Google Found Software House Vulnerability Allows Inside Attacker To Open Doors

By: IPVM Team, Published on Sep 04, 2018

A vulnerability in Software House IP-ACM modules allows an attacker to potentially unlock doors, or perform other actions, on affected systems. Many affected systems are unable to fixed with a software patch, requiring hardware replacement instead.

IPVM spoke with Software House executives to get more details on this exploit, in this report we provide an assessment of the risk in vulnerable systems, and what Software House recommends for affected users.

[Note: this post was first published in January 2018 but was updated in September 2018 when it was disclosed that a Google employee discovered the vulnerability, making it mainstream news.]

************** ** ******** ***** IP-ACM ************* ** ******** ** potentially ****** *****, ** perform ***** *******, ** affected *******. **** ******** systems *** ****** ** fixed **** * ******** patch, ********* ******** *********** instead.

**** ***** **** ******** House ********** ** *** more ******* ** **** exploit, ** **** ****** we ******* ** ********** of *** **** ** vulnerable *******, *** **** Software ***** ********** *** affected *****.

[****: **** **** *** first ********* ** ******* 2018 *** *** ******* in ********* **** **** it *** ********* **** a ****** ******** ********** the *************, ****** ** mainstream ****.]

[***************]

Vulnerability ******** - *** *********** *********

****** *** *** ****** the ************* ** ** the ***** ***** ******, Software ***** ****** **** device ****** ** *** where *** ************* ****. Instead, *****-*** ******** **** ******** *** ****** ********* affected.

***** ** *** *** network ********** ******* *** IP-ACM **** ****** *** the ***** ***** ******* controller ** *******, ** attacker *** ***** ****** to *** ******* ******* the ******* ***** ******* packets ******* ** * specific ******* (**** ** a **** **** *******), and **** ***** ****** those ******* ** *** network ** ***** *** door ** **** ** will.

*** *** ******* **** organizations ***** ***** ******* should ****** **** *** network **** *** **-*** to ***** ***** ************** is *** ********** ** potential *********. *** *******, unused ***** ** ******** handling **** ******* ****** be ********, *** **** security ******** **** ** MAC ******* ******* ****** be *****.

*** ********* ******* ***** how * ******* ******* using ** ***** ***** and **-*** **** ******* would ** ***********:

Replay ****** ******

** * ****** ******, an ******** ******** ******* with * ******* ******** for ******* ********** (*.*.:*********), *** **** ******* those **** ******* ** the *******, **** *** result ***** ******* ********* duplicate **** ** ********, and ****** ** **** as ** **** **** sent ** *** ******** source. ****** ******* *** occur **** **** ************** are *********, ******* *** attacker **** *** **** to **** *** ******** data ********* ** *** packets, **** *** ******** outcome ** *** ****** receiving **** (*.*.: * series ** ******* **** says "**** **** ****", or "***** **** ****'* password").

****** ******* *** ** prevented ** ***** *** only ******* **********, *** also * ****** *** or ******* ** *** each ******* ********. *********, if ** ******** ******* a ******** **** ** ID/key **** *** ******* been ****, *** ******** will **** ** ****** it. *******, ***** **** reduces *** ******* ** use ****** *******, ** often ******** **** ********* and ***** ************ ********* (such ** ***** ******* a **** ********** *** an ****** ******* ******) more *******.

Current **-**** *** ***********

****** **** ************* ******** software ************ **** *** IP-ACM ** ****** *******, due ** **** ** memory *** ********** *********. JCI ** ** *** process ** ********* ** IP-ACM ** ****** **** increased ********* ** *********** patched ********. ********* **** need ** **** *** V1 **-*** ***** *** V2 ***** ** **** want ** ****** **** vulnerability. *** ****** ********* wishing ** ****** *** their *********** ****** ******* their ********** *** ******** House ******* ********* *** additional ******* *** ***********.

Low **** / ******** **********

************ ********** **** ************* requires ****** ** *** Ethernet ******* ******* *** IP-ACM *** ***** ***** to ******* ******* ** be ******** *****. **** would ********* ******* ****** access ** * ********** port ** *** ******, an **-**** ***, ** other ****** **** ******** more **** **** * PC ** *** **** network, *** ***** ** fundamentally ********** ** ******* remotely *** * *** or ****-********** *****. **** reduces *** ******* ** exploit *******, *** ****** it ** **** ** an ******* ******.

******* *** ****** ****** on ****** ** ******* packets **** *** *******, the ******* **** ** exploit ** ***. ***** this **** *** **** that ******** ******* ****** be *******, ** **** reduce *** ****** ******* and **** ** ********* attackers ************ ****** **** customers ****** *** ****** their ***** **** ***** being ******** ******** ** hackers.

Comments (8)

Undisclosed Integrator #1

01/17/18 02:47pm

**** **-***** *** *********** utilize *** ** *** bit ********** ******* ** door *********** *** *** host ********/****** **********. ** this ******* ****** **** Software ***** **** *** have ***/*** *** ********** built **** ***** ************* protocol? *** ********** ** master ************* ** **** likely * *********** ******** (which ***** ** ******** less ***** ** * hack ******), *** ** not **** **** ** optional ******* ***** ** encryption *** *** ** set ** *** ** door *********** ** *** so ****.

*** ** **** ******** to **** ************** **** the **** **** *** access ******* ******* **** on ********** **********?

Avatar

Brian Karas

IPVM | In reply to Undisclosed Integrator #1 | 01/17/18 02:59pm

***, *** ********** ******* the ******* ** *********.

********* ************** ** *** prevent ****** *******, **** just ******* *** ******** from ******* *** ******** protocol. *** **** ** do ********** ****** **** adding ******* **'* ** the ******** ** ******* replay *******. * ***** to ***** **** ** the "****** ****** ******" section, ******* ******* *** deep **** *** *******.

***** ** ** **** this, * *** ***** you ** *** "***** is *** ********" ** Japanese. *** ***** *** understand *** ******** ***** (analogous ** * ****** form ** **********), *** you ***** **** **** making *** "******" ** asking "***** ** *** bathroom" ** * ******** person ***** ***** **** to ***** *** ** the ********. *** ** not ***** ********** *** protocol (********), *** *** can ****** ******* ** get * ******* *******.

********* ** *** ***** example, ** *** ****** to ******* ******* **** using * "******" ** words **** ****, *** would *** ********** *********** to *** ******, **** "Where ** *** ********. This ** ******* #*". The ****** *** ***** would **** ********* ** somebody **** *** ******* made ******* #*, *** if ** **** ***** refuse ** ****** **** query, ******* **** ** was **** ****** * fake ** *********. ****** the ****** ******* ** prevents *** **** ****** an ************ ******* *** getting * ********.

Avatar

Michael Gonzalez

In reply to Brian Karas | 01/17/18 07:51pm

*************, *** *** **** wait *** *** *** or *** ********** ** a *** ******* ****** jumping ** *** ******* bandwagon. ****'* ********* *** I ******** ***** ********** new ********. **** * made **** ****** ***...

Undisclosed Integrator #4

In reply to Michael Gonzalez | 09/04/18 10:54pm

**** *********** * *** frustration. *********** *** *** Users *** ***** ********* beta *******, ** *** them (*************) *** *** privilege ** ***** ****...

Randy Lines

01/18/18 05:28pm

**** ** ***** ** assumptions *** ** ** crypto ****! * **** assumed ***** ***** ** a ******* ** ** time ***** ** ***** encrypted *******. *** ***** that ******* *** **** is **** ** ** the ************** ** ********** not *** **** ***** the **** ** *************** live.

***** *******!

Undisclosed #2

09/03/18 07:44pm

**** **** ******: *****://***.******.***/*****/**************/****/**/**/*******-*****-******-****-****-**-***-********

*** *** ***** *****'* mention **** **** ******* have ** ** ********.

Undisclosed #3

In reply to Undisclosed #2 | 09/04/18 12:26am

**** *** ****** *****:

"********* **** ******** ***** had **** ** **** solutions ** *** *** problem, ****** ** ****** to ***, **’* ******* a ****** ** ******** at *** ******** ****. That’s ******* *** ******** House ******* ****’* **** enough ****** ** **** with *** ************ ** new ********, ********* ****."

Undisclosed #2

In reply to Undisclosed #3 | 09/04/18 12:42am

****

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