Widespread Doorking Callbox Key Vulnerability

Avatar
Brian Rhodes
Feb 19, 2021
IPVMU Certified

A member forwarded us this tweet about a widespread Doorking Callbox vulnerability, where doors/gates can be opened via default enclosure key and shorting lock contacts:

(2/2) The Answer: the Doorking callbox has a 'mail' keyswitch for postal workers. If you can open the callbox, you can easily short that switch gaining instant lobby access.

*** ***** ****** ******** ******* **** THE **** ****** ***.

***** * ****** ** ****** *** $16.99 */*****.***.*******.***/**********

*** **** ** *** ******* ********* key, * ******** ***** *** **** as ******* ******* ** ********* ** callboxes *** ** *********** ** ***, i.e.~$*.** **** *************** **** **** ********* *** ****. Doorking ** ****** **** **** *** code *** ******* ** ********* *** new *********, *** ********** **** ***** are ***** ***** ******* ******* ****.

******** ********** **** **** **** ** replace ******* ***** *** ***** *** many *****, *** *********** ********** ****/***** are *********** (*.*.: ~$**), *** ********** **** ** ******* factory ******** (**** **** *************** *********** ******* *********).

**** **** ** *** *** *** has **** ******* ** ****, ********* videos ********* ********* **** **** *** **** ** is ** **** ***:

** **** ******* *** ** ******** tech ******* *** *************** ** ******** this ****.

**** *** **** **** ******* ** the *****? *** **** *** ********* it?

(1)
Avatar
Michael Silva
Feb 19, 2021
Silva Consultants

**** ** ** ********* ****** ************* that ** ********* ******** ** *********** properties :

********* ******* (** ********* ***** ** effectiveness):

*. ********* ******** ******* *** **** with **** **** ** **** *** not ***** ** ***** ***. (* randomly ***** **** **** ** ** packed ** *** *** **** ******** units, *** **** ********** ***** **** the **** ** ****** *** ******* lock).

*. ********* ******** ******* *** ***** with ****-******** *** ***** **** ** Medeco.

*. ****** * ******* ** ****** or **** ***** ** *** ***** (ugly *** *********).

*. ****** * ********** ***** ****** around ****** **** ** **** (******** done ** **** ********* *****.)

*. ****** ******-****** ** **** ** unit *** ********** ** ****** ****-*** circuit. **** ******* *********** ******** **** hardware **** ******** **** ***** ***** from ******. **** ******* *** ****** be ***** **** ***** $** ***** of *****

***** ** * **** **** **** from******* ***** ********* *** ********** (****)**** ***** ******** ** ********** ***** shrouds *** * *** ***** *********.

IPVM Image

(2)
New discussion

Ask questions and get answers to your physical security questions from IPVM team members and fellow subscribers.

Newest discussions