P2P Is The Worst Protocol To Have Been Introduced In IP Camera Systems, Regarding Security

P2P is the worst protocol to have been introduced in IP camera systems, regarding security. It's purposefully designed to punch through safety/control measures. Some may say ONVIF is worse, but I digress. :D

NOTICE: This comment was moved from an existing discussion: Hikvision Hardening Guide Recommends Port Forwarding

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* **** **** *** own ***** ***** * think **'* ** *********** issue ** *******.

***** ** ** ***** that **** ** ****, since ** ** ** design: "************ ******** ** ***** through ******/******* ********". * am ******* *** **** people *** **** ** an ******* *** ********?

****'* * ****:

***** ** ** ***** **** **** ** ****...

*** *** ***’* ****** ******* **’* ***** **** **** **********, do ***?

* ***** ***** *** is ***** **** **** forwarding ******* ** *** be **** ******* *********. At ***** **** ********** requires *** ****/********* ** know **** ***** **** to ** ******. *** just *** *** ****/********* scan * ** **** and ***** **** ********** is ******.

** ***** **** ********** requires *** ****/********* ** know **** ***** **** to ** ******...

******** ** *****’* **** UPnP ** *******, ***** is *** ****, ** not **** **** ******* ship.

**** *****... ** **** **** *** **** **** ***** *** you.

#*, **** ********. **** forwarding ** ******* ** the ***** **** ** allows ****** ** **** access.

** *** ***** ****, P2P *** ********* *** general ******** ******** *** in ***** ** ** organization's ** ********** ** that ** *** ** deployed ******* ********* ** permission ** *** ** department, ***/**?

****,

*** ***** "******" **** ******? ******* **, * ******* **'* be ***/** *********, ** *********. *'* **** ** **** ** speak ** ******* *** * ***, **** ** ** ****** Administrator ***********. *'* **** ** **** ** *** **** ******** on ** ********* *** *** **** *** ******* ********* ** regarding *** ** ****.

**** **********/********** ** * ************ ***** ****, **** *** ** not * ****/******* *******. **'* ***** *** **** ****** **** through. **'* **** ** ** ** ** *******/****** **. ** we **** ** ** **** ** ****** ** ***** **** from *** *******, **** *** ****** ***** ******* ** **. Same **** *** ********. *******, ** *** ******** ** ***** ports/applications/REMOTE ******. **** ** *** *** ** * ***, *** will ******* **** ********* *** ***** ** ******** *** **** you ****** ***** *** ** ***/** *********/********* ** **** *** are *** ******* ** *** ***.

***** *** ******* **** **** *** ********** ** ************ ** "route" *** ****** *******, *********** *******, **** ** *******, *************** of *** ***** * ************** ********, ***** ********* *** ****** came ****: (***. *.*, **** ********** ** ********* *** ******** Policy).

* **** ** ***** **** ** ** ** *** ****** MAC/IP *********, ** **** ***** (******* ** *** ******** ** application *****), **** ******** *** ******* ** *** *** *** are ******** ********** *** *************** *** ************. *******, ** *** enable *** *********, **** ******* **** ***** ** ********** **** the ***, *** *** *** (*******) ****** **** ****/*******.

******** **** ********:

*) *** *** ** * *** **** *** *** *** admin **** ** *****://**:****.

*) *** ******* **** ** **** ****** ** **** ***, exposing ** ** ***.

*) ** *** ***** ** *****, ****** ** *** ***** can ****** *** ******* ** ***** *******, ****, ******, ******, whatever, *** *****://**:**** *** *** *** ********* ** ****** *******/****** etc. *** *** ******* * "***" **** ****** **** ** any ******* ** *********** **** ***** ** ******* *** *** browser ******** *** ****. **** ****** **** ** ****'* **** commonly **** ** ***** *********** ******* *** ************** ******** *** exploitation.

*) ** *** *** * *** ********* **** (******* **** because *** ********* ** ******** *** ** *** ******* ******* methods, *** *** **** ***. *** *** *** ***** ** Apache *** *******, ***** ******** ** *** *** ** **** ramble * ****** ****.) ** **** ******** **** **** ******* access **** **** *******, **** ***** ****** *** ** ******* they ******* * ********* **** ***** ** ******** ******** ** an ******** ** * "******* ** ***, **** *****" ******. They ***'* **** *** *** ***** **** **** **** ******* from * *******, **** *** ** *****. **** ******** *********** of ********** ******* ** * ****** *****.

******** ** **, ** ** ****** *** ****** ****** (***, SFTP, ***, ******, ***.) *** **** *** ******* ** ***** access, ** ** ** ** *** **** ****** ****** ** expected, ** ******** ******* **** ******* *** *** ***** ** the ***** *****, ** ********** ********.

*'* ***** ** ** ** ****** (*********** ***..) *** ***** that **** ********** ** ** *** ******* ***** ****, **** MAC ********* ** * **** ****** ****** ** ******* ** admin *********. ** ** ********** **** ****** **** *** *** it **** ************* *** * **** ** ****** ** ** an **********/********** *********** (** * ** **** ****** ** **** permitted). **** ****** **** ****** ******* ******** ** ***** *** would ****** ****** **** **** *** ****** ******, *******, *** admin *************. ****'* ******** ***** ***. :)

** ****** *********** ********* **** ****, ******* *** ** *** lapse ** ******* *** ******* ** *** *********. *********.

*** ***** "******" **** access? ******* **, * assumed **'* ** ***/** filtering, ** *********.

** ********* ** *********** to ********* *** **** users ******* ** *** heavily ********* *** **** and **** *** **** of * ****** ** the *********.

****** ***** ************ ******** is * ***** ******** who ***** ** **** their ******* ********. ** you ** ** *********, any **** *** ** address ******* (*** ****** uses ***** ***** ** the ****, ** ***** relative's *****, ***.), **** new ** ******* ** now ******* *** **** cannot **** ***** ******. The ******** ** *****, calls *** *********, *** installer *** *** ** manually *** * *** IP ******* *** ***** new ***** *** ******** wants ** **** ***** cameras. ** ******* ***********.

** *** *** * MAC ********* **** (******* this ******* *** ********* is ******** *** ** the ******* ******* *******, not *** **** ***. You *** *** ***** in ****** *** *******, sorry ******** ** *** may ** **** ****** a ****** ****.) ** your ******** **** **** permits ****** **** **** devices, **** ***** ****** try ** ******* **** receive * ********* **** which ** ******** ******** by ** ******** ** a "******* ** ***, move *****" ******.

*** *** *** ********* to ** **** *** devices ****** *** ****** Internet? *** *******, ******** is ** * ********** and ***** ** *** their ******* ** ***** office? *** ***** *** office ****** / ******** be **** ** *** the *** ******* ** the ****** ********** ** connect ** *** **** forwarded? *** ********* *** layer * *** *** 'shared' ****** *** ****** Internet, *.*.** **** *** ******* revealed **** *** *** up * *******?,*** ********* *** ******** traffic?

****,

******* ****, * *** have ********** *** ********* can ** **** ** filter *** *******, ** can't. * *** ********* to **/*** ********* * little *** ******* *** may **** ******** ******! I ****** **** ****** "IP" ****** **** "***" filtering ***** ****** *.

* ** *** ****** to ***** ** *** "challenges" ** *********** **** a ******* *** ********** etc. *'* ****** ** state **** ******* ***** admin, *********** ** **** forwarding ** ********** **** secure **** *** *** be, ** *** ******* all ***** ** * P2P *******.

*** ******* ***** (** a ********* ***) ***** DDNS ******* *** *** set ** **** ***.

****'* *** ****** ******?

** ** ************ ***** ** *** *** **** **** **** you *** **** "**** **********" **************.

*** ******* ** ****** *** ***'* **** **** ** **** the ******* ************** ** *** ****** ** ********* **.

*** ** *** * *******, **'* * ******* *********** ***** of ********* **** *** ****** ************ *** ****** ****** **** veiled ** ********* *******.

***, ***/***, ** **** **** "**** **********" ************** *** *** best **** ******** *** *** ******* *** *********** *** * secure *** ********* ********* *****. **'* **** *** *** ** built ** *** ** ** *****'* *** ******* ****** ******** practices, *'* **** * **** **** ***** ********* ** **'* negative ************ ** **** *****. * ***'* ***** *** ******* how **** *** ******** ** ***** **** ********** ******** ** P2P ** *** **** ******** **** ******* ***** ******* ************** of ***. ***** ******* **** ***** ** ***** * ***** quantity "**** **********" **************, ****** **** *** ********** ** ********* vendors **** ***.

*'* ** **** ** ******* *** ** **** ** ****** but * **** ***'* **** *** ** ** *** ****. It's ****** ** ********** ** ***** ***, **** *** **** using ***** **** "********" *** "*****" ******* **** ***'* ***** (whut) *** ******* ************ **** "** *** *****/***/*** *********/********** **********" explains ******* ***** *** ******* ** *** *** ****** *********** raise *** *****. *****, ***** ** * **** ********** **** vendors *** *** ***** ******** ********* --** **** **** *****-- to ******* ***** *****/*** *** ***************.

**** **********: **** **** *** ** ***** ** ** *** like *** **'* * ***** ********. ***, ***/*** *** ******-****** industry ********* *** ***** ********* *** ****** **********, **********, ********, deployable, ********** ****.

***: * ***** * *** ***** ********* * ******* ********** regarding ***** *** ************** *** ** *****'* ******* ** *** how **'* ********, ** ********; *** ** * *** *** but ************, ** ********. * ***'* **** ** **** **** out *** **** *** **** ** *** ********* ******* **: "We *** *** ********* ** ******* * ********** *** **********". It *****'* ******* ** ****, *** *******, ****** *****/****/*** *** NAT ********* *** **** *** ******** **** **** ********* ** know. :*

*********: **** ** *** *** **** *** ******** **** ********* from, ***'* *** * **** ******. ** ******* ****** **** system, **'* ******** ****** ** ** **** ******** *********. *** isn't * ********, ** **** ** **** *** "********", ** the "*****" ** * ********. **** ** **'* **** ** know *** ******* ** ******* ** ********* ******, ** **** to **** *** ********* ****** **** ** ************ *** ******* P2P **** *** "******" ****.

*******: *** ********** ********* (***, ***/***, ******) **** ***** *** browser ***** ***** *** **** *** **** *****, ** *** know ****, **** *** ****** ** ******, *** *** ************. The ********** ********* (*, *, *?) **** ***** **** ******* implementation ** *** *** *** *********, *** **********, *** *** modicum ** ***** ** ********* ** *** *** *****, ****** in ***** (*****). *** ***** ** * ********* ***** ********* that "**** **********" ** ***. *****, ******** ** **** *** please */********/***/* ***.

*** ********** ********* (***, TLS/SSL, ******) **** ***** the ******* ***** ***** web **** *** **** known, ** *** **** them, **** *** ****** in ******, *** *** standardized.

*** *************** *** *** the *****. *** **** school *** ***** *** and **’* ******** ** the ***/** ******** *****?

** *** **** *** implementation "***" *** *** the *****, **** *'* be ******** **** ***. As ** ******, *'* confident **** *** *** not **********, *** *******, explain ** ********* "*****" implementation. *** ****** *** get *** **** *** of **** *******, *********** signing ** ***. **** could ** ******* ******* from ***** "*********" ****** via ******/***/***!/******* ******, *** don't **** *** ** you ***, *'* ******** you ******'* **** **.

** ** * **** that ******* **** *** likely ***** ******** ** implement *** ******* **** incorporate ************ ** *********** over ***. *** ******** that **** ************* **** UDP *******'* ** **** and ** *** **** least ** ****** ****** an ******* ** *** client.

** ** ********** *** inherent ***** ** ***** UDP *** **** ******?

**.

* **** *** *** team ***** **** *** software.

***** ** *** ****** we *** **** *******************'* *********, ***** ** ******* to ****. ** **** free ** ***.

**** ** *** *** connection ******* ****** *** server ** ***********.

*) ***** ** *** to *** *** ********* technics(UDP **** ******** **** specifically, **** ******* *** used). *** ******* ******* on *********, ******* ****** etc *** *** **********. If "*** **********" ** established, ** *** *** library(which ****** ** ** use *** **** ***, which ****** ** ** use ***** **** ***). Practically ***** **** *****, we **** ******* ********** between ****** *** ******.

*) ** *** ********* does *** ****, ** use * ****** *****(* guess ** ****** ** considered ** ***).


** ******* *********** **** scheme ** **** ****** than **** **********, ***** if *** **** **** forwarding: *** ******** ** scanning ***** *** **** which ******** ** *** use, ***** **** **'* running ** *** **** do **** ****** ** something.

* *** ** ******** including(skype *** ********* **** be ** * ********)*** absolutely *** **** ********.

******, *** ******* ** done ****** *** **** through:

*****:

**********.*******-********.***
*** - *****: **, 443


*****-*******

****** *:

*.********.***

****** **:

*****.********.***
*****-**.********.***
*****-**.********.***
*****-**.********.***
*****-**.********.***
********.********.***

*** **** : **, 443.

***** *** **** **** for *** *****. *'* truly ********* **** *** effort ***'** *** ** to ************. * ***** meant ** "**** ***" DW (** *****, * made * ********* ***** them ** ****) *** I **** ********* ** use **** **** ********* to *** ** ****** home ** ******** ***** P2P.

** ******* ** "****" (I ****** ***), ** that ** **** ********** P2P ***** ***** ** misconceptions ** *** ********** technology. * ***'* **** to **** * ****** on *** ** ******** else. *** *** ** made ****** ****** *** TEMPEST ******* * *******, but ** ******* *** is * ***** ** I'm **** ****** ** throw * ***** **** it ** ** *** see **..

* ******* **** ******* may ** *** **** glimpse ** ** * P2P ************** *'** **** published ** * ******. With **** ****, * feel **** ** *** type ** *********** ** need ** ***** ********* analyzing ****.

***'* ******* ***** ** want ** *** **** questions **** ***, *** I ***'* ***** **'* fair ** ******* ***** config ********* ** *** tweak ** * ************* file ***** **** *** the **** **** *********** etc. *******, ***** ** is *******, *'* ****** UM5 ***** ****** * few ******* ********* **** may **** *** ******** as * *****:

***,

*) **** * ****** enables *** ** ** would ** *** ***********, is ** **** **** the *** ******** *** the ******* ** ******* and ******* *** *******? This ** ** ** obvious *** * ***** some ****** **** ** hear **. *** ****** on *** ********* ** the ****** *** *** implementation.

*) ** *** **** any *************** ** **** weak *** ***************? ***** throughout **** ******* *********** you've ********** * *** technical **-***. ** ***** anything ** ********** ** should **** *** *** from ******* ****** *** board?

*) ***** *** ********* using ***** ********* *** implementation **** **** **********, without ****** ***** **** an ******* ** ********** their **************?

****** *****!

**, ** *******, * agree **** **** *****.
***** *** *** ***** I ****** * ************.

** ****** **** *********:

*) * ****** **** for ******. **** *** product, *** ****** ** no. ** ***'* ****** the ******, ** ****** control **. **** ** a ****** ****** - we ****** ** ** it **, **** **** we ****** ** ** organization - ** ****** to *** *********' *******. This *** **'* **** less ************** ** *** shoulders.

******, * ****** *** about ***** *** ********* in *******.


*) ******* * *** think ** **** ***** be **** ** *** users ** ***********. * would ******* ******: *** do *** **** **** your ******** ** *******? (Obviously, **'* *** * QA *** ** ***** security ******). **, *** example, **** * ****** of ******** ***********, *** most *********** ** ********** our **** *** *** party ************* ******* ** check. *** **** ** find ****** *** ** to ***. * **** question ***** **: *** often **** *** ******* audit ** ****?

*) ******* ** *** volume *** *****. *********** very *** ************* ***** do *** ******. ** security ** ****** ******** to **** - **** would *** ******* *** system ** *** ******** at ***.

** ** ** ****** to *** *** ********* I **** ** *) ..nobody *****. *** *** backdoors. ** ****, ** still ** *** ***** shelf...

* ************ ***** "********" when * ***** "*****". There ** ** ***** argument *** **** * P2P ********** ******* * client ****** *** * cloud ***** ******* ** not "* ******** ****". The ******** ** ******* there ** *******, ** lesser ****, *** **** kind ** **** **** is.

* ***** ***** * P2P ********** ** **** risky **** ***** **** forwarding. ******** *** ********(*) used ** ******** *** P2P ********** ****** *** reasonably ******, **** ***'** putting **** ******** ** the ***** ** * company *** (*********) *** significantly **** ********* **** you ** ** ****** security *** **** ************** up ** ****. **'* certainly ******** **** *** P2P ******** ***** **** a ******, *** ************ ***** ** ***** and ***** - ******** quicker **** **.*% ** their ********* ***** ** to ****** ********.

** **** ********** *** port ********** ** ******* the ************ ***'* ***********, then *** ******** ***** flat ***** *** ************ could ****** ********* * back **** ******** **** to **** *** ****** devices **** *** ******** without ***.

***** ** **** **** both. * ***** ******** lean ****** *** *** smaller ************* ***** ***** is ******* ****** * person ***** ** ** they *** ****** ** the ****** *******, *** VPN *** ******** ****, while ***** ** **** to ****** **** ********* resources ** *** ******* are ********* ** **** cases. *** ** ****** the ***** **** ** to ****** ******** *** manufacturers *** **** **** you *** ***** ** the ***** *****.

*** ** ***** ******** a **** ******* *** firewall ** **** ****** to *** ***** ******. At **** ** ** security ****** *********. ** worst ** ** ** unauthorized ****** ** *** firewall.

** * ********* *****, it's *** "******** * hole" ***** **'* ****** no ********* **** * client ** ****** ** outbound ********** ** *** internet *** ************* **** a *** ******. **** the ********'* *********** ** is ***************** **** ****** internet ******** *** *****'* no *** *** * random ******* ** ******** an ******* **********. *** it **** ****** *** P2P ******** **** **** network ** ****'** ******** their ******** ** ***** remote **** *********.

** * **** ** doing **** ******* ** approval **** ***, * agree ** ***** ** unauthorized. *********, ** ***'** making * ********* ******, then **'* *********** ** authorized *** ********** ******* your ******* *** *** P2P ******* ********.

******* ** ****** ***** be ******* ** *******, and **** **** ******* should *** ** ******* out ** *** ***. But * ***** ***** P2P ** *** ****** choice **** ******** ** port ********** **** * security ***********.

* ***'* ***** *** is ******** ** ********* (non-default ***** ***** **), but * ** ***** that ***** ** **** and ** ***** ** be ******* ***. **'* not **** **** ********** is ******** *** *** is *** ********* ****** alternative.

* ***** ****** *** VPN **** ********, *** it's ******* ******** - just *** ****** ********** due ** **** ***/** inconvenience.

****, * **** *** first ******** *** *** now *** *** **** will *** ********** ** network ******* ******** *** more ********.

*** *** *** ** right ** ***** *******.

*** ** ** ** pear * **** ********** with * ****** *** is **** ** ****** as **** ********** ** dynamic **** *******.

*** *** **** **** every ******** ** *** on **** *** ** NVR.

*** *********** *** **** customers *** ** ** is *** **** *** most ****** ********.

** ** ****** ****** is *** **** ******! lol

** ** ** **** you **** * ***** of ****** ******* *** every ********.
*** *** **** ** make ** ***** ** them **** ****** ** cameras ** * ****, do **** **** ** or ***, *** ** what ***** ** ******** do **** ****.

*. **********

*. ******* ******* **********

*. ** ******

** ******* ** ** they **** ** ** hack **** ******* * pass-code **** *** **** them.
****** ********** ***** ***.

* *** *** ***** anything *** ** * say *** ** ****** but * *** ***** and ****** ** ****!

** ** *** ** P2P **** ****** **** a "****" ******* ** securing ** ***/*** ******* based ***** ****. ** you ***, ****** ******* what ******'* *** ************** you *** ******** ****.

**** ***'* ** ** the ****.

*** ********* ***** *********** *** *** ********** ** ****** **** defined ** "******** * ***** ******* *** ********". ***** ** even * ****** ****** *** ********.

*'* *** **** *'* ******** ****.

** ***** **** ** *** ********** **** **** ********** ** bad. ** **** *** *********, ** ** *** ******* **** port ******* **** ************** *** ***?

********** ******** **** **********, **** ****. ***'* ****** * *** without *********** *****. ****** *** *** ** * ****** ***** in *** ****** **** ***/**** ****, **** *** **** **, right?

******* ***** **** **** ********** ** ***. ******* ** * VPN, ******** ** *** (** *********), * *** ********** ** the ***** **** ** *** **** **** *** ** **. The **** ******* **** **** ** **** ******** ********* **** at ********. *** ***** ******** (****** ******?) **** **** *** admin **** ** *** ** **** ****** *** ******* *** device. *** ***** ***** ******** **** ***. **** *** ******* to ******.*** ** ****-****-***, *** *** ****** ** *** ***, not *** ** *'* *** **** ***** *** *** ******** come **** *** *'** ******* * *** **** ** ****** why * **** ***** ** **** ** * ******* ********* port ******* **** *************.

*** ******* ***'* **** ********** ** *** ***** *****. *** problem ** *****, ******** ********* **** ** ********. ** *** need * ***, ** *** ***** **** ****** *** ***. With **** ****, ** *** *********** ** ******* *******. *******, if ** *** *** ***** **** ***** ******** ******* **** their ******** ** ** **** **** *** ***** *** ******** it ********* **** ******* *** ***** *** ****? ********* * web **** **** *** ** *** ** *** **** **** to **.

******* *** ***** **** ** ********** ** * *******, **** not **** ** ****** *** ****** *******. **** ******* "*****" can ****** *****://***********.*** ** ****** ***** ********** ******* *********** *** have ** ************ *******. *** **** ** *** ****** ** authenticate? ***? ******? ** *** ******* **'* **** ***, ***** we **** ***** **, *****?

***** *** **** * **** *** **** ******** *** ********* using **** ******* **** **************:

*) ******** ********* **** ** ********* *******, *********** ****** ** question *** ********* ** *** ***** ****** ***** ****.

*) ******* ***** ********* *** *** ****** "*******" ** "******.***" files ** ***** *************, **** ***** *** ******* ** ******** and *** ********, ******* ** * ******** **** ** ***** scale ***********. ** **** ****'* ** **** * ***** *** effective ****** ** *** ******** ****** *** *****, ** ***** recommend ** *** *** ******* ** *** ***** ******* ** reputable ****** ******* ***'* ***** ****. **** ***** ****** ** able ** ** **** *** *'* **** ****'* *** **** to *** * **** ****** ***** ** ***** ****** ******* notes. ** ****** ** ***** **** *********** ** *********** **** worse **** *** ******* *** ** *** ******, ***** ****** all ******* **** *** ******* ********** ** * ********* *** servers. ****** **** ** ** *** ***************, * *** ** do ** *** ******** *** *** *** **** ** ** Krebs ******* ********* ***.

**** *** ** **** ****, **** ** *** **** *********?

* **** ***** ** ***** ****** ********** ************* ********** ** systems *** *'* *** **** ******* **** ** *** ********** here, ** ********. ** ********** ** ********** (**** **** **** an ****** ** **********), *** *** **** ********** ** ****** the **** "****** ******" *** ***. ***** ** ****** * security ****** ** ***** ** ***** **** ******* *** ******* coming ** *** *** *** **** ***'* ** **** ** you ** **** **** *** ********* *** ***. **** **** said, *** *** *** **** **** ***** ********* **** *** IT *********/***** *** ** *** ***'* ****** ****, ****'** ****** have *** ******** **** *** *******.

** ** *****, *** ** ****** ******** ** * ****** to *** ********* ** ** *******. ***** ****** *** *** up ** *********** * ****** *****. ** *** **** ****** etc *** *** *** ********** ******* **** "*****" *** ********* kid *** **** **** *** ** **** ***'* ***, **** can **** ** **** ******* ********* ** ******* **** ** software.

*** ***** *********, **, *** ** ******** ***** **** *** a **** ********** *************. *** *** ******** ***** ******* *** hackers ***** "*****" ** **** *** ** **** ******. *** use ** ** ****** *** *********** ** ********* *** **'* use ****** ****** * ******* ** **** *******.

****** ******** ******** **** ******* ********* ***** **** *****. **** have * ********* **** ** **** **** ** ****** **** valuable **** *** ** ******** **********.

****** **** *** ****** **** ** *** *** *****. * think ** ****** ******* **********. ** ***** ** **** ** contact ******* ***** ****** ******* *** ******.*** ** ***** ****** and ******* **** ** ******* ***** *** *************** * *** more ** ******. (** *** *** ***** *** ***** *********, lol)

******** **'* ****** **** using **** **********. **** ports ******** ** * DVR ** * *** more ***** ***. *** isn't *******, *** * lot ****** ** *** ask **. ****, ** may ***** **** ******* what ******* ***** ** takes, *** *** *********** is *****.

* ***'* **** ** come ** ** ***** obtuse, *** *** *** explain ** ********'* *** implementation? * ********** ** for * *** ***** the ***** *** *** as * ********, ** doesn't ******* *** **** implement *** ***** **** "NAT ********* ******** **** forwarding ** ******* * direct ****-**-**** **********". **** is *** * **** to **** **** * don't **** ******** ***** it.

*** *** **** *** the ***** ****** *** can ****** ********-****. ******* manages *** *** *******, essentially **** **** ******. I ***** ** ********** that *** **** ** vexing ** ** *'* honest.

*** ** ******* *** buck ** ******* **** (those ******* *** ********) and ****** **** **** will **** *** ****** measures ** ****** ********. Have *** **** ***** those *********** *** *********** these *** ******** ***** what **** ** ***** gathered, ***** ** ** being ******, **** ** is ***** **** ***, etc? *'** ***** *** of *** *** * providers ** **** ***** provide ** **** **** from *** ******** *** marketing ******** ***** ** was ***** **** ** a **** ******* *** was ******* * ***** stare ** ********. ****** wants ** *** *** deeply **** *** *** works *** ******* ** not ** ** ***** properly ******* *** ********** because **'* **** "** easy" ** ***.

**** ********** ** ********** no ******* ******** ******, but ** **** *** have ******* ** **** it **** ****** **** more ******. *** *** used *****/*** **** ****** certificates, *** *** *** non-standard *****, *** *** use *****/***** ******* *** IP *********, *** *** implement *** *********, *** can *** ** ******** only *** ********, ***. P2P *** ******* ***** solution ** ****** ******** efforts ** **** ** easier. *** ***** **** is **** *** **** no **** **** ** really ********* **** **. The **** ***** ***** in ** ******* *** the ******** ** ****.

**** ** *******.

***** *** *** **** input. * ***** *** explain **** **** ****** than *. * **** this ***** **** **** in ****** ** ****** misconceptions ** ***.

** *** *** ** solicit *** ** ***** "secure". ******.

***** * ***** **** you ** ******* *****, how **** ** **** DVR ************* *** *** actually ***** **** ******** with * *** **** from * * ******* CA?
*** **** ** *** check ** * ******* base ** *** ** the ****** ****** ******** is *********?

**** *** *** ********* a ***, *** ****'* do-able *** *****-****** ***** businesses, *** *** **** home ********* ***** ******** do **** **** ** brings ***** *****?

*** ** * ******** router *****'* **** **** an ****** ******** *** either.
*** ** ****** * VPN ** * ****** solution, ****** ** ***** to ***** ***** ****, but **** ********** * recorder **** **** ****** weak ********* *** *** dated ******** ** * very *** *****.

*** ***'* *******, *** from **. *** ** somewhat ******* *** **** certain *****.

**** *** ******* ****:
*****://***.******.***/*/*******/********/******/***********************************************/

****** ******* ** **** an ****** **** ********:

"** ***** ********** *** multiple ******** *******, *** nothing ******* **** *** other ******* **** ***** surveillance. ** **** ********** only *** ************ *** connection. *** ***** ****** were ******** *********** ******* our ******* *** ***. ThroughTek ***** ******* ***** our ********'* ***** ******, nor ** **** **** anything ***** *** ****'* information (**** ******** *** password). **** **** ********. Thanks!"

** *********** ******** *****'* a **** ******* ** using ***. *** ******* is **** ********* **** of *** *****. ****, we *** ***** ** certain ** *********, ********** with ***** *** *********, but ** ***** *** prevents * ******** **** being ******* *** *** entire ********.

**** ** * *****

!

"** ***** ********** *** multiple ******** *******, *** nothing ******* **** *** other ******* **** ***** surveillance. ** **** ********** only *** ************ *** connection.

******* ******** * ******** installer ** ***** **** to ***** ********** **** their *** *********. ****** like * ***** *** of ***** ***** **.

**'* *** ********** ***** from *** ****** ********* (although ** ****** ***** in ********** ********** *** from ***** *****), *** Wyzecam *** ****** ** make *** ***** **** they ** *** ***** ThroughTek. *** ****** ***** does **** ** ***** Wyze's ***** ** ******.

**** **** **** **** ThroughTek ** ****** * way *** * ****** app ** ******* ** a ****** ** ** knows *** **** ** the ******, **** **** any ****** *** ******* to * ****-********* ****** if ** ***** *** ip ******* *** **** that *** ****** ** available **. *** ********* Wyzecam ***** ******** ************** information, ***** **** ** Wyze (*** *** ** Throughtek), ****** ** **** talk ** *** ****** - **** ** * port-forwarded ****** ***** ******* a ******** *** ******** to ****** *** **.

*** **** **** *** NAT ********* *** **** of *** ************* **** didn't ********** **** *** camera **** ****** **** a ****-********* ******. *** might ***** **** **'* a ****** *** **** secure ** ********** ***** it ****** ** ********* the **** ***** **** it ** ** ********* IPs.

*************, ***** *** * number ** ****** ***** that *** ********** ** other ******* *** ************** and (****** *******) **** a ******* **** **** and ******** **** *** user *** *** **** changed. ***** ***** ******* establish * ********* ** which *** ******* ***** can ******* *** ****** w/o *** ****'* *******, they ****** ** **** the ****** **** ********, to ***** *** **** extent *** ****** ** insecure ** ************* *********** a **** ********** *** itself *** ****.

******* ** *** *** being **** ** ******** cite *** ********, *** wasn't ***** * ****** report ** *******'* *** service ***** ******** ** that *** *** *** to ** *** ****** something ** *** ****** of *** *** *** you ***** ******* ** someone ****'* ***** ** will? ** * ****** correctly ***** **** ** login *********** ****** ** you ****** **** *** unit *** **** ******* the *** ******.

*** ******* ** **** type ** ********* ** nice *** *** **** of ***, *** *****, you *** ** *** mercy ** ******* **** it ** *** **** it ** ** *** right *****. *** * guess ** **** ** someone *** **** ***** at ******* **** *** say "**** **** ** it *** ******" **** it's ****.

***'* *** ** *****, I ********** ***** **** you. *** * ****** to ***** *** ** that **** *** ** setup *********, **'* **** a ****** *********** ** port **********.

**** * **** *** example ** ****, ****'** given ** * ********* name, *** **** ** well ******* * *** service **** ***** ********* line-up.
*****://***.****.***/************/****-******-******-******

*'* *** **** ***** the ******** **** *** using, ***** ** **** be ***** *** *** like *******, *** *** probably *** *** ***** :-)

*'* ****** **'** ******** to ***** *** ***** P2P ******* ** ***** and ********* ***, *** services *** ** **** used *** * *** more **** **** ******** cameras.
**'* *** *** ****** which ** ********, *** the *** **'* *********** in **** **** *****.

*** ** * ****** used ********, *** **** in ************. *** **** interesting ** ****** **** is **** ****** *** what ****** ****** ** used.

*** ******** ** * down ** ***** **** of ***, ** *** want *** ******* ****** to *** **** ****** connected *** ****** *******, P2P ** *** *** to ** ***** ***.

*** ****** *************, ****** things **** ****** ** and ******** ** * top ******** *** *** is * ** ** method *** ****** ****** easier.

**** ********** *** ***** was *** *********** *** to *** *** ** for ****** *******, *** with ** **** * huge **** ******* **** point *** **** *** users *** ******* *****. P2P *** * *** Send *** ***** *** werent *********** *********** *******.

*** **** ********* ** here **** * *** connection ** *** **** choice *** ****** *******. This ** ***** *** not ********* ** ***. Can *** ******* *** users *** **** **** dealers ****** ** ***** a *** **** ** view ***** ************. *** may ** ******** "****, this ** ****" . However, ** *** *** saying ****, ** ** obvious *** **** ***** worked ** **** ******* with *** ***** ** different ******.

** ***** ******** **** topic ** *** *** all, *** **** *** things *******, *** **** of *** ****** ******* that *** ** *** best ****** *** ********** us *******.

** *** ** ******** goes, * ***** **** like ** *** ** the **** **** ** cyber ********. ***** ** need * ********** ****** to **** *** ******** for **** **** ** connection **** ******* ********** to ** ******** *** occasionally ******* ****. **** like *** ******, *** for ***** ********.

****,

**** *** ****** *** on * ***** ******, it ***** ******** ** an *** ******* ** Florence *****, ****** ***** routed **** *** ** servers ** *********. ** then ******** ** * Garmin ******* ****** ** sync ****** **** ****** being ******* *** ** binary; **** ******* ** the *** ****** ** trained *******.

**** ** *****'* ************** of ***.

*** *** ***** ** wrong?

*** ** *** * protocol. **'* ** ************ or *********** ** ******* a ****** **********. ***** is ** ***.*** ** "stack" **** ******* *****. Napster *********** *** *********** from *****, *********** **** DW ********, *********** **** Dahua.

* **** ** *** is *********** **** ** more "******". *** ** the *** ** *** IP **** ********- ***** too **** ** ***** it's * *** ****. P2P ** **** ******, however **'* *** **** to *** ** ******** configuring *** ******* ********.

* **** **'* ******* that **** ** ** no *** *****'* ************** of ***. :*

***** *** ***** *** incorrect **** **** * said ********. ***********, *** still *** ******* *** to ***** ******* *** remote ******* *** *** masses. *** ** ** leaps *** ****** ****** than *********** **** ********** or *** *** *** masses ** ****. ****** of ****, *** * game *******.

***** *** ***** * was ****** ** ****.

*** ** ***?

*'* **** *** *******. ** ********* **** **** ** ** the *******.

** ******** *****'* ****** ** **** ** **'* ****?

* *** ********* **** a ******** **** **** would ** *****.

***** ****** **** ** all *** ********** ** have ** *** ** the ***** ** ****** a **** (** ***** what *** **** ** call **) ** ******** as ** ******** *** take *** ************* **** for ** **** ** is ****. ******* ** is ** ***, * dont ****, *** **** do ** *** **** the ***** ** ************* if ** ** ** isnt *** ******** *** it. **** **, *** is **** ****** *** way **** ********** **** any ***** ******. *** good *** ******* ** you ****.

** *** *** ** to *** ***** ******* opposite *** ** *** spectrum *** ********** ****** your ******** **** *** internet **********.

* ********** *** ***** you're ****** ****, *** this ***** * ****.

********** ** **** ** get ** *** ***** of ****** * **** (if ***** **** *** want ** **** **) to ******** ** ** industry

***** **, **** *** be *********.

* *** ***** ***, I *** * *** developer. ***** **** **** large ****** ** *** web *********** ********* ****** that ****. *****, ****, Responsive *** ******, ****.**, etc. * *** ***** Gulp.js *** ******* ***** tasks ****** (*** *****) Gulp.js *** ****. * remember ******** *** *** being ** *** ** every **** ***** **** Sindre ****** ***.

** ****** **** ****.** and *** *** ***** to ******* *** *****. Yeah, ***** **** **** naysayers, *** ********** *** so ********** ****. ** you ****** ***********, *** could *** ** **** a ****** "*** ******* antigravity".

********-***********. *** *********-**************.

** ** ***** ***, yeah,************************** *****. *** *** micromodules *** ************ ************ make ** ************ **** to **** ******* **** a **** ****** ** projects.

*** **** *** ******* growth, *** ****** ** inertia ** **********. *** whole *** ********* ** still *****. * *** of ********* ****** ** it. ** **** **** time *** ****** (**** most ***'* ****) ** switch. *** **** *** feasibly ** *** ** use ******** ******** *** Snyk ** * ****-***.

*** ****'* *** * wouldn't ** ********* ** something ****, **** ****** than *****-****** ***** ** the **** ****.

**, ***, **** ****** can ***** ********, *** sometimes ** **** **** everybody **** ** "************ dead-end" ******. ** ***, say, **'* * ****.

****** ** ***** * go *** * ****** fallout *******.

* ** ********** *** respect **** ***** ****, but ** *** ***** side ** **** **** dark. *** *** ******* to ***** ************* ** an ******** **** **** a ********, ******** ***** record *** ******* ********. They **** ** **** no ******* ********* ** it (***** **'* ******* to ***** ********* ** the ***** ** * major ********) *** **** they **** *** ***** and ***** **** *** with * ***** ** some *****.

*** ******* *** **** burnt ** *** ** the *** *** ******** to *** ** * P2P ****** *** ** on ***, **** ** paid ***, *** *** to ***** *** *********** it *** ********* *** knowing *** ** ***** we *** ******* ******* bandwidth **** **** ** was **** *** * DDoS ****** ******* * network ** ********, *****. At ******* ****, * different ************ *** ***** P2P ******* ***** *** had ** **** ***, so ** *** ** try ** ******* **** angry ********* *** **** them ** ** **** and ****** ***** ******** all **** *****. *** these ** *** ***** botnet, ****** **** ******* and ** **** ***** stops.

* **** ** **** any *** "********" **** these ********* **** * very ***** ***** ** salt *** ******** ***** attempts ** ******** ** every **** ******* **** don't **** ** ******** it ** ********* ** all. ** *** *** ones **** *** *** price, **** *** *** a ****** **** ** in *** *****, *** that's ****, ****'** **** have ******* **% *** sale *** ******** **** let ** ** **** again.

** ** ***** **** ** ***** * ************ ** **** are ****** **** ******* **** *****. ********, ** * *** in ****'* ***** ** ** ********. **** *****.

**** *** ****** *** on * ***** ******, it ***** ******** ** an *** ******* ** Florence *****, ****** ***** routed **** *** ** servers ** *********. ** then ******** ** * Garmin ******* ****** ** sync ****** **** ****** being ******* *** ** binary; **** ******* ** the *** ****** ** trained *******.

**, ** * ***** device **** ******* ******* P2P ** ******* ** not.

**** *********, ***** *** set ** ** **** the ****** ***** *** read **** ***** *****?

**, **** *** ******* P2P ** ***** ** a **** ****?

****(****, **) **** **. Adding * ******* ********** certification ** ******* *** negligent ** *** ** answer * ***** *******. Installing ** *** ** a ********'* ********* ******* with ** ********, ******** access *** ******** ** a *#*#*** ****. ***** are **** **** ****** afford *** ***** ***** VMS ** ** ******** needed ** ********* ********. They ***** **** ** at ***** ********** *** risks ** *** ***** end ******* **** *** be **** ** **** informed ** ******** ***** network ******* *** ******** connections.

*** *** *** **** Hikua ** ***** ***** as **** *** **** publicly *** **** ** every ****** ****** ** the *****!

* ******* *** *** I *******. * ***'* have ******** ******* *** piece ** ****. *'* just ********* **** **** getting * ****** ******* away ********** ********* **** no *** *** *** eyes ** ******.

** ******* **** *** is "******" ** "******* than" ** "****", * would **** ** *********** that *** ****** ***** the ******* ** ********** P2P, ** **** *** volunteering ************** ***** ** dangerous ** **** ********, I ****.

*** ******'* ****** *** be *****-******, *** ***** may ******** *********** *****-**** over ***.

* ******* *** *** * *******.

**********, * ***’* ******* *** *******, ** ** ** **** some **** ******.

**** **** ******** ** ***** ;)

**** **************:

********'* *** ***** ** in * ******** **** from ******** ******* *** on *** *** ****** IP.

****** * ********* ****** IP ********* *** ****** to *** ***/********, *** pass ******* *** ********/****** in *** *** ****.

********* **** (********) **** allow ********** ********* ****** from *** ********* ******* segment ** ****** ** the ******** ****. **** takes **** ** ******** access.

** ****** ****** ** required, ******* * *** connection (********** *****, *** PPTP) *** **** ********** users **** ****** ****** to *** ******** ****. Log *** *********** (********** and ******) *** ***** the **** *********.

** *** ********* ** the ******** **** **** sure ** ****** *** default ********* (*******, *********, switches, ***.). *****, ***** is ********, *****? **** sure *** ***** ****** is ****** *** ****** if ********.

*** ****** ** *** servers ****** ********* ****** and ******* *********. *** here: *****://***.******.***/*********/?****=********

****** ********* ** * schedule *** ***** *** live ****, **** *** never.

**** ******** *** ******** up-to-date ** *** ******* on *** *******.

**** **** *** *** still **** * ****** serial ****** *** *** device *** * ******** (providing *** ****** **** from *******) ** ******* a ****** **********. *** question ** *** ****** is *** ****** **** these ***** ***?

*** ***** ***** **** I ***'* *** *********: what *** *** *** service ********* ***** **** the *********** **** ******???

*****'* ***** ******* ****** the *********/******* ** ***********, even **** ** *** that ** ******** ***********. When **** ******** ***** up *** **** **** service ******** ** *** manufacturers "*** ** *** goodness ** ***** ******" they *** ********* **** with ******* **** ** data, *** *** ***** of ***** ** * valid ******* *******. ** you ******** ******* **** in **** ***** **** this **** *** ** exploited ** **** *******? If ***** ******* ** focus * **** ******** on ******* ** **** directly, ** *** ***** they **** ******** *** even * *********** ** start ******* *** ******* to ***** ****** ****** using **** *******? ** you ***** **** **** care **** **** ****** product ******* *** ** Nelly's ** **** **** just ****** ** *** them *** *** ***** in ******* *** *** user **** ****** ***** material?

***** **** ************ *** service ** ****** **** the *********** *** ******* to ******* ***** ****** one ** **** ********* that **** **.

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