No Hack, Still Liable, Court Finds ADT

Author: IPVM Team, Published on Jun 20, 2017

Recently, ADT has been in the news for a $16 million settlement for a cyber security vulnerability class action suit.

One of the most important and interesting points behind this settlement is a court order that found ADT could be found liable even if no actual hacks were proven. Many could see this as counterintuitive since what 'damage' had occurred if there was no hack / incident?

In this note, we examine that court order, how the Court reached that conclusion and what impact it might have on manufacturers and providers generally.

********,*** *** **** ** *** **** *** * $** ******* settlement*** * ***** ******** ************* ***** ****** ****.

*** ** *** **** ********* *** *********** ****** ****** **** settlement ** * ***** ***** **** ***** *** ***** ** found ****** **** ** ** ****** ***** **** ******. **** could *** **** ** **************** ***** **** '******' *** ******** if ***** *** ** **** / ********?

** **** ****, ** ******* **** ***** *****, *** *** Court ******* **** ********** *** **** ****** ** ***** **** on ************* *** ********* *********.

[***************]

Executive *******

* ** ********** ******* *********** ** *** ********* *** *** ******* ********** *** ************* ******* ** ****** an ********** ** ** **:

*** ***** ********* **** ********* ************ ******* **** *** **** him * **** ** ******** ******* *** *** ********* ********* of ******** ***** ******* ** *********.

*** ********* / **** ***** ******, **** ******* ** ****** hack, ***** *** ***** ********* **** *** ******** (*** ****) should **** ********* *** ************* *** *** *** ************ ** so.

Industry *********

*** ********** ***** ********** ***** *** **** *** ******** **** about ***** *****:

*** ************ ***** ** ********* ** *** *** ******* **** the ******** ** ***** *** ******* **** ** *** ************* of ******** ******* **** ****** ********* ********** **** ***.

Consumers *** ******** ** ****

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Rejects **** ** *******

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General ********** ******** ************

*** ***** ******** *** ******** ***** ******* ********* ********, **** is:

"*** *** *** ******* ***** ******* ** ************** ** ***** is *********** *** *** ******" *** "** ***** ****** *** provide ******** ********** ** ********* ********** ** **** ** ******."

******* ** *********, *** ***** ***** ** *** *** ***** the ******** ****:

**** ******** ** *** * ********** ** *** ********* ******* fact, ****** **** ***'* ******** ******* *** ********** ** *******, jamming, *** ***** **********.

Misleading *********** / ********* ********* **** *******

*** ***** ************ ***** **** ***** ** ******** ************* ****** *********** *** (***)*** ************* ********* ***** ******** *** (****), **** ******** ** ******* ********* ******* ********** *********** *** deceptive **** ** *********.

Industry ******?

**********: **** **** *** ***** ***** ****** *** ********** ********** one's *********.

**** * ******** ***********, ** **** ***** ********. **** ***** suppose ***** ******** ***** *** **** ** ***** ** ** actual ******* / **** / ****** ******. **** ***** ****, as **** ** *** *****'* ******* ******* *-****'* ** *******, *** ******** ** ************* ** ********* ****** ***** ***** and ********* ********* *** *********** ********** ****** ***** *** ******** risks *** ******** ***.

*** ************ *********** ********** ****** ** ***'* ***** **** ($* - $* ******* ****** *******) ******** **** ********. **** ********* that *** ******* *** *** ******* ********** ***** / ******** efforts ** ****** **********. ********, ** ** ******** **** ***'* monthly ******* ******* ***** ******** **** *** ** ********* ****** vs ******** ************* **** **** ******** *** * ***-**** ******.

**** ***********, **** **** *********** **** * ******** ****** (*.*., security ********) *** ***** (*.*., ***** ******** *****) ***** ** used ** ****** ** *** * ******** **** ** *** buyer *** *** ******** **** ******, *** ****** ****** **** they ***** *** **** ****** * ******* ******** ** *** supplier *** ******** ********* / ****** ******** ***** ********. **** is *** **** ** **** **** ********* ****** ********* ********.

Comments (19)

**'* * **** *********** ****, *** ** ************** ** **** any ****** **** *** ****, ***** *** *************, ** ********* to *** ******** **** **** * ********** **** ** *** be ******. **** ******** ***** ** **** *****, *******/********, *** "smart" ******* ** *** ******, ***. **** ** *** ******** they *** * ******** ****** *** ******* **** * ******* providing ********* *** ***** ** *****, *** **** **** ***** that **** ******** ****** *** *********** ******* ** *** ******** was ******* **** * *******.

** ************** ** **** *** ****** **** *** ****, ***** any *************, ** ********* ** *** ******** **** **** * disclosure **** ** *** ** ******

** ************** (***** ** "*** ***** ******** *** ******** ***** ******* ********* ********")*** **** ** ********* ******** ** ***** (*.*., *********** ********), it ***** ** ** ************ *********, *** ****** * ******* 'anything *** ** ******' *********.

* *** **** ** ** ************* ******* ** *** ***** strategy. **** * **** ** **** ********** ******** ** ** country (***** ****) ** ****** ******* ** ******** - **** had ** ** ****** ** *******- **** *** ******* ***** system *** ********** ******* *** *** ** ********* ******. ** offered ******* ** * *** ** ***** *********** ** ** intrusion *** **** ***** *********** ** **** *********** ***** *** never ****.

**** *** ** ** ****** ** *******- **** *** ******* alarm ****** *** ********** ******* *** *** ** ********* ******.

*****, ** **** ****, ** ************* ** **** **** * disclosure / ********* ***** *** **** **** * **********, ***** neither *** *** *** ******** ****** **** *** ****** *** an ********* ******.

* ** *** **** **** *** ******** ********* *********** **** are ** ***** ****, *** ** *** ***, ***** *** a **** ****** ** **** **** *** ***** *** *** laws **** *** ******* / ******* **** *****.

**** ** ****. *** ******** *** ****** ** **** ******** language ** ** ******** *** *** ** **** **** **** for *****.

** **** ** *********** ** **** *** ******* **** **** be ** * ****** ** **** ******.

**** *** ******** * ***** ** *** ****** *****, *** increase ** ********* *** ************ *** *********** **** **** ********. There *** ****** **** ******* ** *** ****** ******, **** considerations *** *** ********** ** *** ****, *******, **** ***** set * ********* **** **** ****** **** ***** ******* ********** to *** ******** ** ********* ***** ********.

*** ** *** *** ********* * **** **, "*** ** really ***********?"

- *** *********** (*** ***** **** ** **** ****)

- *** **********

- ** ***********

- ***-****... ***.

** ** ****** ** ************ ********* *******, *** ********* *** challenges ** ***** ** ** ********.

* ** *** **** ** **-**** *** ****** ****** ** manufactures ***************, ******* * ***** ***** **** *** ************ *** integrators **** ** *** * ***** ****** ** *** ** respond ** ***** ******, *** **** **** * ********* ***********, but **** **** * ********* **********.

* ***** **** ***** ******** ** * ********** ***** ** SSN's **************** ********** ******* **** ****. *** ***** *** ** impressive ********** ** ******** ******** *** ***** ******** *** * consensus **** *** ************** ** ******.

"******" ******** **** **** ** **** *** ***** *** ****** when ** **** *** *** *** ** *** ***** **************. Almost ** **** ** ****** **** ********** ***.

*** ********* ** *********** ** ***** ** ****** ******** *** the ***** ******** ****, ******* **** * ******** ***** *** have ****** *** ******** ** **** ****:

****'* ***** ** **** ** *********** ****** ** *** **** counters *** ******* **** ** ********* ****** **** ** *********** the *******. *** ****** ***** ***** "** ** **** ****** $1M ** ********, *** ****** *** ******* ***** $*.**, **** to **** ***** *** ******* *****". * ***** **** ** a ***** **** ** *** *** ****** ******** ** ** this ****, *** **** *** ******* ****** *** ** ****** to ***** **** **** ** ********.

*** ***** **** *** ******** ***** ***** ******* *********

******* ****** **** * ***** ****** **** ******* ********* *** dahua

***** ******** *** *** ****** ********

***** ******** *** * **** ** **** *** ******** ******** has **** ******* ***** *****

*** *** ***** *** ** ***** **** ***

**** **** ***** ******** *** *******

* ****** ** * **** ** *** *********** ********, ***** the ******** ******* ** ********** *****:

  1. WIRELESS *** ******** ****** ************: Subscriber is responsible for supplying high speed Internet access and or wireless services at Subscriber's premises. RADIUS does not provide Internet service, maintain Internet connection, wireless access or communication pathways, computer, smart phone, electric current connection or supply, or in all cases the remote video server. In consideration of Subscriber making its monthly payments for remote access to the system RADIUS will authorize Subscriber access. RADIUS is not responsible for Subscriber's access to the Internet or any interruption of service or down time of remote access caused by loss of Internet service, radio or cellular or any other mode of communication used by Subscriber to access the system. Subscriber acknowledges that Subscriber's security system can be compromised if the codes or devices used for access are lost or accessed by others and RADIUS shall have no liability for such third party unauthorized access. RADIUS is not responsible for the security or privacy of any wireless network system or router. Wireless systems can be accessed by others, and it is the Subscriber's responsibility to secure access to the system with pass codes and lock out codes. RADIUS is not responsible for access to wireless networks or devices that may not be supported by communication carriers and upgrades to subscriber system will be at subscriber's expense.

** **** ***** ********* ******* ***** ******** ** *** ********* the ******** *******, ** *** ******** ******* ** ********** ** the ******** **** *** ********* *********. * ***** ***** ********* need ** ******* *** ********* **********.

******,

****** *** *******. * ** *** **** **** *** ******* you ****** ** ******* ** **** *****, *.*.:

********** ** *********** *** ********* **** ***** ******** ****** *** or ******** ******** ** **********'* ********....

****** ** *** *********** *** *** ******** ** ******* ** anywireless ******* ****** ** ******. Wireless systems can be accessed by others, and it is the Subscriber's responsibility to secure access to the system with pass codes and lock out codes. [IPVM highlighted]

*** *** * **** **** ** **** ** ** * disclaimer ***** *** ****'* *** ******** *******, *** *** ******** communications ******** / **** ** *** ***** ******. ** *** ADT ****, **** *** ****** **** *** *** ******'* *** wireless *** ********, *** *** *********'* ******** *******.

*****/********? ** * ******* *********?

*******, * ***** ************ ***** **** *** ** **** ** was ******** * ********** ***** **** *****.

* *** ******* * ******* *****. **** * *** ****** to *** ** ** **** *** ******** ********** **** ** ADT *** *********** ********* *** ****** *********** ***** *** ******** or **** ** ******** ** ********* ** *** ***** ****** 9. ** **** ***** *** *** ***** **** ******** ************ than *** ***** ********, ****** *** ** ***** ******* ****** contracts. * *** **** ******* ***** ******* ********* (**** **** users) *** **** **** ******* ** ******* **** *** ***** industry *** ******** ***'* **** ********* ** ***** *** ***** of ********* ******** **** ****:

*. * ******** **** ** ****** *** *** ****** ******** is ****** *** *** ******, **** ****** ** ** ****** by *** ********* *** *********, *********, *********,...

*. **** ** * ***** **************, ** ********** ******* ** a ******** **** ***** ******.

*. ********* ****** ** ****** ********* ** *** *******.

*** *** ******** *** ** *** ****.

********* *** *** ******** **** ** ******* ******* **** *** big **** (******, *****, *********) *** *****.

* ******** **** ** ****** *** *** ****** ******** ** blamed *** *** ******, **** ****** ** ** ****** ** the ********* *** *********, *********, *********,...

**, *** ** ** *****, *** *** / *********** **** is *** ***** * **** ********* ** ***, **** *** title ** **** **** - '** ****, ***** ******'.

* ** *** ********** *** ******* *** *********. * ** emphasizing **** ***** ******* *** *** ****** ** ****** *** case ** **** ****, ******* **** ** ***** ***** / misleading ***********, *** ****** **** * ****.

*** ***** ** **** ** *** ******* ** ******** ***** systems *** *** ********* **** ******* ***** **** **** *** ADT ******* ***** *** ******** ************ *** ** ******* *** manipulate *** ****** ** *** ***** ****** ** ****** ***** an ***** ** ****** * ******** ** ******* *** ****** by **** **** ** *******.

***** ** *** ******* ** *** **** ***** ** *** been **** ************ ****** ** * ********** *****, *** *** some ****** ** ********** ** *** ***.

*******: * **** *** * ***** **** *** **** * significant ****** ** **** ********* ******** ** ******* ******* **** does *** **** **** ***** **** *** **** ****.

* ***** ***** *** ***** *** ** *** ******** *** that ***** **** *** **** ********** ** *** ***** **** not **** *** ***** ****** ** * ****.

******** ** * **** ***** ******** ** ******* *******.

*******: * **** *** * ***** **** *** **** * significant ****** ** **** ********* ******** ** ******* ******* **** does *** **** **** ***** **** *** **** ****.

** *** **** **** ********* ******** **** *** ************ ****** you * ****** ***** **** *** ****** ** **** ***, the ******** ***** ** **** ** *** *** **** ** their ***** ****'* **** ****. *** **** ******** ***** ****** you ** ******, ***. ****'* **** ********* ** **** ******** here.

* **** **** *** *** *** ***** *** **** **** it

****** *** ******** ******** *** ** *** *****

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