ONVIF Exposure To "Devastating DDoS Attacks" Examined
ZDnet reported "Protocol used by 630,000 devices can be abused for devastating DDoS attacks", citing exposure of ONVIF devices.
And after an IPVM discussion asking about ONVIF being 'dangerous', Verkada launched a Facebook ad declaring that:
IPVM investigated the vulnerability, speaking with the researcher, examining:
- What the risks are and how severe it is for ONVIF devices
- How the vulnerability works and what conditions must be met
- ONVIF response to vulnerability
- Input from the researcher
- Potential for abuse
- Mitigation steps
Executive *******
*** **** ** ********** ***** ***** is ********* *** ** ** ******** a *********** ** ******** ******: (*) a ******, ***-********, **-********* ************** **** (2) ******* * ***-********, ******** **** to *** ****** ********.
** *** ***** ****, ******* **** meet **** ********** ** ********* * threat ** ***** *********** **** ** DDOS *******.
No ******* ** ****** ** ******
** ******** ***** ***** *** ** able ** **** ******* ** *** device, **** *****, ****** ** *****, etc., **** ** * ****** ***** both **********.
Faulty **-********* ******** *** *******
** ***** ** ** ********** ** this *******, ******* **** *** * faulty **-********* ************** ***** ****** ********* to ** **** **** *** ********.********* ** **-*********'* **************, ** **** ********* *** ************* ** ******** **** *** ********:
************, ***** ** ***** ******** ** default ** ******* *******, ********* ****, Dahua, *** *********, ** ** **** be ******** ******* ** ***** *** WS-Discovery ** *** **** *******.
Uncommon **** **** ** **** (***/****)
******, ******* **** ********-****-********** (**** ********, *** *** ***********, used ** *****) *** *** **** 3702 **** ** *** ******** (** uncommon ****).
*** **** **** **** ***** ******** traffic **** *** ******** ** **** attackers *** **** **-********* ********. **** means **** **** **** **** ** forwarded ********, ********* ****, ** ** ******** ********* ** the ******** ******* * ******** ******** ports (*.*., ******** ********* ** * modem).
**** **** ** ********,*** * ****** ****, *** ******** ** ** ******** forwarded ** ****** ***** **** ****** users. ****** ***** ** ** *** which *** ******** ******** *** ****** access ** ******* *** **** ** routers/firewalls, **** ** ************* ****** ******** to ** ****.
UPnP ********* ******** ** *******
************,***** ** *** *******, **** ************* ******* **** ** default. *******, ** ** ******** **** older ********* *** **** ******* **** and ****** **** ****.
Low **** / *********** ** **** ******* ********
***** **** ***** ******* *** ************ rare ***********, *** ** **** ***** true ** ****** ******** ** *** vast ******** ** *************.
ONVIF ********
**** ******* ***** *** **** *********** on **** *******. ***** ******** *****, in *****, **** ** ******* ************* for ********* ******:
***** ******** ********** *** ******* ********* that ******* *********** *** ********** ** physical ******** *******. **** ************ **** have ******** ********* *** ******* ********** to ***** ***** ******** ** ** used ** * ****** ****** ** various ******* ************. ** * ******* rule ***** ******** **** ******** *** use ** ******** ******** ***** ********** security ******** **** ** ***** ** help ***** (******* ****’* *** *********) or ******* ********* (******* *******) ****** to *** ********* **** ** ******* entity. ** ***** ******* ********** ********** ******* **** *********** ***** *** to ******** ****** ***** ******** *** deployment, **** ****** ******* *** ****** manufacturer.
Axis ********
**** ********* **** **** **** ********** their *** ******** *** ******:
** *********** **** ** ** ******** to **** *** ********* **** ****** using ******* **-********* *******. **** ** behavior ** *** **-********* ******. ***** did *** ****** **, ***** **** specified ** *** **-********* ** ******** deployment.
*** ****** ** ******* ******* *** the ********** ** **** ****** *** always ** **********. ** *** ****** are ******* ** ** ********** - not **** *** ****. ** *** various ******** ** ****** *** ****** of ********-****** ******* ********* ********* ***** and ****** ****** ***** ****** (**** Companion). ** ******** ********** ********* *** partners ******** ******* ** ********.
Manufacturers ********
********* ** ****** *******, *** ********** quoted ** *** ***** *******, **** percentages ** *** ******** ******* ******* he *** ***** *** **** **** and *****. *** *** ******** ******* that ****** ***,*** ***** ******* ******* to ******** *** **** *** **** 3702. *******, ** ***** *** **** such ******* ** **** ******* *******. We **** *** ********* ***** ******* are ********** ** ********** ** ****** WS-Discovery ********, *** ******* *** ****** multiple ******* ***** ** ***** ******** and *********.
*******, ** *** *******, ******* ***** models ** *** **** *** ******* by *******, *** ** **** **** with ***** *******.
Exploit ********
****** ***** ******** ** **** ******* were ********* ~*** ****, *** **** recently, ******* ** ***+ **** **** seen. *** *********, *** **** ** approaching *** ********* ** *** **** which**** **** ***** ** ******** (*** Gbps)*** ***** ** **** **** ***** took ********** ** **** (*.* ****), *** ******* **** **** ********.
** *** **** ** *******, ***** were ***,*** ****** ****** ******* **** UDP **** **** **** ********** ** "ONVIF" *******, ***** *****:
*** **********, *******, **** ** **** many ** ***** ****** ********* ********* to **-********* ******* ****. ** **** says **** ******* * ***** ******* often ****** * **** ****** ********, with ************* ** **** ********.
Potential ******
****** ******* ************* *** ******** ** be ********* ***** **** *************, ~***,*** rogue ******* **** *********** ********* *** misuse. *** *******, *** ***** ******, which ********** ******** ~***,*** ******* ** attacks, *** **** ****** **** * *******'* ********,******* ******, *** ****.
**********
*** ********** *****, ***** *** *** basic ***** ***** *** ** ***** to ****** **** *** *** ********** to **** *******:
- ******* ****:******** **** ************* ******* **** ** default, ** *** **** **** ******* by ******* ** *** ***** ********.
- ****** **** **** ** ******:***** ****** **** **** **** **** UDP **** **** ** ****** ** their ****** ** ******** *** *** allow ******** ******* ** **** **** to *** ********.
*** ***** *** *** ******* ** not ******* ****** ** **** ***** changes, ********** *** ********* ****** ** these ******* **** ****** **** ** ISPs, ** **** *** ****** ** block ** **** ***** ***** ********.
* ***** **** "*** ****" ******* the ****
*** **** ** ****** *** **** ONVIF *******. *** ********** **** ***'* ONVIF ****** ** **** ** **** pool ** ********* *** ******* ** this ****** ******** ************.
**'* ********* * ****** **** ** targets **** ***** ** *** ***** these *******.
* ***** *** ***** *** **** to *** ** ** *** **** because ** ******* ********** ************ *** access ** *** ****** ******; *** vulnerability ** ***** *** ***********. **** everything ****** ****** ***** ***** ****, and **** *** ******* ********** ********* of *****, *** ****** **** ** a ****** ****** ***** ************ ****** being **** ** * ****** ** extremely ****.
********* *** **** ** * ************* based ** ** ********** ******-**** ** experiencing ** ** ***** *******. ** would ** **** ** *** ******** about * ******* ************* ****** ******* you **** **** * * ** 10000 ****** ** *** ******** ******* being **** ** ****** **** ********. You ***** **** ** **** ** seriously *** ******.
**** ** **** ******* ******* ** the *** ************* ******. *** ***** everyone ****** ** *** * ****** protocol, ***** ****** ********** **** *** could ***** *** *** ****** ** attack * ******.
“*** ****** **** ** * ****** facing ***** ************ ******”
*** *** *** ********** ** * publicly ****** ***** ****** ** *** specific **** ******, **** ** ************ recommends ** ***, ** **** ***.
********* *** **** ** * ************* based ** ** ********** ******-**** ** experiencing ** ** ***** *******.
**, **’* **** ***** ***** ***** does ***** ***. ***** *** * vast ***** ** ***** ***** **** you **** *** *** **** *** most *** *** *** *** *** safely ******.
** **** ****, ** ** ***** to *** **** *** *** ******** to *** ******** *** ** *** extraordinarily **** **** **** ** ****, close **.
********** ** **** ********** **** ** this, ** ** ***** * ****** concern, *** ******* **** * ******** product ** ***** ******* ***** ** make **** *** **** ** *****. The ****** ******* ** ***** ****** with ****** ************* ** ******* * higher **** **********.
******** * *** *** *** ***** to ***** **** ***, ***** ** was ********* ** * ******** ******, I ******** **** ******** ** ****** ***** *********?******:
Why **** ******* (** *** ******) **** ~**% ** *** ******* *******?
*** *** *****'* ****** *** ** (and *** ******** ******) ***** **** is ******* ****** ** *** *** find *** *** **** **?
*** *** *** ******** **** **% figure? ********* ** ******, *** ***** results *** ***** (******** *** **** 3702) ** ***,***. *** ***** *** Vietnam ** **,***. ****'* **%.
*** *** ***** ******* **** ********* else?
**** ** ** ** **%, ******, I ** ***** **** ** *** that ******* *** *** ******* **********.
* **** *** ******* **** *** graphic ****** ******* *** *** ** the **:
*** * **** * ********** ** get *** ****** ** **.************** ([***,*** x ***] /***,***) - *** *********** that ** ~**%.
*** ****** ** *** **** ** the ******* ** *** *** ****** of ******* ** **** *******, ** is *** ****** ** *** *****:
***.
**** **** *** ******* ****** **** to ******** ********* ** *** ******* column ***** ********* ********** ******* ******* in **** *******?
******* ******** **** **** **** **** all *********.
** ***,*** ** *** ******* **** port **** **** **** ***** *******, based ** *** ****** ********.
**** *** *** *** ** *** other ***** ********** **** ****** '*********'-***** numbers **** ******* '********'-***** *******?
**** *** *** *** ** *** other ***** ********** **** ****** '*********'-***** numbers **** ******* '********'-***** *******?
******* *** *** ********* *** *** shown, *** ****, ** *** ***, products ***, **** *** ** ********** order.
****, *** *** **** *** **** of *** *******, ******** **** *** line *** *****?
**** *** *** ***** *******. * am *** **** **** ********** ** query/response ** *** *********** ** ******** them **** ********* ******** *** **** are *** ***** ******* **** **** 3702 ****.
**** ** ** ******* ** ** ONVIF ****** **** * ** ** the *** *********:
"******* **** ******" **** * ****** to *** *********:
*** **** ** **** ** *** other ******* **********. * ** ******** they ****** ** ***** ********** *********** between *** ******* ********** *** **** emailed **** *** **** ******** *******.
***** **** ***** ******* *** ************ rare ***********, *** ** **** ***** true ** ****** ******** ** *** vast ******** ** *************.
*** **** *** *** **** ** at ***** ***,*** *****, *****?
*** ******** ******** ******* ******* *** why *** ******* ********** ** ***** at **** ******* *** ** *******?
********, ******* *** **** **** * hundredth ** *** ******* ** *** U.S. *** ***** ******* ****, *** here ** *********** *** *.*.?
***, **’* *** ******** ** ** chance. ******** **** *** **** *** in ********* *** *** ** ******* threat **** **.
***** *****'* *** ********* ******* ********** who *****'* **** **** ****'** *****? Maybe **** *** * ******** ** routers *** ***** ** ********** * lot ** ******* ******** ** *** Internet?
* ****** ** *** *** ********* dampen *** ******* ** * **** by ******** *******.
******* ***** ********* **** *******, *** Devices, ***. ***** ***** *** *** devices **** *** ***** **** ****. Maybe ** *** ******* ** ** with *****, ****** ** **** **** port *** ******* ****. ***** ***** are ***** **** ******* *** **** the ***** **** *** *** ******* in ***** ******* ** *** **, etc... *** *****....
"*** *****...."
***, *** **** ** * ****** cavalier **********, **?
*** *** *** ********* **** **** anything ** *** ** *** **** itself ** ************ ***** ** *********** reasoning?
****'* **** *** ******* ** **** Onvif ***** ********* ******* ** *********** to *** *** ****** ******* *** DDOS.
***, *** *** **** **(**** ** death ******!) ** ********* ** ****. DNS *** **** *** *** ***** can ** **** *** ****. ** here ** **, ***'* **** ***** DNS *** *** *********** *** **********.
** ******* ****** **** ***** *******, and ***** *******, *** *** ********** to *** **** ** **** ******?
** **, *** **** ** **** mind ** * ****** ****.
******:**** ****** * ******** ******** ** this, ******* ********* *****:
***** **** **** *** ****** ** limited, **** ************ **** **** *** susceptible:
*** **** ******* **** ******** ***** are *********** ** *** ********* ******. WS ********* ** ******* ** ******* regardless ** ***** *** ** **** or ***.
*** **** **** *** ********** ****** firmware ******* *** ****:
**** ** ************* ********* ** ********* behavior ** ****** **** ** **** 3702 ** *******. ** *********** **** be ****, **** **** ** ********* in * ****** ********* ******** *******.
** **** ****** ** **** ** here.
* ***** **** "*** ****" ******* the **** **** **** **** ***** 627 ******** ******* ** *** ******** doing ****, **** *** ******** **** report ********** ** ***** ******.
* ****** *** ******** ** ** cameras ******** ******* ** *** ********, but **** ****** ** ****** ** block. ** *** ****** **** ******** to ******** ** *** ********* *******, then **** ***** ** **** ****** for *** ******** ** **** *** packets.