Fort Knox is quite decent:
In all seriousness, can you qualify a little about what you are looking for? Residential? commercial? military? Any constraints on price or logisitcs?
Silva Consultants | 11/18/14 01:55pm
Developing a high-security intrusion detection system is not so much a matter of product selection but rather a design strategy. This strategy includes providing multiple "layers" of detection capability and redundancy in both control equipment and communications to the alarm monitoring center.
For example, on the detection side, you might have full perimeter protection (door contacts and glass breakage) as well as complete interior motion detection in all areas. Something as simple as a concealed contact switch on a few interior doors can provide another layer of protection and can fool even the most sophisticated of intruders if he was not suspecting it. The more layers of security that you provide make it exponentially more difficult for the intruder to get around everything.
A few of my high-security clients actually use two separate alarm companies; one for the perimeter of their space, the other to protect the interior areas that contain their valuables. This makes it difficult for any one person (such as a dishonest alarm installer or central station operator) to compromise the facility's overall security system.
@ John, to expand on my question, It would be a commercial application with highly sensitive inventory. Price is not a objection, carte blanch.
John was being funny but on target. If you are talking about a reliable, attack resistant intrusion detection system understand that they don't stop access to the facility, only insure a high likelyhood of detection. Fort Knox uses physical barriers and nearby tanks to secure the facility once a detection has been made, making it hard to get in and harder to get out. How will you delay or deter? How will you detect and will that be early enough to respond? How will you respond? Yes, I have done ULAA and UL2050 facilities as well as "secured areas" where you pass a sign that says....and means "unauthorized access will result in the use of automatic weapons". Only the last one would I consider "almost hack proof" due to the fencing, clear area, multiple security officers and ability to use live fire. Even then, money was a consideration.
The best advice I can give you is to find a solid Integrator who has a stellar reputation in the community. Work with them and develop a long term, mutually beneficial relationship. The integrator should have manufactures training and certification / design build experience.
Concentric layers of security work best (harden your target as you get closer to it.) I also agree that hardwiring is best. Mixing your system with beam sets and Video based analytics will work very well. In your target area, hardwire your openings with Biased contacts as indicated (always supervise).
Again, one of the most important things you can do is to partner with your Integrator. Select an Integrator that will provide you a high quality installation. If you install the best and use a cut rate integrator with little or no manufactures training you will get what you pay for – trouble.
I agree with the 'layer' concept, however it should start at the exterior perimeter, not just the perimeter of your structure with glass breaks and door contacts as stated above. Use detectors and technology to trigger and drive cameras at the first point of intrusion (possibly the fence line), then create layers and redundancies back toward the high security inventory.
Also, just curious a previous post above - would using wireless detectors fall into your below statement?
"Also the use of wireless anything is not a good plan, hard wire you stuff and that will minimizes at least one vulnerability."
If so why? When using a wireless perimeter devices such as a photobeam or detector, what is your vulnerability?
It's called a Type 1 SAS - totally encrypted - only available to government.