Axon Alleges To Supreme Court FTC is Unconstitutional Over Blocked Acquisition
Axon attempted to acquire a competitor but the FTC tried to block it. The matter is now at the center of a Supreme Court case where Axon alleges the FTC structure and procedures are unconstitutional and that the agency conducts "sham" hearings.
In this report, IPVM examines Axon's allegations against the FTC and the acquisition that sparked this lawsuit.
Supreme ***** **** **** ****
** ******* **, ****, *** ** Supreme ***** ****** ** **** * case **** ****** ************ **** ******* against ********** ***** **********.
*** ******** *** * ******** ** a**** ** *************** ** **** ** **** ****, petitioning *** ******* ***** ** **** Axon's ****. *** **** ****** ***** is ******* **** *** ***'* ********* and ********** *** **************** *** **** the ******, ****** **** ********** "********* and *********** ** ********** ***************, *********, and ****** ******** *********," ******** "****" proceedings.
****'* *********** **** **** *** ***'* actions ** ***** ****'* **** *********** of ** ******** **********, *****.
Powerhouse ******** *****
January ****: **** ***** ******* **** ** **.
*** ******* *****'* ****** ***** ********* a ***** ****** ** **** *** Arizona ******** ***** *** *** ***** Circuit, ** ***** **** ****** ***** in ***** ** *** ***.
**** ********* ***-**** *********** *** ******** ***** ** ******* in ******* ****:
$13 ******* ***** *********** ********
*****, *************** ****** **** *** "**** ** the **** *******", *** * **** camera ******* ******* ** **** ** a ****** **** ********, ********* ** Axon's *********** ** ******* ******** *****. In *** ****, **** ******** ***** for $** ******* ***. ***** *** allegedly "*********** *********" ** *** ****, losing $* ******* *** *****, *** failing ******* ** *** ******* *** New **** ****** ********** (****) * contract ** * ***, ************* *****.
**** **** ** *** ********* **** Vievu *** **** ** **** ** a **** ******. ***** *** ******* shopped ****** *** ******, *** ** one *** **********.
FTC ******* ** ***********
******* ***** **** ********* *** ***** acquisition, ** **** ****, *** *** alerted **** ** *** *************, ********* to ****'* *********. ******** **** **** it ********** **** *** ***'* ************* over *** ****** ** **+ ******, Axon ******* **** *** *** *** not ******* ** *** *********** *** threatened **** **** *** *******: ********* a "***** *****" ********* ** ** sued ** ** *** ************** *******.
**** ****** **** *** "***** *****" divesture ***** ****** ***** **** * clone ** **** **** ****'* *** IP:
*** *** **** *****, ** ** least ***** ****-**-**** ********, **** ****’* only **** *** ******** ********** *** to ********* * “***** *****” *********. The *** **** **** ** ***** unilaterally ******* *** ***** ** ********** from * “****” ** *** ****’* customers *** ********* (*** **** ***** won ****-***********), ****’* ************ ******** *** technology, **** *********, *** *** ********* services *** ******* ********* *** *** deemed *********.Remarkably, *** *** ********* *** ****** ** “**-********” ***** **** * ******* “*****” ** **** ***** **** ****’* *** ************ ********—something that Vievu never was nor could be without impermissible government regulation of, and unwarranted interference in, a highly-competitive marketplace. [emphasis added]
** *** ***** ****, **** *******, engaging ** ** *** ******** ************** hearing ***** ****** ** ** ******* that ** "*** *** **********."
Az. ******* ***** ******: **** ** ******* ****** ************
*** ******* ******* ********** ******* ****** ***** ****. *** ******** *** not *********** ******* ** * ******** in ****'* ********, *** ******* *** court ******** ** ****** ******* ****** jurisdiction ** *** *******:
**** *****, *******, ** *** *** appropriate ***** ** ******* ****’* ******. It ** “****** ***********” **** *** FTC *** **** ******** ******** ** preclude ******** ****** **** ********* *** type ** ************** ****** **** ***** to ***** ****.
*** ******* ***** **** **** *** appropriate ***** *** ***** ****** ** during *** ************** *******:
*******, **** **** ***** ***** ****** during *** ************** ******* *** **** renew ****, ** *********, **** ******* review ** *** ***** ** *******. Thus, **** ***** ***** ******* ****** jurisdiction **** **** ******, ****’* ******* for * *********** ********** **** ** denied, *** **** ****** **** ** dismissed.
** * ******, **** ******** ** the ***** ******** ***** ** *******, who ******** *** ******* *****'* ********.
** *** **** ********* ** *** Supreme ***** ********* *** ***** *******'* ruling, **** ********* **** ** ******* to **** **** **** *** *********** and ****** *** ***** ******. *** the ******* ******* **** *** *** enough *** *** ***, ***** "***[**] with *** ********** **** ***** **** believing ****** ** ** ***** ********* from ****** ** ********** ******** ******."
*********, *** ***'* ***** ** ****** the *********** ** ******, ** ******* in** ********* *** ***** ******* ***** ** Appeals, *** ** ****'* ****** ** the ******* *****.
Axon: ******* *********** ******
**** ********* * ***** ** *** Arizona ********* ********** *** "***'* ********** to ****'* ***********" *** *********. *** company ******* * ******* ** * healthy *** *********** ******:
*** **** **** *** ***’* ******-****** MCC ********** ** *** ******, ** least * *** *********** ***** ***** DEMS (********/**********, *********, *****, *******, *****, Visual ****/*******, *** ******* ****), * of **** **** ***** *** ********* accounts. ******, **********/******** **** * *** accounts, ********* *** *, *** ******* has *. *** *********** ***** *** Getac **** *** ***** ***-****** ******** like *** ********** ******* ****** (*,*** officers) *** *** ******* **** & Wildlife ********** (*** ********).
** *** ***** ** **********/********, **** inserted * ********, ****** **** *** FTC ******* ********'* $*** ******* ******** of **********, ******* ********'* ******* ********** presence:
** *** **** ** *** ***** acquisition, ********** *** ****’* ******* **********. In **** ****, ******** ********* ********** for $*** ******* **** *** ***’* blessing, ******* *** **** ******** *** already * ********** ********** ** *** BWC *** **** ***** **** ***** city ********** *** ***** ****** ************** of $**.* ******* ****** ****’* ** $4.3 *******. *** ********/********** *********** *** has * ***** **** ***** *********** (“MCC”) ********, ********* ******* **** **** than *,*** ***** ********, *** ** least ** ******** **** ***+ ********.
*** ******* **** ****** *** ******* that ***** **** ****** ********* **** won ***** *** ***** ***********, ** show **** *** *********** *** *** anti-competitive:
***** ************* *** **** ******* ******* Axon, **** **** **** ****. ******, post-acquisition, **** *** **** ** ***** 55 ******* **** ******** ** ***+ sworn ******** ** ** ******** *********:
********** (** ****) – ********* *** Nashville ***** **, ** (*,*** ********)
******* (** ****) – ********* **. Louis ****** **, ** (*** ********)
********* (* ****) – ********* *********** State ****** (*,*** ********)
***** (* ****) – ********* ****** PD, ** (*** ********)
******** (* ****)
**/****** ****** (* ****)
****** **** (* ****)
***** (* ***) – ********** ******* Patrol (*,*** ********)
****** ****** (* ***)
*********/***** (* ***)
**** **** ****** **** *** ****** had "*** ******** ** *****," *********** by *** ******* **** **** ****** entrants **** ***:
** ***** ********** ***********, *** ******* for *** *** **** (******* ***** markets *** *******) ***also ************* ** *** ******** ** *****. Recent entrants, including Getac and Visual Labs, have quickly gained traction. These dynamics are wholly inconsistent with any market power on Axon’s part—the company simply cannot exclude other companies from competing, or deter entry by new players, or charge supracompetitive prices. [emphasis added]
Axon: *** ******** "****" ***********
**** ******* ****** ** **** ** Vievu **** ****'* *** **, *** did ** **** ** ** ******** in ** ******** *** *******, ***** would ***** **** *** ***** ** Due *******. ******, **** ****** *** FTC's ******** ******* ******* * "****" in *** ******** ******* *********:
**** **** ** **** ******* ******* is ******* **** *** *** ******* Clause *** ******** ** *******.
*** ******* ****** *** ***'* *********** are * **** ********* ******* ** is ****** ********** ** ****** *** administrative *** ******, *** ************* ******* over *** *******, *** *** *** commissioners *** "******* *************."
Structure ******** ******* ** ** ** ************
****'* ******* ******** ** ** *** the *** ** **************** ** **** the *** *** ******* ********* **** largely *********, **** ************* ** ** *** ******************* *** ********* ***** **** "****** care **** *** **** ** ********** executed." ***** *** ********* *** ******** enforcement ** ***** "******** ********," ** must **** **** *** ******* ** remove ***** ********.
*******, **** ******* **** *** ************* are ******** **** **-**** ************ ******* and, *********, ********** **************, ** ********* of ******* **. ******, ********* **** *.*.*. **, *** *** **** *********** *** FTC, ************* *** **** ** ******* if **** *** ***** ** "************, neglect ** ****, ** *********** ** office.”
*** **** *********, *** ************* *** not ******* ** ******* ** *** President ****** * ******* ** “************, neglect ** ****, ** *********** ** office.” **** ***** *** ************* *** not *********** *********** *** ***** *******. So **** ** *** ************* **** short ** “***********,” *** ********* *** do ******* *** ***** ** *** watch, ** ****** *** **** ** disagrees **** ****.
*******, *** **** **** ************** *** judges **** *** ********* ** *** FTC ****** **** ** ******* ** the *********, *** **** ** ******* by *************, ** ****************, **** *******:
********, ******* *** ***-********* *** *** also **** ** ******* *** “**** cause” ** ********** **** ********* **********, 5 *.*.*. ****(*), (*)(*), ** ************* “dual-layer ** **********” **** ******* ********* Executive *******.
FTC ***-************ ***** ******* *** *******
*** ***'* ***-************ ***** ******* ****'* Due ******* ******, **** ********:
*** ******** ************** **********, ** ***** theFTC **** *** ** **********, *****, *** ****, violates Axon’s Due Process rights, including but not limited to depriving Axon of the ability to make its case before a neutral arbiter. [emphasis added]
*** ******* "*******[*] ** ********* **** all ****** ** ******** ********** **** operate ****** *** *** ("********") *** provide **** **********,"********* ** ******* *** ******'* ***** Information *********.
*******, **** ***** * ****** ** issues **** *** ***'* ********* *** procedures ***** *** ******* **** ******** Axon's ***** ** *** *******. *** example, **** ********** ** ****** *** ALJs, *** *** "** *** ***'* payroll" *** ********* ** *** ***. Further, ** * ******* **** ** appeal ** *** *** ********, *** commissioners, *** ***** ** *** *** defendant ** *** ***** *****, ****** appeals.
**** ***** * ****** *** ************, Joshua ******, *** ****** *** *** appeals ******* "********* *** * ****** institutional *******." ****** ******* *** **** in *** **** ** *****, ******** there *** ** ****** ** * result ** *** ******** *** *******, if *** *** ***** ** ***** of *** ***, *** *** ************* would ****** *********. *******, ** *** ALJ ********* **** *** ***, *** commission ***** ******* *** ***'* ********.
** ***** *****, ** *** ******* of ***** ***** *** ************** *** judge ***** ** ***** ** *** FTC *****, *** ********** ******** *********; and ** *** ******* ** *** cases ** ***** *** ************** *** judge ***** ** *********, *** ********** reversed. **** ** * ****** **** of ** ********* *** ****** ************* process.
** *** ***** ****, ******** **** to ******* ******* ******, ** ***** appeals ********* *** ********:
** *** ** ********, **** *** antitrust ********* ** ******* ******** ***** judges *** ******** ** *** ******* courts ** ******,plaintiffs ** *** **** ******** ***** ** * *** ******* ******* ****—******, *** *** **** ** **** ****** ** ** *******. [emphasis added]
DOJ *. *** *&* ************** - ******** ***** **********
**** **** ****** **** *** ***** to ***** ********** ** ***** ******** because *** *** *&* ****** ******* is **** ********* **** *** *** process. *** ******* **** ** ** unclear ** *** ****** *** *** FTC *** *** ****** ***** ****** investigates * ******** ******/***********:
******* *** *** *** *** **** dual-jurisdiction ** ****** *******, *** ******** have ******* * “*********” ******* ** decide ***** ****** **** *********** * merger. **** *** *****, *** ******** have ******* * ****** **informal, ***-****** ************** as to how they will divvy up merger investigations. Clearance ** ** ******, *****-*** *******. [emphasis added]
*******, **** ****** **** *** *** provides *** ****** ** ** ************* with ** ********* ***** ***** *** FTC **** ***. *** ***, ** it ***** ****** **** *** *&*, can **** *** ** ******* ***** to ****** *** ***********:
***** ****** ******* * *********** *********** is ********. *** ***’* **** ***** of ********* * *********** ****** ** to *** ** ******* *****.
**** ***** ******* ***** ****** "******* III ********* ****-******* *** *** ** allegiances ** *** ***." ** ********, FTC ************* ******** *** ********* ********* internally, ******** **** ** ** *** ALJ ** *** ** *** *** Commissioners **********:
*** *** ************ (********* *** *** voted ** *** *** *********) ** permitted ** ******* **** *** ************** hearing; ***, ** ****, ** *** appointed ** *** *** *** ** the ***’* ******* **** *******.
**** ***** * ****** ** ***** issues **** ********* ******* *** *******'* equal ********** ******, ******** **** ********* forced **** *** *** ******* *** not ******* ******* ** ***** *** undergo *** *** *******. *** *******:
******* ***** *********** *** ******** ** the ******* ***** ** ******** *** Federal ***** ** ***** *********. ******* apply ** *** ************** ***********.
*** *** **** ******* * **** rigorous ******** ** ******* **** * merger ** *********** “************* ******* ***********,” whereas *** *** *** ******* * less ******* “****** ***********” ******** ** the ************** *******.
Timing *******
** ** ********* ******* **** *** Supreme ***** **** **** *** **** arguments **** **** *** **** *** federal **********. *** ******* ***** ** typically ** ******* **** ******* ** June/July **** ****.
**** **** ******** ** ***** **** case *** ****** ***********.
*** ******* ***** *** ***** ** favor** **** ********* ** ** ******** Court ** ** ********:
*** ***** ******* ***** ******* **** point ** *** **** *********—****** ******** district ***** ****** ** ****’* *** Cochran’s ****** **** *** *********, ** even *********,** ** ****** ******** *** Constitution. *** *** ******* ***** *****, those ****** ****** ******* ********** ******** review ******* *** *** *** ** Exchange ***. **** ************* ** *** decisions *** *********** ***** **** ** individual *********** ***********. *** **** **** outside *** ***********’ ****** ** *********. Our ********** *******: *** ****** *** not “** *** ****” *** ********* review ******* *****. **., ** ***. A ******** ***** *** ********* ****** them.
** *********** ******* *** ******** ** the ***** ** ******* *** *** Ninth *******, ****** *** ******** ** the ***** ** ******* *** *** Fifth *******, *** ****** *** *** cases *** ******* *********** ********** **** this *******.
** *** **** ********* ******* ************, **** **** **** ***** ****** with *** ***: