HTTPS / SSL Video Surveillance Usage Statistics

By: IPVM Team, Published on Apr 01, 2019

HTTPS / SSL / TLS usage has become commonplace for websites to improve security and, in particular, to help mitigate attackers reading or modifying communications between a website and a user.

And such technology has readily been available for many years in video surveillance products with the potential to improve the security of connections between cameras and recorders.

As such, 148 integrators answered the question:

HTTPS: In the past year, what percentage of cameras did you deploy that used HTTPS / SSL for connecting cameras to recorder / VMS? Why?

Usage was very low, with the most common meaningful response was that cameras and servers were installed on isolated networks. Moreover, many integrators clearly misunderstood what HTTPS was or how it works, or does not work, with video surveillance systems.

Inside this post, we examine these themes, explain how HTTPS / SSL / TLS is applicable to video surveillance, and share dozens of integrator comments.

***** / *** / TLS ***** *** ****** *********** for ******** ** ******* security ***, ** **********, to **** ******** ********* reading ** ********* ************** between * ******* *** a ****.

*** **** ********** *** readily **** ********* *** many ***** ** ***** surveillance ******** **** *** potential ** ******* *** security ** *********** ******* cameras *** *********.

** ****, *** *********** answered *** ********:

*****: ** *** **** year, **** ********** ** cameras *** *** ****** that **** ***** / SSL *** ********** ******* to ******** / ***? Why?

***** *** **** ***, with *** **** ****** meaningful ******** *** **** cameras *** ******* **** installed ** ******** ********. Moreover, **** *********** ******* misunderstood **** ***** *** or *** ** *****, or **** *** ****, with ***** ************ *******.

****** **** ****, ** examine ***** ******, ******* how ***** / *** / *** ** ********** to ***** ************, *** share ****** ** ********** comments.

[***************]

Key ******

*** ********* *** ****** emerged:

  • * *********** ******** ** Integrator ********* ********* ****** to ** *** ** HTTPS
  • * ****** ** *********** did *** ********** *** question ** ************* ******** communications ******* *** ****** and ******, ** ******* to ****** ****** ******
  • **** *** ********** ********* reported *** ******* **** using *****
  • ********* ********* ***** *** the **** ****** ******** to *** *********** ********* them. ***** **** * integrators ********* ** *** their ****** ** ******* policy.

*** ***** - ******** Cameras *** *******

*** **** ****** ****** for *** ***** ***** was ******* *** ******* being ******** **** *** customer's ******* ******* *** the ********. ***** **** is ** ********* *** to ******** ********* ************* risks, *** *********** ******* for ** ******* ****** on *** ****** ******* to ******* ***** ***********, commands, *** ***** *******:

  • "**** *** ** *** systems ** ****** *** on **** ********, ** HTTPS ****'* **** ********* as *********."
  • "****. ******* *** ****** behind ********* ********'* ** no **** **** *** https. ** ** *** easier ** ***** ** would ********** ****** **. "
  • ****. *** ** *** systems *** ***** ** an ******** *** *** cameras ****. **** ** through *** ********* *** for *** ****** *** do *** ***** *** outside ****** ******* **. We *** ********* ** control *** ****** *******."
  • "**-**%. ** **** ** our ***********, *** ****** aggregation *******, ** **** physically ********* *** ********."
  • "****** *** *** ****** networks *** ** * secure *******, ******** **** clients (***** ********) *** isolated **** *** ******** (in *** *****)."
  • "** ****'* *** ***** as *** ******* ** deploy *** ******** *******, no ****** **** *******. If **'* ********* *** them ** ** ******** from ******* **** ** deploy *** ****** ** some ***** **** ** secure ******."
  • "*% * ****** *** a ********* **** *******, and *** *** ******* switches *** *********, ** there's ** **** ** secure *** ************* ******* the ******* *** ***'*"
  • "*...*** ******* *** ****** networks *** ****** ********** via * ******** *** card"
  • "**** - *** ** the ******* ** ******* are **** ** *** LAN ** ** ***'* bother **** *****/***."
  • "****. *** ******** *** completely ********** **** *** outside ********** ** **** point. **** *** ****** in *** ******."
  • "*** **** ** ** automatically ****. ******* ** they ** ** ************* it **** **** *** better ********. ** ********* don't ***** *** ***** because ** ** **** consuming *** *** **** are ****'* ******."

Customer ** ******* ************ ******* ***

*** **** ****** ******** related ** *** ***** is ** ** *** used *** ** *** customer ** ******* ******** it (** ***). **** of *** ******** ******* why ** *** **** were *** ******** ******, PCI ********** *** ** policy ***********:

  • "**% **** ** **** our ********* *** ********* now."
  • "*. **** *** *** been ********* ** *** customer *** ***** *******."
  • "**%. ********** ******** ***********."
  • "****. ** **** *** had **** *********** ********* for *** ********."
  • "** ***'* *** ** since ********* ***'* *** for ****. ** *** we ****'* *** *** security ********."
  • "**-**%. ** ******** ***** this ****** **** **** required ** ******** ******* policy"
  • "*** ******** ** *** industry / ******"
  • "**** ** ******* ** this ****. ********* ** are ******** ** **** on ***** ** ** able ** **** ******** audits *** *** **********."
  • "***. ** **** ** a ********* ******** ************** environment, ** **'* ******* to **** ** **** security ****** *** *****"
  • "*** ********** **-**% ** commercial ************ **** ********* by ***** ** ***** for ********* ********."
  • "** *** * ****** method ** ******* *** cameras. ***** ** *** easiest. ***** ********* **** a ****** ********** * standard ***********."
  • "**** **** ********* ** customer"
  • "*%. *** ********* ** customers (****** ** ***** local ***) *** ******** in ***** *** ********** is **** ******* ** benefit"
  • "***%. ****** ********. **** customers *** *** *****/*** they **** **** *** safer **** *********."
  • "**% ***** ********* **** dedicated ** *******....*** ****** security ****** ***** **** to *** *****"
  • "** *** ***** *********** it ***-***** ******** *********"
  • "** **** ***** **** it ***. *** ******* customer *** **** ****** concern *** ******** ** the ***** ****** ***** we ******* * ******** network *** *** *****. The **** **** ** see ** *** **** access ** *** ***."

Not ***** - *** ****** *** *******

*** ****** **** ****** reason *** *** ***** HTTPS *** *** **** and ********** ** ************ it ** *******.

***** *** ************ **** a ***** *********** ********* can **** ~$*** *** domain/customer, ***** ***** ********* only ** ******** *** client *********** ******* ** the ********. ******* *** Servers *** ******* ****-****** certificates ** *********** ********, however, ****-****** ***** *** be **** ****** **** certificates ********* **** * Certificate *********, *** *** potentially **** ******* ** create *** *****.

*****, **** ** ***** responses **** ***** **** the ******* ****** ** installed ** ** ******** network, **** ** ******** access:

  • "**** - *** ****** and **** ** * SSL. *** ******* ****** be ** * ******* network *** *** ******* to *** ***."
  • "**** ****** ******* **** ssl **** ** *****. We ******* *** ******* onto * ******** **** and *** *** ***** to ******* ****. *** cameras **** **** ** see *** ****** ** they ****** ** ********* off *** ********. *** server **** *** ** protected ** ******** ******** access *** ****** ****** to **** *** ******* needed ** ****** ** all."
  • "****, ******* ** *** way ****** *** ***** on ****. *******, ** is * *** **** for **** ** **** the ******."
  • "**% **** *** ** those ***** **** ** slower ** ***** **** it ******** ****** **. Haven't **** **** ** the **** ******** **** of ***** **** ***** is ****** ** *********."
  • "*. ******* *********** ***** does *** ******* ************, and ********/*************** ******* *** be *******."
  • "*% ******* ** ****** all ****** ** ****. Because ***** **** *********** that **** ***** ****."
  • "****. ** *** *** been ** ***** ** our ******** *** ****** captive ****** ********* *** VPN's. *****/*** **** ********** and *** **** ****** that ** ***** ****** not **** **** ****** absolutely *********."

********** ******* ****** *********** Limited

**** *** ********* ***** company ****** **** ******** the *** ** *****:

  • "*** ********* ** ****** have *****/*** ************ ****** and ****** **** *** the ************ ** *** security ******* ******."
  • "***% - * ***'* mention ** ** *** customer. ** ** **** it ***** ** **."
  • "*** ********, ***** **%. An ***** ***** ** security **** ******* ******, why ***?"

Comments (3)

* ***% ***** **** SSL/TLS ** *** *** to ** *** ******** ****, ******* ** should **** ** ***** that **** *** ***'* support ******* ********* ** this ***.  

** ********, ** **** increase *** ****** ****, possibly ********** *** ****** of ******* *** ******.

**** ******* ** *** encrypt *** ***** ******, rather ********** **** *** API & *** **** data.  *****, ****** **** encrypted ** ** **********.  Check **** **** ****** manufacture *** *** ** find *** *** *** combination ** *********.  

****, **** **** ** test *** *** *********** of * ****** **** HTTPS *******.  **** **** that ** ******** ** it ******** **** - webpages ***'* **** ****, video ***** **** *****'* drop, *** ***** ********, such ** *** ****'* limited.  * **** **** cameras **** **** ***** as * **** ** win * ***, *** it ****'* ******** ** ******** be ****.  *** *** page ****** **** ** slower **** *** **** enabled.

*******, *** *** ****** NOT ***** **********, ** is ******* ********* **** usernames *** ********* *** always **** ***** ****** authentication (* ***** **** of **********, **** **** HTTPS ***), *** *** clear ****.  **** ******* default ** ***** ****, which ****** ******* ** sniff *** ******* *** easily *** *** ********.   I **** **** **** cameras **** **** * selection ** *****, ******, or ****.  *** **** option ** **** ** weak ** *****.  ** attacker ******** ** *** authentication ******* **** **** only ******* ***** **************, and **** ** ****** them ** ******* ****** authentication.

***** ** ***** ** you *** *** ***** support ** * ****** option ****** *** ****** finder. ** ** ********* for **** ****** ********** clients. 

** *** *** ***** HTTP ** *** ********** network **** ** ** is ******* - ******** well, **** *** ***** as **** *** ******. GG.

**** **** *** *** has *** ****, **** network/their ******* *** **** own **** *******. ** is *** **** **** to ****** ******* **** a ******** ***. * have **** ** ******* more ****** *** ****** than * ****** ******* over ****** ******** ***** everything ********* *** **** expired *** ****** **** techs ******* **** * low **** *** ****** crying ***** ***** ***** and *********, *** ******* to *** ******.

*** **** *** ** by ************* ************** **** managing *** ****** ************ as * *******. ******** Integrators **** ** **** up ** **** ** the ** *** ***** rather **** *** ****** with * **** **** and **** ***** **.

**** ****** ** **** will **** **** ***** reverse ***** *****!

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