I have to admit, I am kind of surprised the "fever camera" hype train is still going.
If these devices were truly effective I would have expected a handful of solid case study examples and claims of "wins" by now in terms of catching infected people. There are many manufacturers and integrators still promoting the fever camera concept, but I am not hearing much in terms of verifiable preventions.
Maybe some of the delayed back-to-work initiatives mean that users are still figuring out the impracticality and unreliability factors.
There's a truth in his message but take it as a Business/Marketing person speech. Being a CEO of a thermal imaging company doesn't make one an expert in thermal imaging. Neither does a degree in Business Administration/Marketing. Thus Jim Cannon is not an expert. Period.
FLIRS's comments are very true. Many "new" entrants have made statements that the uninformed would fall prey to, Alabama school district is one of many examples. While FLIR claims they were the only company doing development back in the time of SARS there is another company Omnisense Systems that was also in development at that time as well. While Omnisense Systems is a small company in comparison to FLIR I believe they are one of the only companies that has been developing and manufacturing Mass Fever Screening Systems continuously all along. FLIR left the business after some of their first products had operational issues, but of course has since rejoined the mix making a fine product. Omnisense Systems is one of the only true Mass Fever Screening Systems on the market in the world today with this pedigree. The SENTRY MK4 has been proven effective, when properly deployed having logged many millions of operational hours in a multitude of venues across three continents and now many hundreds of deployments here in the States since April.
The idea behind fever screening is not eyewash, though most of the implementations we have studied are. It is the demands of instrument accuracy and calibration in screening for infection and then the efficacy of the measurement site which leads to the feel good of screening leaving over 50% of the contagious to go undetected, or false negatives. The bias associated with the idea of "approach-avoidance" in psychology leads the instrument maker and the buyer to settings that greatly avoid false positives in exchange for a bevy of what screening must avoid - false negatives.
Aside from the failings of instruments and human sites measured is how the Public Health Services publish 100.4F as a hard number for screening. 100.4F is a canard with all scientific studies teaching away from it. It is dangerously wrong for detection of contagiousness. In fact, no study in any manner has ever found an oral temperature of 98.6F, a human average. Oral temperature is also what non-contact measurement is referenced to, clinically.
Studies over the past 20 years with cohorts from 20,000 and 5,000,000 well people, demonstrate soundly that average human temperature is 97.5-97.7F and fever therefore can be as low as 98.6 taking age, gender, and time-of-day dependent - all things able to be instantly discerned without interaction with the subject.
Because of the tighter standard deviation of certain non-contact measurements, with greater accuracy of instruments and proper choices of human sites to measure, false negatives (undetected contagiousness) are reduced by even greater amounts.