U.S. Moving Closer To Banning Security Gear From China

A law signed this week prevents NASA, the Justice Department, and the Commerce Department from buying IT-related equipment from China without a “cyber-espionage” risk consultation with law enforcement. The story is worth a read.

The topic has been stewing for a while. In the...

* ********* ****** ** *** ** **********.

*** *********: *** *.*. ** ****** ** ****** *********** **** China ******* *** ****** **'** ** ****** **** **** ***-****** hardware ** ******** **** *********** ******* ******.

*’********* ***** **** ***** ** *** ****. **** ****, ********* * ****** ** **** ****** **** the **** ** *********** *********** *********** *** *.*. **** ****** any ** ** ********-******* **** **** ******* *********. **** ******** surveillance *** *** ********-******* ****, ** *********, ********** ***** *** weapon *******, ********** ******** ***** *** ******* *******.

*** *** *** ***** *** **** ** ******* **** ********, however, *** *** ****’* ** ** *** ** ******* **** requirement ** *** *********** ******** **** *** *** *** *** or ******* **** ********** ***** ********** *** *** **** (*** it ***** ** * *********). ** *** *** **** **** local ****** ***********, *** **** ** **** **** ***** *********** often ***** ********* **** ********** **** ****** ***** *** **** and ***** ****.

** ********* ******* ****** ** *** ******, ** ***** ** a ******** *** *** ************ ******** -- ********** *** ****** who ** ******** **** ********** ******** (*******, ***** *** *****).

********?

Login to read this IPVM discussion.
Why do I need to log in?
IPVM conducts unique testing and research funded by member's payments enabling us to offer the most independent, accurate and in-depth information.

** ******* *********? ***** * ****** ***** ****. **** ***** be * ********. ****** ******** ** ***** ***** **** *****.

****'* *** ****** **** **** *************** *** ******* ********** ************** *** ** ****:

Sec. ***. (a) None of the funds appropriated or otherwise made available under this Act may be used by the Departments of Commerce and Justice, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or the National Science Foundation to acquire an information technology system unless the head of the entity involved, in consultation with the Federal Bureau of Investigation or other appropriate Federal entity, has made an assessment of any associated risk of cyber-espionage or sabotage associated with the acquisition of such system, including any risk associated with such system being produced, manufactured or assembled by one or more entities that are owned, directed or subsidized by the People’s Republic of China.

(*) **** ** *** ***** ************ ** ********* **** ********* under **** *** *** ** **** ** ******* ** *********** technology ****** ********* ** ** ********** ******** ** ********** (*) and ********, ************ ** ********* ** *** ** **** ******** that *** *****, ******** ** ********** ** *** ******’* ******** of ***** ****** *** **** ** *** ********* ****** ********* in ********** (*) **********, *** ******* **** ************* ** *** Committees ** ************** ** *** ***** ** *************** *** *** Senate, **** *** *********** ** **** ****** ** ** *** national ******** ** *** ****** ******.

Sec. ***. (a) None of the funds made available by this Act may be used for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) or the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop, design, plan, promulgate, implement, or execute a bilateral policy, program, order, or contract of any kind to participate, collaborate, or coordinate bilaterally in any way with China or any Chinese-owned company unless such activities are specifically authorized by a law enacted after the date of enactment of this Act.

*******, *** ************ ***'* ***** ** ***** **** *** *** checks *** *****:

(*) **** ** **** ** ********* ** *** ******** ** technology, ****, ** ***** *********** **** ******** ******** ** ******** security ************ ** ***** ** * *******-***** *******

* ***** **** ** * ***** **** - * ******* it **** **** **** ** ******* **** ** *** ** their **** ******* ** ******* ****** *** ******* - ** order ** **** *** *** *****.

******* ** **** ** ********** *** * **** ********.

** ******, *** ****** ***** ***** **** **** **** **, affected ************* **** **** **** ********** ** "***-**********" *********. ** at ***** ****** ***** ******* *********...

********, ** ****** * *** **** *** ***** ********* **** still ***** ** **** *** (***** ******). * ******* **'* still ******* ** ***, ******, ***/** *** ***** ****** ** the **? ** ** ******, ************* ******* *** **** *** line **** ****** ** *** ***** ******. *** ********* ** one ***** * ****, *** **** ***** ** *** ***** thing **, *** ****** **** ******** **** *** "******" ***** cigars ***** ** **** ***** ********* ****** ** ****** *** embargo ******... ** *** ***** "******" ********'* **** ** *** about *** *** **** ** ***** ****'* *** **** "******" that **** ****** ****** *** ** *** ***** *****.

*** **** ***** * ***** *****: ** ****** ***** **'* finally "*****", ****** ******** ********** *** ** ***** **** ***** coming **** *****... ** *** ******* ****** ** *** ********* code **** ** ********* **** *****, * ****** *** ** direct ********* ***'* ***** ** **** **** **** ** ***.

****, * **** * ******** *** **** *** *** *****: Why ******* ** ** **** **** *********** (********, **, ***.) manufacturers ***** **** ****** ************ **** ** ****** ***** *** issue. * ***'* **** ** **** ******** ** ****** ********* lobbying ******* **. ******** ***** ** ** **** **** ** letting ** ******.

* **** ** ******* **** *** ** ****** ** ******* Cisco **** ******. ***** ***** ** ***** *** **** ***** to ******* ****** **** *****.

** *** ******* ************* - *** ** ***** ** ****** to ****?

***** *** ** **** **** ************ ** ***** *** * few **** **** **** - ********* **** **** **** **** slow ******* * ******* ***** *** ************ **** ** ***** in ***** ** ** ****** *********** ****** *** ** **** up ** *** **** *** *******.

*******, **'* ******** **** **** ***'* ****** *** **** ** a ******. ** ***** ****'** ******* ******* *** ***** "****-*******" and *** **** ******* ***** ** **** ***** *** *****.