How To "Defog": Change A Cloud IP Camera To Locally Controlled
Increasingly, IP cameras are designed to be only accessible from the manufacturer's cloud but many users prefer, for security and privacy reasons, to control their cameras themselves, a process sometimes called "defog".
Another reason may be one buys or inherits "Hostage as a Service" camera providers such as Verkada and want to use the cameras you own without having to perpetually pay Verkada subscription fees.
Based on our extensive cloud IP camera cybersecurity testing and review of public methods of "defogging", we explain the options and issues involved in doing so.
Executive *******
*** **** ****** *** *** **** organizations, ** ** ****** *** ***** pursuing **** ******* ** *** ****, cost, *** ********** ** ********** ** do, *** *** **** ** **** breaking **** ****. *******, **** ***** IP ****** ****** ***** ***** *** security *********** ** ****-**** ****** ** do **** **** *********** ******** *** knowledge.
***** ** ****'* ************* *******, *** methods **** *** ********* ********* ** disconnect ***** ******* *** ******** ** work **** **** ********** ******-**-***** ******* from *******, *******, ******, ***, ***** have ******-**** ******* ************ ********* ****** certificates, *** ** ********** *** ** make ***** *******.
"Defogging" ******* *********
********* ****** ** ************* *****-******* **** devices, ** ******* ** **** ****, and ****** **** ******* *******, ***** streaming *******. ***** *** ******* ****,*** ********* *** ******* ** **** as * *********** *****-********* ******** **** *** **** devices *** **-******* **********, *******, *** communications.
Bluetooth ******* ** ******* ********
******* ** "*****" ** ********** **** cloud ** ******* **** ***** ***** services *** *********. *** *******,**** ****** ******* ****** "*******"*** ************ ****** **** **********: "*** * ******* ** *-**** DCS-8000LH **** * ***** ****** ** a ******* *******".
*** ******* ******* ********** *** ********* to *** ****** *** ********** *** camera **** ******** ******* ********* ****************** **** *** ******* ** *** the ***** ******** ** ********* "&&(" + ******* + ")&" ** *** legitimate *******.
** **** ********** *******, * ************* in * *****-***** *-**** ****** ** exploited ** **** *** *** ****** firmware *********** *** ****** ** ***** access, ***** **** ** **** ******** case ******* ****, ** *** ******* warns:
******** ********* ******** ********* *** ** the **** ******* ** *** ******. This ******* *slight **** ** ****** ** **** * *****. *** **** *** **** ******... [emphasis added]
***** **** ********* ******** ********** *** skill, ******* ******** ***** *** ** as **** ** ******* **** **** IP ******* *** ** **** *****, would *** **** ** ********* ** implement.
Cloud ******* ********
******-**-***** ******* *** ********* ****** ** their *** ***** ********, ***** *** minimal ***** **** ***** ** ******** running ** *** ******, **** ******** ** *** *******. *** ********* ** **** ************ is **** ************ **** *** ****** with *** ************, ***********, *** ************* of *********** ** ******* *** ** mitigated. *******, ************* *** ******* ******** updates *** ******* ** *** ***** service ********, *********** *** **** *** manual ************.
*** ************ ** *** ************ ** generally * **** ** ***** ****** configuration, ******* ********, *** ************ **** complex ***** **** *******.
Manufacturer ****
**** ***** ****** ******* *** ***** an ******** ** **** ***** *** local **** ***** *********, ******* ****** to ******** ***** **** *** ******** to ***** ******* *** **** **** to ** **-******* ******.
**** ** **** ******** ********* *** viewing ** *** ************'* ******, *** some ************* (*.*.,*******,***,******, ***.) **** ***** **** ******* for ******* ** *** ***** *********.
****** ** **** ****** ********** ** supported ******* ** *** ****** ** be **** *** ***** *** ****. However, ** *** **** ** **** cameras,***** **** *** ********** ********* ** a ******** ******* ** ********, ** was ******* ** *** *******, ******* ***** ******* *** *********** unsupported *******.
Not ********** ** ********** ***** *******
***** *********** *** ************* ********* ********* **** ****** **** **** a ******* ***********. **** ********* *** strong ************* ********* ** ******** *** risk ** ************ ******** ** ***********. IPVM ******* *** ***** ** ****** to ****** *** ******* ************ ******* Bluetooth ** **** ****** *********** ** serial ******* *****.
*******, *** ** *** ***** ******* IPVM *** ****** *** ****** ********, secure ****, *** ********* ********, *** do *** ******* ******* *** ******* upgrading ********, ***** ** ********* ******** to ***** *******.