Should Manufacturers Sponsor Penetration Testing Of Competitor's Products?

In the Dear John letter discussion, U17 suggests the following:

...it would seem that publicizing the backdoors so that the integrators can demonstrate the risk would be one of the few avenues to combat the predators. One thing to talk about them, another to provide the steps...

*),*) ** **** *********** *** ***** *** ***** ** *** mind ** *** *** ****. ** ******* ******* * ******* configuration ** *** ******** *** *** **** *** *** ******** they're ******.

*** *** **** *****?

*** *** *** * *** ***** ** **** *** **** some *** ******* *** **** *************** **** *** **** ** their *********** ********?

** **** **** ********* ********** ******** **** ***** **** *** pen ******* ******* ** ** ***** ***, ** ***** *** negative ********.

** **** ***** *** ** *** ***, ***** **** *** right ****** ***** *** **** **** ** '**********', ** ***** up * *** ** **** * ****** ****** ** *** news.

*** *** ******* ** **** ** **** ***** ** ******** about *** ******** ***** ** **** ** *****.

This ** ******** ***-***** ******** **** ** ***** ****** *** ** ****** ** ***** **** * ********, certainly a dubious proposition in the past. But I feel awareness of the danger of unsafe devices is finally growing at the consumer level, and once you get branded as hackable, it might be hard to shake.

***** *** *** ******** ** *** ***** ******** *******.

****** ************ *** **** *** ***********? ***/**.

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*******:** ***** **** ***********

** **** ********, ** ****** **** *** ******, ****** * think *** **** *** *****.

(*) * *** ** ************* *** ******** ******** ** ***** competitors. ********* * ***** **** ************* *** *** ****** *********** that **** ** *** **** **** *********** ********** ** ***** competitor's *********. ** **** ** *** **** *** **** / interest / ********* ** **** ****, * ** *** ********** about *** *******.

(*) ****** *** ************* *** ****** ********* ** *** ******** negative ***** ***********, **** ** ** ** ****. ***** *** only **** ********* (*.*.,***** ********** *******'* *****-******).

******* **** ***********, * ***** ** ** ********* **** **** should ****. ********?

(*) * *** ** ************* *** ******** ******** ** ***** competitors.

** *****. *******, ******** ***, ******* ** ***** ************, *** best **** ** ****** ******* **. ***** ****** *******, *.*. Coke **. *****.

** ** *** ***** **** **** *** ******** ****** ***** to ******* ******* *** "***'* ****" ****, ***** ***** **** competitive ***** *********, *.*. ** *** **** **** **** ********* is *** ******** ***** ***** *** ******* *** ** *** dark ***** ****.

(*) ****** *** ************* *** ****** ********* ** *** ******** negative ***** ***********, **** ** ** ** ****.

** ***** ** **** ** ** ******* **** **** * negative ******** **** ******* **** ***, *** ******** ** ***** retaliation.

****'* ***** **** ****** ****** ******,since ******* *** ******* *************** *** *** ****, *** *** *** **** ** **** **** **** ** **** ********** ********* **** ** ***? As opposed to running an anonymous negative ad against your competitor, where everybody would be assuming who it was from.

*** *** ** ****** ******** ***** *** ** ** *********, regardless ** ********.

* ***** ** *****, *** * ***'* ******* ******* ******* works ** **** *******. ** ******* ****** ********* ***** *** release ******** ******** ****** * ******* **** * ****** *******/******* is ******** ***-********** ** ***** ******** ** ***************.

** ****, * ** *** **** **** ***** **** *** Manufacturer * ** **** *** ******* ** ************ *.

***** ****** *****, * ** ***** ****************-******* ******* ***** **** ***** *** ******* *** ******** ***** forward.

*************, ******** ********* **** ******** *******, ***********'* ********** (**), ** an **** ***** ** ************--** ***** ** *** **** ** to *****. **** ***** **** **** **** **** ********* *** be ****** ** ****** ******* **** ******** *******.

****? *********? ******** ***** **** ***** ********!

** **** *** **** * ****** * ***'* ***** ** have *** ***** ** **** **.

* ***'* ******* ******* ******* ***** ** **** *******.

*** **** ******** ***** ******? ;)

*** ***** ******* ***** ******** ** ****** "*********** **********", *** would ********* ******* ********* *** ****** ***** ** **** ****** them **** **** ** *****. ** **** ** **** ******, and ***** ********* ** *** ** ** *** ****** ** act ** ***** ***** *** ******* ** *********.

*** ******'* **** ***** ** **? **** ** **** **** these **** **** ******** ******* *** ****-*** ******* ** *** sort, ****, **** ******* ******** ***** **** **** ** **** threat.

* ***** (****) ******* *** ****** ********* ** *****, *** I ***** ** ********* ** **** **** ** ***** ***'* happening ******* ** *** ****** ****** ** ********** *** ******* OS.