Dahua Says They Are Botnet Attack 'Victims'

Author: John Honovich, Published on Oct 26, 2016

'Victim' or 'accomplice'?

Dahua has issued a new press release, referring to their products as 'victims' of the massive botnet attacks hitting the Internet, emphasizing that Xiongmai devices were more heavily used and that publications have 'downgraded' their role in the attacks.

So, is Dahua a victim here?

'******' ** '**********'?

***** *** ****** **** ***** *******, ********* ** ***** ******** ** '*******' ** *** ******* ****** attacks ******* *** ********, *********** **** ******** ******* **** **** ******* used and **** ************ **** '**********' ***** **** ** *** *******.

**, ** ***** * ****** ****?

[***************]

Case *** ***** * ******

***** *** *** ******* *** ******* *** ***** **** *** build, ****** ** ********* ***** *** ******** *** ****** *******. ** that ***, *****'* ******** **** ********** ****.

Case *** *** ***** * ******

***** ******** ******** **** *** ***** ***** **** ******* ******** best ********* *** ****** *** **** **** *******. ***** **** admit ******** ******* ********* *** *********. *** ***** ** *** stayed ****** ***** ******** ****** ** ** **** ** *******,*** ******* ***** **** ***** *** ******* **** ***** (*** **** ****** ***** *** ** ******** on **** ***** *******). 

***** ***** **** **** ** ***** ********* *** ***** ******** for ****** ******* **** *** ********. ***** ****** **** ** should **** ***** **** ******* ****** **** ****** * **** for ***** **** ********* **** **** ***** **-******* ******* ********* on *** ********.

Importance ** ********** *** ***** ****

** ***** ** * ******, ****, ** ****** ** ****, they ****** *** **** *** ******** ** ***** ****. *******, if ***** ***** ************* ** *** ****** ** ***** ********, they ***** **** ***** ****.

** * ********* ******, ***** ******** **** *** **** ******** internationally *** ** **** ******** ********** ** *** ****, ***** would ** * **** **** ********* ********** ****** ***** *****'* well ******** ******** ******* ** '********' *******.

Debate ***** **************

**********, **** **** ** *** *********** ******** ** **************. *******, the ******* ********** *** *********** *** ***** *******.

*******, *** **** ***** **** **** ********* *** ** ** (1) *** ***** ** *** ******* **** ****** **** ***** action? (*) *** *********** *** *** ** *** *******? ** (3) *** ************* *** ******** ***** *******? ****** * **** could ** ****, ** **** ******, *** ****. *** ** do *****, **********, *** **** ********* *** ** **** ***** attacks ** *** *** ***** ************ ************* ** ** ** much ** ******** ** ***** ** *********** **** ***** ******* just **** ***** ******** ******* ******* **** **** ***** *** many *****.

Comments (26)

*** *** ** ** "******."

** **, "** ******** ******* ************ **** ******* *************** ** ****."

****** ** **** *** ******, ** **'** "********" *************, *** telnet ***** *********** ** ***** ****... ** *** **** ****** anymore. *** ****** **** *** **** ********* ** ** *** including ****** ** **** **'* *** "*********" *********. **** * mass-production **** *******'* **** ******!!!!!!

**** ****** ** **** * '*******' **** ** *** ** a ******** (** **** **** ******* *** ***'* *** *** like). *** *** **** *** **** ****** **** *******, ********* or ***. ***** *** ******* ** **** ** **** *** login ******* *** **** **** *****, ***********, *** **** ** plaintext.

*** ****** ** *** ********* ** ********* *** ** ******** professionals ** ***** ** * ****** ** *********** *** ********* communications *****. ** ***** ************** *** ****** **** *** ***** opposite ** **** (*** **** ******* *** ********). *** ****** of **** ** **** ** ***** *** ******** ** * connected ******, ** *** ** ****** *****, ***** ****** **********, and **** ******** *** ** *****. **** ** *** ********* we *** **** ** ******** ***** ******. ***** ** ** draw *** **** **** ************** ** ***** ** * **** in *** ****** ******? ** *** ** *** ********* ****? Or * ***** *** *********** ** *** ******?

******** *** ****** ******** ** *** ** ****. ***** *** embedded ** ** **** ***** ******, ********** ** ************, ** improved? * ***** ***** *** ****** ** * ********** ***. This ** * ********* ***** *** **** ******** ** **. Is ** ** ********? ** ** '****-*****' ********? ****?

*** ** **** *** * ****** *******: * ******* ********* camera ***** *** **** ** *** ***** ** * ********. Someone ***** ******** *** ****** *** **** ***** **** ****** to * ******* ***** *** *********** *** **** ** *** network. ******* ******* *** ****** **** * *****..... *** **** have ****** ** **** ******* *** * ***** **** ***** to ** **** ** **** **** ******. *** **** **** down *** ******* ***** **** **** *** ****** *** ******* a ****** *****..... ******* ** *** ****..... ** ****, *****'* an ***, ******* * *** ***** ** ***** ********** ** that, ** **** ********* ***** *** ***** *********, ** * password ******* *** *** ****** ******. * ***** *** *** the ****.

**** ** ** **** **** ********** ** ** * **** management ********. ***** *** **** *** **** ******** ** **** 'throw * ******* ** **' ******* ************* *** ****** ** that ********. * ** *** ******* ** ** **** ** expect *** *** ******* ** ** ********** ******** ******* *** attack *******, ********** **** *** ******** ** **** **** *** the ************ ** *** **** ***. ***** ***** ** ** a ******* ** ***** ********. * ** *** ** *** this **** *********** ** *** *****. **** ** *** ** IT ******** ******* ******** ** ******** ** **** ****. ******** it ** *** * ****-***** ******** ******* *** ** ******** here ***. ** ** * ****** ******* *** ******** * hybrid ********.

** **** **** * ***** ******* **** ** ****** ** person ** '**** *****' ******** ****** *** * ***** ******* methodology *** ******* ****. ** ** ********* **** ***** ************ thought *** ******** *** ** ****** ** **** **** *** circumstance. **** ***** ** *** *** *** **** ** **** management (*** **********) - *** **** ** **** *** ******** is **** ** **. ***** *** ** **** ** ** to *** ****** ******** ******* ******** *** ************** ****** ** the ********* *** ***** **** ** ******.

**** ** **

*** ** **** *** * ****** *******: * ******* ********* camera ***** *** **** ** *** ***** ** * ********. Someone ***** ******** *** ****** *** **** ***** **** ****** to * ******* ***** *** *********** *** **** ** *** network

*** **** **** ****** ** ******* ***** ** ** *** a ****** ** *** ****** *******?

* ********* ***** *** ******** *** ******** ** ******** *** that ** * ******** ********* **** *** ******** ** *** building, ***** ** ********** ********* **** **** ******** ** *** issue ** *** ********* ****.

** ** ********* *******. **** * ** ************ ** ******* things:

*/ ***** *** ** **** ** * ****** **** *** to *** ****** ** *** ******

*/ ***** *** ** **** **** ** * *********** ** the ******

*/ ********* ***** ** *** ** ******** ******* *** ** the ****** ** *** ********* ******** *** *** *********** ********** they *** ******* **. ***** *** ******** ****** ******* **** can ** ********* - ***** *** *** ********** **** *** line?

** ***** ** **** *** ******* ** *** *********** ** far ** * ******* ****************** ** *** *********. *** *** sue ********* ******* *** **** *** * *****? ** *** Anti-Virus ************? ** *** ******** ************ **** **** *** ********? Or *** ********? ** *** ** *** **** ******* * network? *** ****** / ******** *** **** *** *****? **** about *** ********* ** *** ********* *** ******* ** ******** device **** *** ****? *****'* * ***** ********* ** ****** going ** ****.

** ***** * ******? ****. *** **** **** * ***********? Sure. ** *** ******** ************ **** * ****** ****? *** so *****. *** **** * ***********? ****. *** ****** *** installed *** **** ** ** ******** ***, *** **** *******? No. ************? ***. *** *** ****?.... *** ** ** ****.

*** **** **** *** ******** = *** ********* ************ ** at *****. ***** **** ********. **** ** * **** ****** scenario *** ***** ******* *** **** ***** ** * **** larger *********** **** ** *** ******* ** ***** ***. *****'* the *** ********* ** ******** **** ** **** ***** ** disasters?

***** *** ******** ****** ******* **** *** ** ********* - where *** *** ********** **** *** ****?

******, *** *** ****** **** *** **** **** **** ******** intrusion *******. **** ** ******* *** * ***** ** *** manufacturer, ******* ** ** *****, *********, ****, *******, ********.

** ******* ***** **** **** ******** *** ********** ******* * camera *** **** ******** ** **** *******, **** *** ******* to ** **** *** ******. **** ** ** ***** ** your ******* *** ************. ********** ** *** *** ****** *** designed, *** ****** ****** ******* ******* ** * ******* ** is ********** ************ **.

* ********* *****, ** * **** ** *** **** ** the ****, **** ************** *** *** ****** ****** *** ** reasonably ****** ******* *****, *********** (** ********) *** ************* *** the ******** ******* *** **** ** *** ********.

* ***** **'** ***** ** **** ** ***** ** ******** on **** ***. ** **, ************ ** * ****** ** the ******* **** ******** ***** **** *** ******** ****** ** a ****. ** **, ********** **** ***** ** ** **** both ** *** ****** *** **** *** ******* ********* - again ******* ** **** ****** **** *****.

**** ***** ** ****** ** ************ ***.** ** *** *******. (and * ***** **** **** **** **** ******** *** ******** is ****** * ******* ******** *****, *** ****** *******) **** a ****** ** ****** ** ****** *** ******* ** *** before **** *** *************. ** ******* **** ** ******* * device, **** ** *** ***** *** ***-*******, *** **** *** be **** ** *******.

* ** ******* **** ************ ***.** ** *** * ******* task *** ***-** ********* *** ** ** *** **** ************* time ** **** *** ***** ******.

*************, *** *** ****** ********* ****** ******** ******** *** *** network, **** ***** **** ******* *** ******* *** ******* ** high **** *** ****** ** *** ****** **********. ** ** a **** ***** ***** ** ******** ******** ** ***.**, *** for * ******* ********, ** * ***** ********* ******* (******* or ********), **** ***** ** ************.

** **** ** **-******** ****** ****** ******* ******** ******** ***** is ***** ** ** * *** *** *** *******.

*** ****** * *** ** *** ***** ***** *** ********, it's *** ******* ***** *** ** ******, *** **** **** was ***

** *** *** ** **** ***** *****, * ***** *** Dahua *** ****** ***** *** *******.

**** **** ** ****** *** ****** ******** ******** *****. ** no **** *** **** *** ********, **** * *** ***** old **** *** **** *** ** **** ** * ********* fireguard.

****** ****** *** ***** ** *** * ******, ** ***'* see *** **** **** **** ****? ********! * *** ** are ***** ******. **** **** **** ** ***** ** ******* shame, *** ******* ** ***** *** **** ** ******** ******. No **** **** ****** **** ******** ****** *** **** ****** of **'* *** ********* *****, ****'* **** **** *** *** world ***** **. **** ** ************* ** * ******* **** are.

****** ***** **** ** *** ******* ****** ***** ****** ******* is ****** * ****, ******** ****** **** **** **** *** get * ****** *** **** * ****** *********** *******.

******* ****** **** ** *** ***** *** ** *** ********, make ** ******, ** ******. **** ** ***** * ******* manufacturer **** **** *** ** *** ***** *****, **'* ****** with *** ******, **'* ****** ** ****** *****.

* ***** ******* ********** ****** **** * **** ** *** Apple **** ******* *** *** ******* *** ***** *******, **** stuff *** ***** *********** ******** ****** ** **** **** ****** from ********.

****** **** ** ***** *** ******* ********, **'* **% ********, time ** **** **! *** **** ******* ** *** **. and ***** *** *** *******, *** *** ***** *** *** problem.

** *** **** ** ********* *** *** **** ** ******* used ** ***** *******, **** *** ***** *** ** ** only *** *** ****** ** ** *****.

** *** ***** ******** *** **** **** *** *****, ** would **** **'* **** * ******** *** *** ********* ******! remove ***** ******* *** ***** ******* ***'* ********.

** *** **** **** ********* ******** ***** **** ****, ** a ******** *** **** ****** **** *** ******** *******. *** lets *** *** ***** ***** **** **** *** ****** **** certified *****!

****** *** / ** / ** ****'* *********, ** **** something ****'* *** ***** ** ***** *** ******** *** *** freedom ** ***** *** ***** ** **'* *****.

* ** **** ** ** ***** **** * ****** ******** would **** ********* **** ****** ***% ** *** ****.

**** **** *** *** ***** *** *** ****, *** *** integrator ****** ******* *** *******' ******** **********.

*** **** *****'* **** ***** ******. *** ***** ****** **** what ***** ********* ******* *** ******* **, *** ** **** aren't ***** ****** ** ********* **** ** ***** ***, **** a ***** ***** *** **.

******, ***** ** **** ***** ** ** ****** ** *** feet ** *** **** *** ***** **** ******* **** ****** be ****** ********** *** *******. **** ***** ************ *** *****/*** corresponding **** **** ******* *********, ***** ***** ******* **** *******.

***** **** ** ****** ***, ***** ** *** **** ***** insecure *******, ** ***** **** ****** ** *** ***** ** feel *** ******. ***** *** ****, *** ** **** ***********.

****** ** * ******** **** ** ********* ** **** **** know ******* ******* ***** (*** *** **** *** *******). ***** the ******** ** *** ******, **'* *** ******** ******* ** manufactures ** * ******* *******. **** ** ** ******** **** practice.

*** (****** *****) ******* *** **** ***** ** ****** ** the ****** ** ******, *** **** **** ** ******* ******* over *** *******. *** ** ********* **** ****** ** * best ********.

***.** ** * ******** **** ************* *** ****** ** *** network ******. **** ***** ************ ******* **** ********* *** ******* (i.e. ****** * ****** & ****-** * ******). **** ******** is *** ******** ******** *****, *** ** ** ********* ****** on **** ******* ******* *** ********.

**** ******* ******* ***** **** * ******* **** **** *** password. **** ** ******** **** ** ** *********-********. **'* ** industry **** ******** *** *** ********* ** ****** ***** ********.

*** ******** ******** ** *** ******** ****** ** ********* ** a ******** ********** ******** (*** *******: *** *** ****** ****** only *** ****** ******* ** / ******* *** *****). **** best ******** ****** ** ***** ** *** *** **** ** their ** ********** ****, *** ******** *********** ** *** *********.

*** **** ***** ****, *** **** ******** ******** ******* ***** are ********* **** *** ******** ** ******* ********, *** ********* to *** ******** ******* * ******** ********** ********.

** ** ********, **'* ** *** ** *** **** ********* to ****** *** ******* *** ******** ** ****** ***** ***** of *******. ** *** ** *** ******** ********, *** ***** events **** *** ****** ******** * ***** ***. *** **** thing ** **** ** *** *** ***** ** ******* *** devices *** ************ ******* *** *** ****** ****** ** *** on ***** ********** ***** ********.

** ** ********** *** ** ******** *******; *** ***** ********** will **** ****** ****** ** ********* ********-**-****** (***) ******* **** as ***********, ***********, *** *************. **** ******** **** **** ** get ******* ***** ******** ** ****, ***** **** *** **** consumer ********, *** *** ******* ** ****** *** **** ******* on-line.

** *** **** ** *** ****** *** ***** **** ***** attacks *** **** ***** **** **** **** *****, **'* **********, and **** *** ** *** **** ***** ** ****.

**** ****** **** ****** ***** ********* & *******, ** ****** of ****** **** ***'* **** **** ** *********. * ******** on ****** ***** *** ******** ******** ***********, **** **'* ******* on **** *******!

**** ***** **** *** ******* *** **** ***** *******, ***** be **** ** ******, ****** *** **** **** ** **** for!

***** ****.

****://***.*********.***

*** ***** ** ********, *** ** ** ****, ****, *********, and ******* - *** ****** **** * ***. ** **** the ************* ** ****** ***** ******** *** ******* * ***** time ******** ******. *** *** **** ** ***.

********* ***** *** ******** ** ******* **** *** *** * have ********* **** *** ********** ** ******. *** ******* **** not ** **** ***** ** ***** ** *** ******** *********. I ******* **** *** **** * **** ***. ** **** see ** *****.

** *** ********* *****, * ****** ** ******* *** **** the ***** ***** ****** ******** *** *******, ** ****** ** retransmit ****? *** *** ******* * ******* ****** ** *** actors *** ******* ** **** *** ********.

** **** *** ************* ** ****** ***** ******** *** ******* a ***** **** ******** ******.

*****, *** *** ***** **** ** **** ****** ******. **** if *** ******* ** ** ****** **** * ******* ********, if **** *** ****** ******, *** ****** ***** *** **** been **** ** *** *** ******* ** * ****** ******. All **** ***** **** **** **** ** ** ** ***** video, ****** ****** **************, ***., *** **** ********* **** ****** out *********** ***** ** *** ********.

*** **** ***** **** **** **** ** ** ** ***** video, ****** ****** **************...

****** **** ***** **** ****** ****** (** ***) ****, **?

****** **** **** ***** ** ******* *** ************* ******** **** being **** *** ********* ** *** ** ** *** ******.

****** ** *** *** ******* ** ******* ** ****** * local *****. ** ***** ** **** **** **** ****** ***** be ***'** ** *** ****** ** ***** ****, ** ****** access ** ***** ******* ****** ** ******* ** *** ********.

*** *** ******** ***** **** ** * **** ***** ** where *** *** * **** ******** *********** ** ******** *** device ** ** ** *** ***. **** ** ************* ** unprofessional **** ***** *** *** ****** ******.

****** **** **** ***** ** ******* *** ************* ******** **** being **** *** ********* ** *** ** ** *** ******.

********. ****** **** **** ** **** ** **** ** ** port **.

**, ***** *** **** **** ** **** *******, ******** ****** to *** ** **** **** ******* ** **** ***** *** root ** ******.

********. **** ** *****'* **** ** ** **** *** ***** systems. *** **** **** ***** ** ******* ********. ** ** your ********* **** ****** **** ******* ** **** *****? *** there *** ***** ***** **** ***** ******* ****** ** *** Telnet ******? ***** ** **** **********?

** ** **** ********* **** ***** ****** ****** ** ** run ** **** **** **?

* ***** *** ***. ****** * *** ************* ******* **** the **** *** ** *******, **** **** ** ** ******* assumption.

*** ****, **** ** *** **** ****, ***** *** ** effect ** ***** **** ** ***** ** ** **** ** a ***** *******. **** ** **** ** ************* **** **** firewall **** ******, ***** ** ******** ******* ****.

** *** **** ** **** ** *** ******* > ********** page, **** ** ***** *** **** **** *** ***** **** the *** ****** *** ** ******. ** ******** ** ****, you *** ** **** ** **** ***** ******* *** ******/***.

*** ****

****** **** **** ***** ** ******* *** ************* ******** **** being **** *** ********* ** *** ** ** *** ******.

***

**** ** **** ** ************* **** **** ******** **** ******, which ** ******** ******* ****.

** * ***** *** ***** ** **** ** * ****** enabling ****, **?

**** ***** **** ** ** ******* ** *** ********. ** decent ******** *** **** ******* *** *** **** **** ** support **, **** ** ******** ** *******.

** ****** ******** *** **** ******* *** *** **** **** do **** ** ********.

**** ****-******. *** **** ****** ***** ****** **** *** ***** Jon *.'* ******** ****** *******? ******* ****,

** *******, ******* **** ******* **** **** *******...

*'* *** **** ***** *****, **** ***'* **** *** ****** at ***. *** * ** ***% ******** **** ** **** cams * *** ****** *** *** *** ** ** ******** port **** ** **** **** *** ********.

** *** **** ***, * *** **** ***?

***, ************ **** *** *** **** **** ****:

"** *******, ******* **** ******* **** **** *******, ***** *** business ******* **** ** ********."

*** ***** **** ***** ** ******** **** *** ****** ** business ******* ** **** *******?

*** **** *********...

** ***** * ***** ****** ** ******* ******* ** *** internet ***** ****. ******* ***** ******, ***** ******* **** *** this ** ** ******* ******* **************.

**** *** *** *** ** ******** *******, *** ****** ****.

** *** *** *** **'* ***** ****** ******** **** ******* are *** **** **** * ******. ******** *** / *** / *** ** * *** ** ***** *****!

**** *** *** ******* ***** **** ******* ***** ** **** devices **** *** **********, ***** ****** ** * *** ** in-secure ***** *****!

****** ***** * **** **** ****** ** ***** **** ******** operators *** **** **** *******, ***** *** **** ***** *****, lacking * ***** **** ********.

***** ******** *** ******** ******, *** *** ******** ********** *********** to *** **-**** ********* ** * **** ***** *******, *** also ******* *** ******** ************ **** *** ******* *** ***.

******* **** **-**** ****** **** ** ******** ****** *** ******* models **** *** ************* ******** **********. ** **** ****** *** language, *** ** ******* ******* *** ******** *******.

**** ***** ** *** * *** ** **** ** **** devices **** ** ****** *** ******* ** *****.

**** ******* ** *** *** **** *** ***, ***** *** still * ***, ***** *** *** ***** ******* ****** ****** in *** ** ********.

******: **** ******* *** **** ***** ** *** *** **********:***** ******* ******** ********

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