How Flipper Zero Can And Cannot Hack or Harm Cars
While social media posters have exaggerated how harmful Flipper Zero is to cars, some cars are at risk of being stolen, and most cars can still be harmed by malicious Flipper Zero users.
This has gained attention as the Canadian government has restricted Flipper Zero sales, citing risks to cars.
In this note, we examine how Flipper Zero can impact cars and what models are impacted.
Canadian government is restricting the use of Flipper Zero linking to auto theft, see Canada to Restrict Flipper Zero Sales To "Legitimate Actors Only."
Executive *******
***** **** ********** ******* **** **** cars *** ******* ***** **** ****** be ********* ****** ** ***** * car, **** ***** ** *** ********* a **** ************* *** ***** ****** attack ****** ********* ****** ******* *** replaying *****.
******* **** *** *** ***** ******* between **** *** ****** *** **** using ************* *********, ******** ******* *******. Signal ******* ** ********* ******* ** many *********, ********* *** *** *** European *****. ***** ******** ********, *** actors *** **** / ***** **** vehicles **** ******** *******, ********** ******* (brute *******), ** ********* ***** * future *** ****.
******** ****** *** **** *** ****** interface ** *** **** (******* *** OBD ****) *** ******* ** * car's **** ********.
******** *** **** **** **** *** can **** **** ******-********** ****** *****, bollards, *** ***** **** ***** ********** methods, ************* ****-***** ********.
Functionality ******** **** *********** ********
***** *** ******** ******* ******** ********* sub-GHz *************, *********** ******** **************************** **** *************, ******** ***** ** read *** ******** ***-*** *******. ***** firmware ***** ****** ******** ******** ** increase *** *****, *****-***** *************, *** remove ***** ********* ************. **** ***** install *** *********** ********, **** *** also *** ***-******** ******* ******* ** their ******* *******.
******* **** ****** ***** ********* ***-*** functionality ** *****-***** ******** ** ******* restricted *** ********* ***.
Signal *******
*** ******* ****** ******* ******** *** auto ***** ** ****** *******. *** actors *** *** ******* ** ********* a ****** *** ***'* ********* ********* and ****** * ***** ****** ** the **** ********* ** **** *** remote *** *** *******.
***** ******* ****** ******** ***** ***** signals **** ******* *** ***** ** record **** **** * *****-***** ******, various ****** ************ **** ********** ***** jamming ******* *** ********* ******.
** *** ******* *****, ** ********** two *********** ** *** *** *** communicating **** *** *** ***, ***** two ********, ******* *** ****** ************ between *** *** *** *** *** vehicle.
****: ***** ****** ******* ** *******, this ***** ** ******** *** ******** and ************* ******** ****, **** *** vehicle *****'* **********.
Various ***** *** ****** ** ****
**** ******* ******** **** ****** ****** key *** ******* *** ** ******. Other ****** ****** **** **** ************** / **********,**** ******,******(*** ******), ******* *** ********* *********** ** ****** *******. **** could *** *** * ****** **** a *** **** **** *** ***** key ****.
** ******* **** ***** *** ****** are ********** ** ****** ******* *******, and ******* ****** ****** ***** ******** are ******/******** **** ******* *** ****** signs.
RollingPWN ******* ** ****/****** ******
******* *** ****/****** ****** ***** ****** (2012-2022)*********************. *** ****** ** **** ** sending ******* ***** ** ************* *** rolling **** ******** *** ********* ** older ****.
*** *******-*** *** ** * ******* vulnerability. ** ***** ** ** * vulnerable ******* ** *** ******* ***** mechanism, ***** ** *********** ** **** amounts ** ***** ********. * ******* code ****** ** ******* ***** ******* is ** ******* ****** ******. ***** each ****** ****** ******* *** ******* codes ************* ******* ** *********. *******, the ******* ******** **** ****** * sliding ****** ** *****, ** ***** accidental *** ******* ** ******. ** sending *** ******** ** * *********** sequence ** *** ***** ********, ** will ** *************** *** *******. **** counter ********, ******** **** *** ******** cycle ** *** ******* ****** *****. Therefore, ***** ******** *** ** **** later ** ****** *** *** ** will.
***** ********** *********** *** ****** *** to ******* **** ******, ***** *** examples ** ******* ********** *** ******:
Attack ***** *** ** ********
***** *******'* *****-** ******* ********* *** jamming ***** ** ~** ****, ******** antennas *** ** ********* ** ******** the ************ ***** ** **** ~*** feet.***** ******** **** ~$**, ********* * ****** ******* *****, and ***** *** *** ***** ********* antennas ** ******* *** ***** *******.
Attacks ***** ****** *******
***** ********* *** *** ****** ************, they *** ************** ****** *** ******* sent ** *** *** ****. ********* can **** ****** *** ***** ****** to ****/****** *** *******, ******** ******* and ***** ***** *** ****** ****** to ****/****** *** ******* *** *****. IstroSec's ********** ************* ***** *** *** Flippers *** ** **** ** ***** a ***** *****, *** ******* ******* the ****** *** *** ***** ********* it:
** ********** *** ******** **-******* **** Kamkar******** ** *** ****** **** *** auto ***** ******* *****, ********* ****** jamming *** ************** (*********: **:**):
Flipper ********* *** Targeted ********
*** ****** ************ **** **** **** various ******* ********* *** ********* ** target ******** ********. ***** ******** ******* Lamborghini *******, ***** / ******, ***** Rx8, *** ******:
******* *** **** ***** ******** ***** with ***** ************* *******, ** ************ by ********* *********:
Flipper *** *** **** *** ****
** ******** ********* ********* *** ***-** devices ***** ******** ** **** ****** / *** ********** ** ********. *** controller **** ******* (******) ****** ***** to ******* ***** ********** **** ******* through *** *** **** ** ********* with * *******'* *********. ******* *******,**** **, ******* **** ****** ** ****** non-diagnostic ********* ****** *** ***, ******** bad ****** ** ***** *** ********.
***** ***** ** ** ******** ********* Flipper *************, *** **** **** ** the ******* *** ** ******** ** interface ******* **** *** *** / CANBus ********* ****** ********.
Flipper *** **** ****** *****
***** *** ***-*** *************, *** ****** can **** ****** *****, ******* ********, and ***** ****-***** ********** ******* *** vehicular *****. ******* **** *** *****-***** garage **** ***** ** **** ******.
******* *** ****** ****** ******* ** garage ***** **** *** ****** ***** by ******** *** **** *** ******* it ****. *******, **** ****** ****** doors *** ******* *****. ******** ** vehicles, ****** ****** ***** *** ******* in *** ****** ** ******* ***** they ***, ** ** ******** *** brute-force ******* ***** ** **** ****** doors ** **** **** * ******.
*** **** ****** * ******* ***** demonstrating *** *** ****** *** ****. Samy ****** **** * ****** ****** and ******* *** ******** ***** **** a ****** ****** ** *** *****.