Access Control: Combo Reader / Controllers Tutorial

By Brian Rhodes, Published Jul 22, 2013, 12:00am EDT (Info+)

Economical or foolhardy? Industry professionals are torn on combination door readers. These units typically integrate credential readers and door controllers into a single unit hung outside the door. Does the tampering risk also mean they are a security risk? We look at the units in this note, weigh the pros and cons, and address whether and where the risk is worth the benefit.

The Risk

********** *** ********** ** *** ******* of *** ****** **** ***** ** can ** ******** ****, **********, ** forcibly *******. **** *** ****** *** controller *** ******** *******, **** **** is *********. *** ********* **** ** isolated ** *** ****** ** ****** door, *** ** *** ********** ********* is ********* ****** **** ******, ** ****** becomes ********** ** ***** *** ****.

*******, **** *** ****** *** *** controller *** *** **** ******, ** attack ********** *** *************. ** ******* rips * ***** **** *** *** wall, **** *** ******** ****** ******, or **** ** ****** *** *** security ******* **** * **** **** door? ***** **** ********* ******* *** potential **** ** *** ***** ** use ***** *****, * ****** **** ******* the **** ** *** *** **** for *** ***** *** ******* **********.

****** ****

**** ****** ********** ***** ******* * '**********', ***** *********** **** ********, *** * '******', ***** ** *** ******* ********** interface. *************, ***** ********** **** **** ********, distinct ***** **** **** **** ** be ********* *** *********.

*******, ******* ****** ************* ***** '***********' units **** ***** *********** *** ******* into * ****** ****. ***** ******** offer '*************' ********** ******** ******* *** two **********, *** *** * ****** box ** ******* **** ** ********** cables ** ***.

*** ** *** ****** ***** ******** of * ***** **** ** ****** **** *** ***********, ******** *** **** ******** ** found ** **** '********* *******' **** feature '***** *****' *********. ******, *** reader **** ******** * ****** ** output ******** *** *********** **** ******** is ********** ** *** **** ****: door ********** *********.

 

Hardware *******

*** **** ** ******* ******** **** determines *** **** ** **** ********* presents. *** ***** **** ******* ********* power, **** ********, ******** *** ********** can ********* ***** ** *** ***** and ***** **** ** ** *********. However, ******** ******* *** ********* *** vulenrable ** ********** *******, *** ******* power *********.

********:**** **** ******** *** ************* ******* and *** '******** *******' **** *** controller, *** ********** **** ** * relay ** *** ***** *******, *** removing *** ********** ****** *** *******. The ***** ***** ************* ******* **** weakness:

******** *******:******* ** *** **** ** ****** the **** *****, **** ****** ***** door ******** ** ****** ****** ***** permitting *** **** ** ****. ** most *****, *** ****** ** ********* until *** ****** ****** ******* * door ** ****. ****, *** ********** routes ***** ** *** ******, ******** the **** **** ** ***** ****** through *** ******.

***** ******, **** ******* *** **** of ******** *** ********** **** *************; if *** ********** ** ****, *** strike ******* ********* *** *** **** stays *****. ** ****, ** ***** require ** ********** ** ***** ****** and ********* ** ***** ***** ***** the ****** ** ***** ** '******' the ****. ***** ***** * *************, this ***** ** ********* ******** **** familiarity **** **** ** *** *******.

Tamper *************

********* ** ***** *********** ********* ******* a '****** ******' **** ******* ******* removal ** *** ********** **** *** wall, *** ***** *** *** **** from ******* ********** ***** ** *******. This ****** ****** *** **** ******* alarm ******** **** ***** ***********/********* **** the ********** ** ***** ********:

***** *** ********* ***** ** ****** switch, **** *** *** ********** **** shown *****, ****** *** ** '******* tamper' **** **** ** ** ******* to ****** ********. ** *** ****, using **** ***** ****** * ******** **** in ********** *** ********** *** ****, from ****.

****

*** ******* ************* ** ***** ***** units ***** **** ****** **** **** traditional *******. *** *******:

********: ** *** **** ***** ~$***, *** adding * *** ****** ** ~$** costs ****** $***.  *******, ****** *** addition ***** **** ** ******* *** device *** *** ~$** - ~$*** to *** ****, *** * ***** between ** *** $****.

*****: * ****** **** *** ***** costs ~$***. *********** *** ************ **** of ******* ********* ******* ** $** - $*** ******* *** ****.

External **********

** ******** ***** *** *************** ** a ***** **** *** ****, ********** the **** ****** ************ ******* ***************** ******* *** ****. ************* ************* ******** **** **** ********* ******* and **** ***** ** ************* ********** against ******** *** **** - ****** enemies ** ******* *******.

***** ********** *** ** ***** ** plastic, *** * ********* ******** **** withstand ****** ***** ** ****** *******, and ********* ***** **** * ****** surface **** **** ********** **** ***** fasteners.

*******, ****** ********** *** *********, ********** both ***** *** ***** **** ** access ***. ********** **** ******* ~$** - $*** ****, ********* ********** *** savings ** ***** * '*****' **** to ***** ****. 

***************

*********** ***** *****, ***** ***** ****** only ** **** ** *** ** ****** security ******** ***** **** ** *** use ********:

  • ******** *****:******* ***** ****** * ******** *** behind ******* ****** ** ******** *** are ****** ***** ********* ** '*****' protections **** ***** ************ *** ****** staff *** *** ***** ** ****** attempts.
  • ***** **** ********: *** **** ** ****** ********* ******** is *** ***** ** ********* ***** them ** ******* ***** ******* ** them *** ********.
  • ** **** ********:******* ***** *** ******* ***** ***** with ***** *******, **** ****** ** avoided ** '**** ********' ******* ****** to ********** ** ************* ****** *******. While *** **** ** *****, ***** it ******** ** *** **** ****** for ***** **********.

Brute *****: *** **** ****

***** ***** ***** ***** ***** ************* risk *** **** **** ******** ***********, the ******* ****** ** ********** ***** remains *************** ***** ***** *******. ***** combo **** *** ********** ** ******, most ******* **** *** **** *** time *** **** *** ********* ** exploit ****, ****** ******** ******* ** attack *** ******* ******. 

*** ********* ***** ***** ***** ***** should ** ****** ** **** ** a ****** ****** ** ********** ******* 'security ********' ** *** ****** *******. If ** ******** ****** **** ***** through ******** * ********** *** *** wall, *** ********* *** *** ***** force ** ***** **** *** ****, then *** ***** ** ********.

Comments (10)

The technical advantages of having a single, integrated, intelligent IP device at the door are manifold. But what will drive adoption is simply cost savings (which is potentially more attractive than modeled in this very good article). Security is a matter of degree, not absolute. I expect the inevitable additional functionality and lower cost will prevail over perceived security vulnerabilities which can be effectively mitigated.

We currently have our multi-door microcontrollers in close proximity to the BA/FA alarm control panel and recieve an input signal in the micro's when there is a fire alarm. The exterior doors then unlock to assist firefighters with access. How would this work with the controllers at the door?

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Hi

There are ways to do this:

The Maglock can be controlled by an independent power supply. The Alarm/Fire system can activate that relay in case of fire to open the door...

The Fire Alarm dry contact signal can be translated into a digital signal to the server signaling it to open the door.. We don't like this idea but it is doable

If the door/controller powers the Maglock through PoE, then have the Fire Alarm relay cut power to the PoE switch thereby removing power fomr the controller, hence the Maglock...

As for tampering with the Reader/comtroller to removepower fromthe Maglock, we use ISONAS and they have adevice that effectively address the tampering isue...

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The Fire Alarm dry contact signal can be translated into a digital signal to the server signaling it to open the door.. We don't like this idea but it is doable

why you dont like that ? any drawback/issues ? I think its easier to implement and maintain. instead of laying & integrating the FA with each door. you can just lay one(or couple for redundancy) to the ACS Server/controller and thats it.

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In general, using the controller to unlock the door because of a fire-alarm input is not ideal because it relies on a fully functioning controller to make the switch.

In many cases, AHJs and codes require direct interruption of power to locks, as in when the fire alarm is activated, power is physically removed from access equipment/locks.

In many cases, the FA is connected to the power supply used by access components.

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I was looking at some all-in-one units for home use, from Samsung and Dahua. They typically look like this:

I believe in these that the reader, controller and strike are all in one unit.  After reading the article, I am thinking that having the strike integrated may actually be a good thing, since it makes it harder to attack the leads which control the strike.

Is that right or are there new vulnerabilities that are introduced?

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Units like you list above do not use an electric strike. The lock latch is retracted or the handle retracts the latch when the lever handle is turned.

Think of a 'hotel style' lock. That is essentially what your standalone unit examples are.

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Ok, let me have the bad news, what sucks about them? :)

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No need to reply, found this excellent article:

Hotel Access Control Explained

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Nice article.  Thank you for exploring the risk issues.

 

A point you didn't address is the case where there's now IP outside the door.  If the thing is PoE powered or has a LAN connection, there's the added issue that the net could be the target.  Yes, we still bring Bubba to use the prybar but now after that even the low end thieves have  a kid on the team with a Rasperry Pi and a a 12 volt battery in their backpack, ready to do rude things over the network drop. There are reports of people accessing devices outside the building for net access, I don't think that's too far-fetched.

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