HID Discloses High Severity Vulnerabilities On Configuration Cards

Published Jan 30, 2024 20:40 PM

Following the "Major, Mandatory Upgrade," HID now released two high-severity CVEs on malicious configuration cards, and unauthorized encoders. But how do these CVEs impact access control systems?

IPVM Image

In this report, we detail HID CVEs, with a response from HID, and how users can mitigate these vulnerabilities.

Executive *******

*** ********* *** ******** *************** **** configuration ***** *** ********. *** ******* is ********* ** *** ****** ******* mobile *********** *** ******* *** ********** disabling ****** *********** *** ********** (****** ****** "*****, ********* *******" *** "Legacy ********* *******.")***'* ********* ****** **** ******** ********* firmware ******** *** ********** ************* ***** and **** ** ***** ** ********* for *** ******* *************. *** ***************, scored **** ** ********, ****** ********* data **** ************* *****, ********* ***** and ****** ****, *** ***** ************ reader ************* *******.

Method *** ****** *** *********

*** *** *** ******** *** ***** vulnerabilities **** **********. **** *** ***** attributed ** ****** ******** ******* ******** or * ***** *****.

Reader ************* *****

****** ************* ***** *** **** **** various *******, ********* ********** ** *** iClass **, ** ******/******* ******* ********** types ** ******* *** ********. *************, users **** ********* ** ************* ***** to ****** ********** ******** (********, *****, etc.) *** ** ******* *** ********. With *** ****** ******* ****** ***, akin ** ************* *****, ***** *** update ****** ******** ** ******/******* *********** using *** **** ******* ******* *** BLE **** ******* *** *** *******.

***** ************* ***** **** ** ** programmed ** *** *** ******** ******* and ********* *** ******* ******** ****, including ***** *** ****** ****, *** Reader ******* *** *** ** ******** updated *** ****** **** * ****** using * *** ***.

*** *** *-****** *** ***** ** how ****** ************* ***** *** **** for ***** ***********:

Practical **** ** ************* *****

** ************* ***** ******* ********* ******** data, *** ****** *** ****** ******* and ****** **** **** ***** *****, giving **** *** *********** ** ******* privately ***** ***********.

HID ********

**** ******* *** ** *** ***** the ****, *** *** **** **** they *** ****** **** **** ************* cards ** ***** ** *** ****** manager.

** ******** ** ********* ********, ** are ********* ****** **** **** ************* cards *** * ******* ** ******* and **** **** ** **** ******* for ******* ***** *** – *** example, *** ***** ******* ** *** use ************* *****. ********* ********, ************* cards *** ******** ********* *** ********* and ** *** ******* *** **** of *** ** *** **** ****** tools, **** ****** *******.

** *** ******* ***, *** **** some ****** ** ******* **** **** in ******* *************, *** ***** ******* don't **** **** ******* ***************.

[****]: ** *** ******* ****, *** many ***** ***-******* ******** ***** **** been ********* **** *******?

[***]: ************, ****** ** ******* **** rarely **** **** **** ************* ******. We *** ****** ** ******* *** number, *** ***** ** **** ** speculate.

[****]: ** ***** ********* ******** **** the **** ************* ** ******* *** can ***** *** **********, ********* ****?

[***]: ** **** ** ***.

***'* ********** ********** ******* ********* ****** credentials *** ************* ***** **** *******.

****** ***** ** *** ******* ******** advisory (***) ********* ** *****://***.*********.***/********-****** *** recommended ***********, ***** ******** ********* ****** credentials *** *** *** ** ************* cards.

Sensitive **** ********** **** ************* *****

***'* ************* **** *** (***-****-*****) ********* * ************* **** ****** bad ****** ** ******* ********** *** device ************* ****, ***** *** ** used ** ****** ****** *************.

****** ************* ***** ******* ********** *** device ************* ****. *** ********** **** could ** **** ** ****** *********** for * ****** ********** **** ***** keys **** ******** **** *********** **** a ***** ********** *** **** **** system. *** ****** ************* **** ***** be **** ** *********** ****** *** configuration ** ******* ********** **** ***** keys.

*** ********** **** *** **** * CVSS ***** ** *.*/**.*, * ****-******** impact.

IPVM Image

*** *** **** * ****** ***** to ** ** ***** ********* ** the ************* ***** ** ******* **** that *** ** *********** ****. *** data **** *** ** ********* **** configuration ***** ******* ***** *** ****** keys, *** *** ******* ***** ********* to ******** ****** ** ***** *** configuration *****.

** ******* **** *************, * ****** must ** ********** ***** ** ** in ********** ** *** ************* ***** to *********** **** *** **** *** extract ***********. ***** *** *** ****** Key ********* **** **** **** ***** configuration ***** ****** ****** ******** ** be ******** *** ******** ****** ** those *****.

Free ***** *** ******* *** ***** ******* ** **********

*** ********** ********* *** ** ******** * "**** upgrade ** *** ***** *** *******" for ********* *** *** ********* ***** their **** **** ***** ** ***********.

********* ***** *** *** ******** ***, and ***** ********* *** *** ********* their **** *** ** *********** ****** consider ***** ** ****** *** ******* and *********** **** *** ****. ** assist ** **** ******, *** **** be *********** * **** ******* ** the ***** *** *******.

************, *** ********** ***** ** ******* the ****** ** ****** ******** ** "prevent *** ******* **** ********* ************* changes **** ************* *****." *** ***** readers **** *******, *** ****** "* shield **** **** **** ******* ******* configuration *******."

*** *** ********** **** ***** **** "HID ** ******* ** ******* ************* cards **** **** ** ********** ** this *************," *******, *** ******** ** not *****.

Laborious ********

******* ***** ** *** **** **** that ***** *** **** ** ********* of ****** ** ******* ********* ******* BLE *************. ***** ******* ****** ** updated ******* ************* *****, *** **** requires * *** ******** ** *** the ****** ******* ***. *** ***** looking ** ****** ****** ******** ** prevent ******* **** ********* ************* *****, they **** ** *********** ******* (~$**), ******* **** ** ******* *********, and **** ****** ******** ***** *** Reader *******. ***** *** *** ****** can ** **** *** ******** *******, if ** ** *** ****** **** a *** ***, ***** **** ** careful ***** ********** ***** *******, ** the ********* **** *** *******.

Secure ******* ********* ** ********/*******

******* *** *** ******** (***-****-*****)** *** "****** ******* ********* ** Encoders/Readers," ***** ******* *** *** ** a ****** ******* *** ******* ***** readers **** *** ****** "********* ****," including ********** *** ****** ************** ****.

******* ************* ********* ** *** ************* channel *** ******** ***** ****** ********* data **** ****** ************* ***** *** programmed. **** **** ***** ******* ********** and ****** ************** ****.

*** ********** **** *** **** * CVSS ***** ** *.*/**.*, * ****-******** impact.

IPVM Image

*** ********** ********* ******** ********/******* *** ** **** to ******* **** **** ****** ************* cards, *** "*********** ****** *** ************* of *******" ***** *** ********* ****.

******® **™ ****** ******** *** ***** products ****** ***** **** **** **** configured ** ********, *** ** **** to **** **** **** ****** ************* cards *** ***********.

****** ************* ***** ******* ********** *** device ************** ****. *** ********** **** could ** **** ** ****** *********** for * ****** ********** **** ***** keys **** ******** **** *********** **** a ***** ********** *** **** **** system. *** ****** ************** **** ***** be **** ** *********** ****** *** configurations ** ******* ********** **** ***** keys.

No ***** *********

*** **** "***** ** ********* ** patch ********* ** ******* **** *************," and ******* ***** ** ******* ****** configuration *****, *** ** ******* ****** technologies (****** ****** "*****, ********* *******" *** "Legacy ********* *******").

Comments (4)
UI
Undisclosed Integrator #1
Jan 30, 2024

**** ***** ** *** * **** firmware ******, *** * ****** ************* change. *** ***'* **** * ***** or *** ****** *** * ****** configuration ******. *** **** **, *** you **** **** ** ***** ** front ** * ******.

**** ****** *****, ****** * ***'* know *** ** **** ** **** config *****. *:** ** *:**. * seconds (**** *** **** ** ***** to ***** ***** *** ******).

> *** **** ******** * *** backpack ** *** *** ****** ******* app

****'* *** **** ** *** ******** is ** ***** *.*.*.*, ***** *** the ******* *** **** ****. ******* devices **** *** *** **** ******** to *** ******, **** ** **** for *** ********.

** **** ******* *** ****** ***, then *** ** **** ****** ***** to ****** *** ********. ** *** want ** ** *** ** *****, then ****, ***'** ******** *** *** 5 ****** ***** *** ** ***** like **** *****. ** ** **********, that's *** *********, *** *** ****.

> ***** *** *** ****** *** be **** *** ******** *******, ** it ** *** ****** **** * MOB ***, ***** **** ** ******* while ********** ***** *******, ** *** interface **** *** *******.

***'* *** *****-*** ****. *** **** in *** *******.

IPVM Image

** ***** *** ****, **** *** interface ********* *****'* **** ********. ****'* not **** *** *** ******, ******* there *** * *** ***** ** the ******* ******* ***** **'* ******** to ***** *** ******, ********** **** old **. **'* **** ** * concern **** ******/********** *******; * *****'* managed ** **** * ***** ***, those ****** **** ** **** ****-***** features ***** **.

*** **** ********** ***'* ***** ****, so **** *** **** ** ***** and **-**** **** **** *** ****. They **** ** ****** *******, *** that's *** **** ****** ***** *** it ** ******. ** **** *** even ******** *** ****** **** ****** springs **** *** **** ** **, and **** **** *** ******** **** from *** ******. **'* ********, *** once *** **** ** **** *** it ***** ****'* *** ********.

(4)
UI
Undisclosed Integrator #2
Jan 31, 2024

**** ******** ***********.

****'** ********* ******* **** *** *** releases ***** *** * ***** ** the ******** ******* **** ****** **** will **** ****** **** ** ****** for * ***** ****** ** ******* as *** ******* ******** *** **** out ***** ****.

* **** * ********* ******* ***** they ****'* ***** ** ***** ** that ***** *** ********* *** ***** who ** *** ***** ********* ** the *******. ***** ****** ******* ***** with *** *** *******, ** ***** requires ********* *** ******** ******* ** iOS *******.

UI
Undisclosed Integrator #1
Jan 31, 2024

** ******** ** ***** ***** ** to ******* **** *** ********.

*** ** **** **** ****** ********* Bluetooth ***** *** **** ** ********** securing *** ****** **** ***, ** if ***, **** *** ***** *** temporarily ** ************ ** *** *****.

******* ****, *'* ** ******* ** swap **** *** *** ** * time *** ******* **** ** *** truck. *'* ****** ** ****** *** terminal ***** *** ***-*****.

IPVM Image

MK
Mert Karakaya
Feb 02, 2024
IPVMU Certified

***************** ********* ** ******* ** ***** vulnerabilities, ****** "*** ******** *************** ** *** ****** SE ****** *******."

*** ******* *** ************** ** **** article ********** **** *****: *** ******** *************** To *** ****** ** ****** *******