FCC Expands Covered List, Adds First Russian Company And 2 More PRC Ones

Published Mar 28, 2022 12:37 PM

The FCC added Russian antivirus provider Kaspersky and state-owned telcos China Mobile and China Telecom to its Covered List over state influence concerns. This means the FCC will "no longer review or approve" their equipment authorization requests, making them unable to sell new products in the US within months.

IPVM Image

The three companies join Hikvision, Dahua, Huawei, ZTE, and Hytera on the List. The Secure Equipment Act mandates listed companies be blocked from authorization before November 2022; although previously authorized gear is unaffected, it risks revocation too.

The additions showcase a continued tough stance on PRC tech and a new focus on Russian tech amid the Ukraine invasion. FCC Commissioner Brendan Carr said, "I am confident that we will have more entities to add to our Covered List".

"Unacceptable **** ** ** ******** ********"

*** *************** ******** ** ***** **, ******* the ********* "**** ** ************ **** to *** ******** ********" ** *** US:

IPVM Image

********** ******* *** **** *******:

IPVM Image

*********, *****, ******, ***, *** ****** were "****** * ******" ** ******** security ****** ** *** ****** ***** ****. ********* ** *** the **** ***-*** ******* *** ** seven ** *** ****.

Company ***********

***** ************** ********** *** ***'* *** ******* ****************** companies, ********** ** ******* ** **&* in *** **, **** *** ******* exception **** **** *** *****-***** ** the *** **********. ***** ********** ********* **% ** ***** ***** ********* last ****.*********** * ******* ******* *************/********* *******.

PRC ********** ********* ********

****** ************ *** *** ****** ******* *** either ** *** ****** ***** ** "unacceptable ****". *******, *** *** *** made ******** ***** ***** ***** ********* clear ** *** ****.

** ******** ****, **** ****** ************ *******'* ********* ** ******* ****************** services ** *** **, *** *** said *** ****'* ***** ********* **** it "******* ** ************, *********, *** control ** *** ******* **********" ********* "engage ** *********":

IPVM Image

*********,**** *** *** *********** ******'* *********** *** ****************** ******** authority ** *** ****, ** ***** "ownership *** ******* ** *** ******* government":

IPVM Image

FCC ***** ******* ********** ********* ******** ** *********

****** ************ **** *** *******('******* *********** *********') *** ******* ******** to ****** ********* ******** ** ******* Kaspersky's ******** ** *** ****:

IPVM Image

******** *********** **** ***** ** ***** ********* concerns, ****** "**** ******* ******* ********* officials *** ******* ************ *** ***** government ********":

IPVM Image

Cybersecurity ** ***** **** ********

***** ***** *** ********* **** **** argued **** *** *** **** *** have ********* ** ***** ***** ******** (e.g., ************ ******** *** ** "*********** ****** It **** ******* ****"), *** ***'* ******* **** ********* it ** * *** ******* *** a ******* **** ********* ****** ******** shows *** *** ******** **** ** does.

************, *** *** *** **** ***** for ********** *****, **********, *** ***** transmissions **** *** ********. ***********,*** *** *** **** ***** *** authority ******** *************.

*********

********* ****** *** "************" *** **** *** decision "****** *** ****** ******** ** wrongdoing", ******* ******* ** ** *** current "************ *******" *.*. ********* ** (but *** ******** ******) *** ******* invasion ** *******.

******* ***** ****** *** ***** ******* has ****** ********** ***. ** **** do ** ******* ** *** ******* requests, ** **** ******.

Brendan ****: "********* **** ******** ** ***"

*** ************ ******* ********** * **************** *** ******** "******* ****" ******* it ***** "**** ****** *** ******** from ******* ***** ** ******* *** Russian ***** ****** ********", ****** "* am ********* **** ** **** **** more ******** ** ***":

IPVM Image

*** ***’* ******** ** *** ***** three ******** ** *** ******* **** is ******* ****. *** *** ***** a ******** **** ** ******** *** nation’s ************** ********, *** ******* *** Covered **** ** ** **** ** an ********* **** ** **** ** our ******** ** ** **** ****. In **********, * ** ******* **** our ******** ******** ******** ****** **** my ********** **** ***** ****** *** China ******* ******** ** **** *** threshold ********* ** *** ***** ******** to *** ****. ***** ********, ** well ** ********* ****,will **** ****** *** ******** **** ******* ***** ** ******* *** ******* ***** ****** ******** ******* ** ****** ** ********* *** ********* **** *******’* *********. I applaud Chairwoman Rosenworcel for working closely with our partners in the Executive Branch on these updates. As we continue our work to secure America’s communications networks,I ** ********* **** ** **** **** **** ******** ** *** ** *** ******* ****. [emphasis added]

Impact: *** ** ****?

*** **-***-****** ****** ** ******* ***** the ** ******** ** ***** *******, China ******, *** ********* ** ***** and *** **** ********** ** ******** FCC *** ***** ******* ************.

*****, *** ***'* **** *** ************ Carr's ********* ******** * ****** **** for ***** *** *** ******* **** firms ******* ** *** **, ************ those **** ***** ****. *** ******** candidate *** ****** ******** ** *** is ***, ***** **** ********* ** ***/******** "****** ** *****" *** ********* ***** *** *** ********** ***********.

Comments (2)
UD
Undisclosed Distributor #1
Mar 28, 2022

*** ********* ******** **, **** **** ALL (********) ******** **** ***** ********* be ******?

(2)
UI
Undisclosed Integrator #2
Mar 29, 2022

**** ***** ****** ****** *** ******** certifications *** ******** **** *** ********* to ******* ***** ** ***** ********, but ****** ** *** ***** ****'* sold *** ******* ********* ** **** going ** *** ** **** ******* law **** ****** ****** **** ********* to, ***** ***** **** ** ******* with *** ******* ********** **** ******* had ** ******.