Subscriber Discussion

Hanwha WAVE VMS, Digital Watchdog Spectrum, US Oem & Network Optix All Russian Dev Teams

UI
Undisclosed Integrator #1
Mar 02, 2022

Is anyone else having concerns about the fact that Network Optix, who is the Sole Developer for US Based VMS Platforms that ALL connect via the cloud through the Nx Cloud Platform on AWS is developed and supported almost fully by Most All Russian Based Developers and App Developers. The Company may be based in California, but their is little to no development or programming being handled by US Based Employees. All Platforms and the primary Relay Server used to connect to AWS along with exposing ports and the software also changes Windows Firewall & Security by adding Rules to “Allow” Connections” external to inbound, along with allowing simple API Key’s, Hash’s, and so forth to allow viewing, control, changes, and modifications to be accessed and modified via the relay server and also can be remotely connected and manipulated via an API Call to the /resources file, which in turn can modify change and edit all devices connected including access to encrypted hash’s that NX Russian Developer certainly would have the Encryption Key Pair’s for both the Device Passwords, System Passwords, Admin Credentials, along with a pre-established connection for System Control with the UDP Hole Punching features built in for proxying system connections and device management features via the cloud intended to help bypass Firewall Rules by establishing the connections as Outbound thereby opening and holding open a connection long term to the streams for viewing. Along with Command and Control over the entire server and VMS Platform without any logging or unusual activity seen on the end users systems, as it would all be the VMS Software Connections and Services that would be seen. Therefore allowing exploitation of these features for Russian Cyber Warfare in the event the Russian Based owner and development team became influenced by the Russian Government, if not already. Just believe as the Cybersecurity and Cyber Warfare threat from Russia increases against US Target’s, this is a largely unknown possible threat to US Companies and Critical Infrastructure potentially as such large mainstream platforms such as Hanwha’s WAVE VMS and Digital Watchdog’s Spectrum especially are deployed in such large amounts throughout the US and North America. I believe it’s important that all clients and Integrator have the transparency behind these products that tie directly to Russian Development and partial Ownership, but primarily the fact that these Russian Based Developers control over 95% of these Systems and Platforms including the VMSproxy cloud relay servers used to connect every online system to easily be exploited.

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UE
Undisclosed End User #2
Mar 02, 2022

** *** **** *** **** ************ software ************ ** ******* ***** ******* coders? *** * **** ****** ******* and ***** ***** ****, **** *** have ****** *** ** **** *** tip ** *** *******. ***** *** better **** ** **** *********.....

******** · ********* ******* *** ******** Development ******** **** ****** · ******.***

UI
Undisclosed Integrator #1
Mar 02, 2022

* **, *** ***** **** **** point. *******; *** ********** ** ****** I *** ********* ****** **** ** that *** **** ** *********** ** a ******* ******* *** * ******* Owner ** *** ******* ***** *******. Not ** *******, *** *** ****** who *** *** ********* ********* ** the ******* ******** *** * ******* controls *** ****** ************** ***********. *********; beyond ** **** ****** * ***% Russian *********** ****, *** **** ******* Developer *** ******* ***** ***** ** much ****** *** *** ******* ** KGB ** *** ******** *** **** against *** **. **** *** ******* Product & ********* ********* ***** ** a ****** ******* *** ******* *** entire *********** *** ********* ******** *******, that ** ***** ** ******* ***** is **** ******* ***** *** **** VMS, ***., ***. ******* *** ************ of *** ******** ** ********* *** giant *** ** ***** ***** ***** providing ********* ******** ****** ** *** VMS ******, *******, *******, *** **** easy ********** ** *** ****** ******* from *** ****** ****** **** **** onsite ** *,***’* ** ********* *** Secure ********* ********** *** **. **** Russia’s ***** ***** **** **** **** declaring ********** * “******** ** *** United ******” **** ******* ** ** opinion *** *** ****** * “****-**** Clear & ******* ******” ** *** Cyber ******** ** *** ** *** it’s ****’*. ***** ** *** ************** of *** ********* ****** ******’* ***** coordinated ** ****** ******* *** ** today, * **** **** **** ** a ******** ************ *** ******* *** reason * ***** ** ***** ***** all ** ****** ********* ** *** ties ** ****** *** *** ********* I ********** **** ** ** ****** any ****** **** ** ********* *** the ******** “*****” ******** *** **** access ** **** ********** *** ****** using *** “********* ***” ******* * single *** ******* *******. **** ** a **** ** ***** ****** **** can ****** ** ***** ****** ** the ***** *** ****** ** *** software. **’* ****** **** ********* ******** that *** ***** ******** *** ******** information **** *** ******* ** *******. This ** ********* **** ** *** continually ******; *******, * **** ********** replicated **** ** * *** ******* last **** *** **** ********* ******** Proof ** ******** ** *** ********* exposures *** ***’* **** ***** ** used ***********. **** ********** **** **** Nx *** **********, *** ******* **** denied *** ** **** ******* **** through *** ******* *********** ***** * showed *** ***. ***** **** * tremendous ***** **** ** ***** *** always **** **** **** ***********.

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UI
Undisclosed Integrator #3
Mar 02, 2022

***** ******'* ********** ** **** ***** to ** **** ** ** **** shapes *** ***** ** ********, *** cannot ****** ****** **** ******'* ******* on *** ****** ** ******-********** ********* and ************* ***** **** ******** *********** that *** * ******** ********/************ ********.

(9)
UE
Undisclosed End User #2
Mar 02, 2022

***** **** ** ** *** ** Russian's *** ** *** *** #* PACS ******** *** ** **********. ***** you ****** **** **. ******* *** ask *** ** ** ***** *** the ***.

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UM
Undisclosed Manufacturer #4
Mar 03, 2022

************* ******* **** ******** ********** ****** in ***-******** ********* ** * **** concern. ****** **** ****** ******** ***** is ********* ********, ** **** ** access ** ******* ***** / **** / ******** ****** ****. ** *** essentially ****** ***** **** *** ** that *** **** ** ****. *'* fairly ******* *********, ***** *** ******* had *** **** ********* ****** **** were ******... *** **** ********** ** IPVM.

**'* **** * **** **** **** that **** ****** ************* ******* ** the *** **** **** **** ****** and *****, *** *********** *** ******* political ******* **** **** ******. **'* a ******* *****, *** ******** ******* consideration **** ******** * ******** ** trust.

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UI
Undisclosed Integrator #3
Mar 03, 2022

*** *** *****-******* ***** **** ****** Network ***** *** *** ********* ** subjected ** ** ******* ** *** level **** *** *** ***** **** been? ** **** *****, **** * wide ***** ** ******** ****** **** and ** ***** ****. ** ** were **** ******** ******** **** ***** would/could *** *** *** ***** *************** to ***** *********, *** ** *** world ***** ** *** **** ******* the **** ** ******?

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UD
Undisclosed Distributor #5
Mar 03, 2022

*** *** **** ***** ** ** any ******* *** ** ******* ** Avigilon, ***** ***.?...

***** **** *** ******** ******* ** VMS *** ***** **** )

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UM
Undisclosed Manufacturer #6
Mar 03, 2022

** ***** *** ********** ******* * random *** *** ***(***) ****** ** one's *** *** **** * "******" request ** ** ******* ******?

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(1)
UD
Undisclosed Distributor #5
Mar 04, 2022

***(***) ****** ** ***'* *** *** with * "******" *******

*** *** **** **** ********** *** came ** ******** *** *** **** polite *******?

(1)
UM
Undisclosed Manufacturer #6
Aug 09, 2023

**** ***, *************. *** ***** **** in **** ****'** **** ******* *** crypto **** *** **** ****** **** for * ******* *******, *** *** company * *** ******* *** ** that **** *** ******** **** **** everything. *** ****** **** ** **** they **** ******* *** ******* ** getting **** ********** ***** *** ****** to **** ** ** ***** ******, so * **** ****** *** ******* immediately (******* * *** **** ******). Make *** ** *** ****, *** it's ***** * **** ***** *** them ** **** *** *** *** what **** ****.

UI
Undisclosed Integrator #7
Mar 04, 2022

** ***'** ********* **** ** *****, just ***'* *** **? *** *** still ****** *** **** ***** *** secure **** ******* ********* ** *********** with ****** ** * ***** **/*** ACL. **** *** ** ********** ** the *** **** **** ***** *** when ** ******* ** ********* ** attempts ** *******, ** **** **** the **********. **** ***** **** ***** local ********, *** ***** ****** ***** and ****** **** **** * ***** user ***** ** ***** ** *** audit *****.

* ***** **** ** *** ***** user's ******* ****** ** *** ***** trail ******.

*** *** **** ** ******://:****/******/*****.****#/********, *** ******** ******* ******** *** Cloud + *** **** *****. *** could **** ****** *** *** *** the ****** ********* ******* *** *** manually. *** ** *** ******** ****** you ****** ** ******* *** ****-*****-***-******* service *** *** ** **** ** well ******* ****** **************.

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RS
Robert Shih
Aug 08, 2023
Independent

* ****** ******!

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