely ** ******** ** ****, *** to *****-****** ***********.

*** ****** ******** ****** *********** ** how ********* *** *** ******* ****** the ***** ** ***** **************, **** noting **** ***** ********** ******** ****** they "***** ** **********" ** ******* risks.

***’* **** *** ****-** ****** ********** and *** ******* ******** **************, ************, could ** ********** ** ******* ******** from *** *****-********* ******.

***** ** *** ** **** *** addressed ** *** ******.

*** ***** ** *** ***** **** eyes ******* *** ** ***** ******* compared ** *** ****** ******, ***** would ** *****'* ******* ********* ** an ******** ** ******. *** **** are ***** *******; ** * ******** engagement ****** ******* *** ****** ****** and *****, *** ***** **** **** nations **** **** * ******** ********* or, ** * *******, ******* ********** support ** *** ****** ******.

Comments (2)
MR
Malcolm Rutherford
Feb 15, 2024

******* **, ** ** ***** *********** access **, *** ***** *****, ***** the ***************** ** ****** **** ********** these ****, ** *** *** **** Frontier. **** ***** ** *** ***** if *** ********** ******* ** ********* cash, ** ****** *****, *** ********* for **** * ****** ** **** and **** * ***********, *** *** domestic **, **** ***** ** ** a **** ** **** ******* ******.

*********, ******** ******** *******?******* ****** *********** ******** ****** **********

UM
Undisclosed Manufacturer #1
Feb 15, 2024

*** ** ********** **** **** ****** time *** **** *****….. ********* *** backed ************ ************* *** *** ****** around ***** ********, *** ** ****** stance ** **** **** *********** ***********, this ***** ** ****** *** **** quickly…