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One of the biggest concerns with fingerprint readers is how easy they can be fooled. While biometrics are typically more difficult to steal or fake, headlines still break news of fake fingers or stolen prints being used to fool sensors.
Comments (12)
Horace Lasell
Thanks, Brian, for a really informative article.
It would be interesting to hear about hyperspectral's robustness to skin color variations. It seems reasonable that natural variation has been considered and accommodated, without substantially reducing ability to discriminate false presentations. In fact, it would be interesting (and probably more secure) if hyperspectral skin tones added another dimension to the fingerprint signature.
There must be a reasonably wide variation in acceptable conductivity to accommodate routinely varying conditions. Knowing that skin conductivity is relevant, how hard could it be to replicate a static resistance within a dummy finger, or even on a dummy image? Naively, considering that many laserjet inks are conductive, could you print a target resistance by varying print darkness? Who knows what is possible?
For heartbeat, one could print onto a flexible substrate (something like acetate), then glue it onto a bladder such as a balloon. While presenting that image to the reader, one could gently squeeze the bladder slightly more frequently than once per second.
If hyperspectral IR has a reasonable resolution, it seems as if it could be the most difficult to faithfully replicate, and that fingerprint augmentation with hyperspectral signature could even enhance security.
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Konstantin Avramenko
IMHO, it is too expensive (and usually affects accuracy) and can be solved by employing other methods. For instance, a couple of possible options:
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Baudouin Genouville
[Request for Update (Suprema)]
Hi John / Brian,
Check this out: https://www.supremainc.com/en/AccessControl-TimeandAttendance/Biometric/BioStation-A2
Not all fingeprint devices from Suprema are using that advanced feature thought:
BioStation A2 is implementing advanced Live Finger Detection based on:
- Dynamic Pattern Analysis
- Unnaturalness Analysis
- Dual Source Light Imaging
BioStation A2 was tested and compared to nop notch fingerprint vendors as below:
#pushingthelimits
Best regards,
baud
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Keith Beatty
Who would dig up grandma just to look at a bunch of military floppy discs?
Some people just need a hobby...
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Justin Dingo
once again it seems like it comes down to adding layers to decrease risk. all about the how much the customer is willing to spend to protect their assets.
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Alfredo Santiago
10/24/19 06:58am
I guess I should have read the next article before I asked the previous question.
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Ng Choy Mei
Great article
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Charng Haw Guo
Fantastic info.
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Brad Hill
and i thought Apple's Touch ID was fool proof. A quick summary read, but interesting nonetheless.
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