I'm curious if and how FLIR will react to this ☺️
Well done IPVM, thank you!
Multiple cyber security vulnerabilities exist in FLIR thermal cameras, which have not been fixed, despite being reported months ago. UPDATE- FLIR has released patches, which are covered in this report.
In this note, we examine the vulnerabilities, share our test results of vulnerable FLIR cameras, review FLIR's response and the impact on the company.
Vulnerabilities ********
***** ****** [**** ** ****** *********], a ******** ********** ** ********* ******** ******* ** **** *************** ** ****** Security. *** *************** ******* ******* ** retrieve **** ******, *** *****, ******** files *** ***** **** **** **** FC-series ******* *******, ** **** ** hard ***** *********** *** ****** **** execution ********. *** *******, *******/******* *** string "/********/*********/******/*******.*** [**** ** ****** *********]" onto *** *** ** * **** FC ****** ******** ** ** ******* in * ******* **** ***** ******** cameras ** ****** * **** ***** (e.g.: http://192.168.99.10:8081/graphics/livevideo/stream/stream3.jpg).
** *****, ***** ******** ****** ********* to ******** **** *** ****** **** the *******, ** **** ** ******* various ******** **** ***** **** ** a ******** ******* ** *** ******, ultimately ******** ********* ** ****** *** execute ****** ****.
Vulnerability ********
** ******** *** *************** ** ********** **** ****** and ******* ***** **** ** /***/****** from ******** ********** ******* ***** *** Shodan. **** ******** ** ****** *********:
******** *** /***/****** **** ** ********** cameras ***** *** **** **** ******** used ****** *** ******** ** *******:
**** ********** **** *** ***** ** hard-coded *********** ** *** ************* *******, as ** ** ******** ********* **** so **** ******* ***** **** *** same ********* ******** ****** *** *** root ****.
No ******** *** *********
Updated ******** ********
****** - ****** ******** ******** **** not ********* ** *** **** ** our ******** ***********, **** **** ***** been ********.
**** ******** * ***** *** ***** vulnerabilities [**** ** ****** *********]. ******* instructions *** ******** ** *** ******* ***** for *** ***** [**** ** ****** available], ***** ******** ******** **** ****** individually *** *** *** *********. ******* this ** * *****, *** *** a **** ******** *******, ***** **** to ***** ** ** * ********* version (*.*.* ** *.*.*), *** **** need ** ****** ***** ******** ** one ** ***** ******** ****** ******** the ***** ** ******* ***** ******** on *** ******.
****'* ******** ******** ********* *** **** ****** ******** *** FC-Series ******* ** *-**-****, **** ****** this ************* *** ********:
FLIR Limited / **** ********
********* ****'* ******* *** ******* ** FLIR ** ********* ****, **** ****** a ************* ******** ** ******* *** [link ** ****** *********], **** ******* ***********. **** comes * ****** ***** *** ******* report ** **** ** ***** ***************, and **** *** ******* ***** ****** are ********, ** **** ********* *** expect ******* ********. *** ********* **** recommendation ** ** *** ***** ******** access ** **** *******:
** ****** ****, ** ********* **** customers ***** ******* **** ** ******, secured ********.
*** ****** ******** **** **** ********* a **** ** ************** **** ****, stating "** *** *** * *** or ********** **** **** ******** *** the ********* ***************."
**** ***** ***-***** *** *********** *** *** known ** **** **** ******* ** use ** ******** ************** *****, **** reported ***** ********* ** **** ** warn **** ** ***** *************** ****** the ******* *** *******.
Minimal ****** *******
*** ****** ** **** ***** ******** *** **** ******* **** **** *** results ** ********** *******:
**** ** *******, ***** **** **** thermal ******* *** **** *********, ***** not ** ******** **** ** "*******", and *** ********** ********* ** * VMS. *******, * **** ** *** ********* cameras ****** **** **% ** **** were ******** ** **** *************.
Impact *********
****** ******* **** ******* ********** ******, exploit ** ***** ******* ******* ********* for **** ****/******** ** *** ***** using ****. **** ******* ******* *** ********* deployed ** ******** ************** *****, ** sites **** **** ***** ******. ************, these ******* *** ***** ****** ** video ********* ******* *** ********* ********* warnings. * ************* **** ****** ** attacker ** **** *** ******'* ******** area, ** *********** ***** ******** ** disable *****/****** ********* ******* * **** more ****** **** **** ********* * camera *********** * ***** ********.
************, **** ********* **** *** ****** that ***** ********, *********, ** ***** data ***** ****** *********** ********* *********** about *** ******** ******* ************ ** ***** devices ** ***. ******* ***** **** potentially ** ********* ** ***** ***** access, ****** ********* ****** ** *** internal ******* *** ****** ******* **.
In ******** ** **** ***** *** ***************
***** *************** *** ******** *** ********** to ****************** **** **** *** **** ******* to **** ***** ****** ** *********** *** ********* ** ***** *** and ***** *****.
Vs ********* ********
***** **** *************** ** *** ***** users ** ********** ************** ** ***** to * ******* *** *********, ** ** reset ** ******** **** ********* ********. However, *** ****-***** *********** ** *** linux ** ***** ** **** ** access * ******* ********* ** *** was accessable ** *** ***** (*** *** is ******** ** *******).
**** ************* *** ************ ** *** ********* "***** ******" ******* ** **** ** **** *** ******* any ************** ** ******* ****** ** access *** ******** ********, *** ** is **** ******** ** **** ** cannot ** **** ** ***** ** takeover ** ***** ******* *** **** full ****** ** *** ******.
Poor ******** ***** ** ****
****'* **** ** * ****** ******** in ********* ********* *** ********** ***** vulnerabilities *** ******** ** **** ***** ******* ********** ******** ********.
********* *** ******** ***** *** ******* *******, ******* pressure ** ****, *** *** ********* avoided **** ** *** ****** ******** in **** *******. * ****** ******** **** legacy ************* *** **** ** ***** out *********'* ******** ******** ***************, *** failure ** ******* ***** ***********, ** we *******: ********* ***** **** *** ******** ****** Hit **** *** *****.
**** **** *************, **** *** ****** themselves **-*** **** ********* ** ***** ** ease ** ******* *** ******** ** proactive ************* ** *********, **** ****** eroding ***** *** ******* ***** ************* the ***** *** ***** **** *********** and ***-*****.
I'm curious if and how FLIR will react to this ☺️
Well done IPVM, thank you!
Doesn’t Dahua actually assemble the Flir TC series? Are we sure of who makes the FC series? I only have had my hands on the FC-618 for a short period and don’t recall at the moment if it was Dahua-esque.
It might be beneficial to search for FLIR OEM partners that just use FLIR's thermal modules and combine it with a custom (and more secure) encoder chipset (which includes all network functions).
I do not want to do any promotion here, but these partners exist.
There is now a software fix available from FLIR for these vulnerabilities, the report has been updated with the following section to address this:
UPDATE - Patch Released
FLIR released a patch for these vulnerabilities. Upgrade instructions are outlined in the release notes for the patch, which requires updating each camera individually via its web interface. Because this is a patch, and not a full firmware release, users need to first be on a supported version (1.3.4 or 1.3.5), and will need to update their firmware to one of these versions before applying the patch if running older software on the camera.
This is good information guys, thanks!