FCC REVOKES China Telecomm Authorizations

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CHAIRWOMAN ***********: THE CHAIR VOTES AYE. THE ITEM IS ADOPTED WITH EDITORIAL PRIVILEGES IF REQUESTED. MR. SULLIVAN, PLEASE BEGIN INTRODUCING THE ITEM ON TODAY'S AGENDA.

MR. ********: GOOD MORNING, MADAM CHAIRWOMAN AND COMMISSIONERS. CONGRESS CREATED THE COMMISSION, AMONG OTHER REASONS, FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AND FOR THE PURPOSE OF PROMOTING SAFETY OF LIFE AND PROPERTY THROUGH THE USE OF WIRE AND RADIO COMMUNICATIONS. PROMOTION OF NATIONAL SECURITY IS AN INTEGRAL PART OF THE COMMISSION'S PUBLIC INTEREST RESPONSIBILITY, INCLUDING ITS ADMINISTRATION OF SECTION 213 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS ACT. AND INDEED, ONE OF THE CORE PURPOSES FOR WHICH CONGRESS TRADED THE COMMISSION. COMMISSION HAS TAKEN A NUMBER OF TARGETED STEPS TO PROTECT THE NATION'S COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE FROM POTENTIAL SECURITY THREATS, AND IT CONTINUES THOSE EFFORTS TODAY. THIS ORDER ON REVOCATION AND TERMINATION REVOKES CHINA TELKOM AMERICA'S CORPORATIONS DOMESTIC 2013 AUTHORITY, AND REVOKES AND TERMINATES ITS INTERNATIONAL SECTION 2014 AUTHORITY. THE ORDER YOU HAVE ADOPTED FINDS THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE, AND NECESSITY IS NO LONGER SERVED BY CHINA TELKOM AMERICA'S RETAINING THESE AUTHORIZATIONS. I THANK THE STAFF IN THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, FORSTMANN BUREAU, WIRELINE COMPETITION BUREAU, OFFICE OF GENERAL COUNSEL, OFFICE OF ANALYTICS, PUBLIC SAFETY AND HOMELAND SECURITY BUREAU, CONSUMER AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS BUREAU, AND OFFICE OF ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY FOR THEIR COLLABORATIVE WORK ON THIS ITEM. GABRIELLE KIM OF THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU WILL PRESENT THE ITEM.

MS. ***: GOOD MORNING, ACTING CHAIRWOMAN ROSENWORCEL AND COMMISSIONERS. IN APRIL 20 20, SEVERAL EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES COMMENDED THAT THE COMMISSION REVOKE AND TERMINATE THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION 2014 AUTHORIZATIONS OF CHINA TELKOM AMERICAS, BASED ON A SUBSTANTIAL AND UNACCEPTABLE NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RISK ASSOCIATED WITH CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS' CONTINUED ACCESS TO U.S. TELE-COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE. AMONG OTHER STATEMENTS, THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCY STATED THAT CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS -- CHINA TELKOM AMERICA FAILED TO INFORM THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES OF APPLICATIONS TO THE COMMISSION, WHICH VIOLATED TWO COMMISSIONS -- TWO ASSURANCES IN ITS 2017 LETTER, COMPLIANCE WITH WHICH IS AN EXPRESS CONDITION OF CHINA TELKOM AMERICA'S INTERNATIONAL SECTION 2014 AUTHORIZATIONS. BASED IN PART ON THE RECOMMENDATION OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, THE COMMISSION'S INTERNATIONAL BUREAU, WIRELINE, AND ENFORCEMENT BUREAUS ISSUED A NOTICE TO SHOW CAUSE ON APRIL 20 4, 2020, DIRECTING CHINA TELECOM AMERICA TO EXPLAIN WHY WE SHOULD NOT TERMINATE ITS AUTHORIZATIONS. ON DECEMBER 10, 2020, THE COMMISSION ADOPTED AN ORDER ON REVOCATION AND TERMINATION, FINDING THAT CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS FAILED TO RESPOND TO SERIOUS CONCERNS OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH ABOUT ITS RETENTION OF ITS AUTHORIZATIONS AND CONTINUED PRESENCE IN THE UNITED STATES. THE COMMISSION ADOPTED PROCEDURES THAT ALLOWED FOR CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS, EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, AND THE PUBLIC TO PRESENT ANY REMAINING ARGUMENTS IN THIS MATTER. BASED ON THE COMMISSION'S PUBLIC INTEREST ANALYSIS AND THE SUBSTANCE OF UNCLASSIFIED RECORD, WE FIND THE PRESENT AND FUTURE PUBLIC INTEREST, CONVENIENCE, AND NECESSITY IS NO LONGER SERVED BY CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS' RETENTION OF ITS SECTION 20 -- SECTION 214 AUTHORITY. THE ORDER FINDS THAT CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS, A U.S. SUBSIDIARY OF A CHINESE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE, IS SUBJECT TO STATE CONTROL BY THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT, AND IS HIGHLY LIKELY TO BE FORCED TO COMPLY WITH CHINESE GOVERNMENT REQUESTS WITHOUT SUFFICIENT LEGAL PROCEDURES SUBJECT TO INDEPENDENT JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT. SECOND, GIVEN THE CHANGED NATIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT WITH RESPECT TO CHINA SINCE THE COMMISSION AUTHORIZED CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS TO PROVIDE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES, THE ORDER FINDS THAT CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL RAISED SIGNIFICANT NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RISKS, PROVIDING OPPORTUNITIES FOR CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS, ITS PARENT ENTITIES, AND THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT TO ACCESS, STORE, DISRUPT, AND/OR MISS ROB U.S. COMMUNICATIONS -- MISROUTE U.S. COMMUNICATIONS, ALLOWING ESPIONAGE AND OTHER HARMFUL ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE UNITED STATES. INDEPENDENT OF THESE CONCERNS, CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS' CONDUCT WITH THE COMMISSION AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES REVEAL A LACK OF CANDOR AND RELIABILITY THAT ERODES THE BASELINE TRUST THAT THE COMMISSION AND OTHER U.S. AGENCIES REQUIRE, WITH TELECOMMUNICATIONS AREAS -- PROVIDERS, GIVEN THE CRITICAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICE IN THE UNITED STATES. FOURTH, EVEN THE RECORD EVIDENCE, THE ORDER FINDS THAT FURTHER MITIGATION WOULD NOT ADDRESS THE SUBMITTED LAW ENFORCEMENT CONCERNS. THE ORDER THEREFORE REVOKES THE SECTION 2014 AUTHORITY. SEPARATE TO THE FINDINGS CONCERNING REVOCATION, THE ORDER TERM CADES -- TERMINATES INTERNATIONAL SECTION 2014 AUTHORIZATIONS, DUE TO CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS' VIOLATION OF THE 2007 LETTER ASSURANCES, COMPLIANCE OF WHICH IS AN EXPRESS CONDITION OF ITS INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS. FINALLY, ALTHOUGH IT IS NOT NECESSARY TO SUPPORT THESE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS, THE ORDER FINDS UNCLASSIFIED EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES THAT SUPPORTS THE DECISIONS TO REVOKE DOMESTIC AUTHORITY AND TO REVOKE AND TERMINATE INTERNATIONAL AUTHORIZATIONS RELATED TO TERMINATION. FURTHER MITIGATION WILL NOT ADDRESS SUBSTANTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY AND LAW ENFORCEMENT RISKS. ACCORDINGLY, THE ORDER DIRECTS CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS TO DISCONTINUE ANY DOMESTIC OR INTERNATIONAL SERVICES THAT IT PROVIDES, PURSUANT TO ITS SECTION 2014 AUTHORITY. -- AUTHORITY WITHIN 60 DAYS FOLLOWING THE RELEASE OF THIS ORDER.

CHAIRWOMAN ***********: THANK YOU. WE WILL NOW HEAR COMMENTS FROM THE BENCH. COMMISSIONER CARR?

COMMISSIONER ****: THANK YOU. IN 2019, WHEN HE BLOCKED CHINA MOBILE FROM ENTERING THE U.S. MARKET BASED ON NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS, I SAID IT WAS TIME FOR A TOP TO BOTTOM REVIEW OF ANY TELECOM PROVIDER WITH TIES TO THE COMMUNIST REGIME IN CHINA. WITH THAT IN MIND, WE LAUNCHED AN INQUIRY INCLUDING ONE HERE ON CHINA TELECOM. WHILE OUR REVIEWS CONTINUE ON OTHER ENTITIES, I'M PLEASED WE ARE BRINGING THIS ONE TO A CLOSE. WE ARE VOTING TO REVOKE CHINA TELECOM'S DOMESTIC INTERNATIONAL SECTION 214 AUTHORITY. IN MY STATEMENT, IN EVIDENCE, I WALKED THROUGH WHAT THIS ACCOUNTS. THE FCC MUST REMAIN VIGILANT TO THE THREATS IMPOSED BY THE COMMONEST PARTY OF CHINA AND THOSE THAT WOULD DO ITS BIDDING. I URGE ACTION. WE SHOULD QUICKLY ADOPT FINAL ORDERS IN OUR OTHER SECTION 2014 INVESTIGATIONS. SECOND, WE SHOULD CLOSE THE LOOPHOLE IN OUR AUTHORIZATION PROCESS TO ENSURE EQUIPMENT FROM WHILE WAY -- FROM HUAWEI AND OTHER ENTITIES WILL NO LONGER BE ELIGIBLE FOR FCC APPROVAL. LAST WEEK, THE HOUSE PASSED LEGISLATION SPONSORED BY CONGRESSPERSON SCULLY'S THAT WOULD REQUIRE US --SCALISE, BUT WE DO NOT HAVE TO WAIT FOR THAT BILL TO BECOME LAW. WE SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO CLOSE THE HUAWEI LOOPHOLE. WE SHOULD MAKE SURE WE HAVE A CLEAR PROCESS FOR ADDING NEW ENTITIES TO THE FCC'S COVERED LIST. I HIGHLIGHTED THIS ISSUE AS PART OF MY REMARKS WERE CALLED FOR THE AGENCY TO BE IN THE PROCESS OF ADDING DJI, STATIONS AND BASED -- A SHENZHEN-BASED DRONE COMPANY, TO THE LIST. VARIOUS COMPONENTS OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAVE TAKEN A RANGE OF ACTIONS, INCLUDING GROUNDING FLEETS OF DJI DRONES, BASED ON SECURITY CONCERNS. THE DOD CONFIRMED THAT DJI DRONES ARE POTENTIAL THREATS TO NATIONAL SECURITY, AND CONFIRMED THEY ARE STILL BARRED FROM GENERAL USE BY THE DOD. WE NEED A CONSISTENT AND COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO ADDRESSING DJI'S THREATS, SO THE FCC SHOULD TAKE THE NECESSARY STEPS TO CONSIDER ADDING DJI TO OUR COVERED LIST. AFTER ALL, WE DO NOT NEED A WHUA -- A HUAWEI OR WINGS. THIS DECISION PRESENTS ANOTHER OPPORTUNITY TO LOOK AT UPDATING THE AGENCY'S COVERED LIST. THE DETERMINATIONS REACHED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES REGARDING CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS APPEAR SUFFICIENT TO TRIGGER THE PROCESS OF ADDING THEM TO THE FCC'S COVERED LIST UNDER OUR EXISTING RULES. I WOULD ENCOURAGE THE COMMISSION TO TAKE THAT ACTION, SINCE IT COULD IMPOSE ADDITIONAL RESTRICTIONS ON CHINA TELECOM THAT GO BEYOND THE 213, 214 AUTHORIZATIONS. I WOULD LIKE TO THANK THE STAFF OF THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU FOR THEIR WORK, AS WELL AS STAFFS ACROSS THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCIES PARTICIPATED IN THE PROCESS. THE ITEM HAS MY SUPPORT.

CHAIRWOMAN ***********: THANK YOU. NOW WE WILL HEAR FROM COMMISSIONER STARKS.

COMMISSIONER ******: THANK YOU YOU, MADAM CHAIRWOMAN. THERE ARE THOSE OUT THERE WHO WOULD ATTACK OUR TELECOM NETWORKS. IN JUST THE LAST FEW MONTHS, WE HAVE LEARNED ABOUT A HACKER STEALING PERSONAL DATA OF MORE THAN 50 MILLION CUSTOMERS OF A MAJOR AMERICAN WIRELESS CARRIER. WE HAVE READ ACCOUNTS OF HACKERS PENETRATING THE SYSTEMS OF CRITICAL U.S. TELECOM BACKBONE PROVIDERS AS WELL, PROVIDING ACCESS TO CELL PHONE DATA FOR MILLIONS OF USERS OVER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD. JUST LAST WEEK, A CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH FIRM DISCLOSED THAT HACKERS HAVE BEEN BREAKING INTO THE COMPUTER NETWORKS OF TELECOM COMPANIES ACROSS THE WORLD SINCE 2016. SO ONE OF THE REASONS, AS WAS MENTIONED, THAT CONGRESS CREATED THE FCC WAS TO PROTECT OUR NETWORKS FROM ATTACKS LIKE THESE. EVEN AS HACKERS CONTINUE TO ATTACK THROUGH THE BACK DOOR, WE FACE ANOTHER THREAT FROM THE FRONT DOOR -- CARRIERS WHO ARE OTHERWISE ASSOCIATED WITH ADVERSARY STATES. THESE COMPANIES SEEK OR POSSESS AUTHORIZATIONS TO ENTER AND CONNECT -- INTERCONNECT WITH U.S. NETWORKS AND PROVIDE SERVICES TO FOREIGN NATIONALS. ACCORDING TO THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES WITH ACCESS TO OUR NETWORKS, LOCATIONS IN OUR COUNTRY, THESE COMPANIES ACCESS, MONITOR, STORE, DISRUPT, MISROUTE COMMUNICATIONS, MISUSE CUSTOMER INFORMATION, AND OTHER HARMFUL ACTIVITIES. ALTHOUGH WE HAVE ACTED AGAINST SEVERAL SUCH CARRIERS, CHINA TELECOM IS CLEARLY AN EXAMPLE OF A COMPANY SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL OF AN ADVERSARY STATE. THE COMPANY'S PARENT IS MAJORITY OWNED AND CONTROLLED BY A CHINESE GOVERNMENT OWNED ENTERPRISE, AND THAT ENTITY IS DIRECTLY ACCOUNTABLE TO THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, AND MUST CONSULT WITH THOSE REPRESENTATIVES PRIOR TO MAKING DECISIONS ON MATERIAL ISSUES. OTHER CHINESE CARRIERS, CHINA TELECOM MUST DISCLOSE SENSITIVE CUSTOMER INFORMATION WHENEVER THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT DEMANDS IT. BASED ON INFORMATION PRESENTED BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, THESE RISKS ARE NOT THEORETICAL. CHINA TELECOM'S U.S. RECORDS ARE ALREADY AVAILABLE TO ITS NON-U.S. AFFILIATES ABROAD. IN ADDITION, AS DETAILED IN THIS ITEM, CHINA TELECOM HAS A RECORD OF INACCURATE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FCC AND OTHER U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES. I WILL HAVE A LONGER STATEMENT. THANK YOU OF COURSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL BUREAU AND ALL THE COMMISSION STAFF THAT WORKED ON THIS ITEM. BUT CLEARLY BASED ON THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES, OUR DECISION TO REVOKE CHINA TELECOM'S SECTION 214 AUTHORIZATION IS WELL-FOUNDED.

CHAIRWOMAN ***********: THANK YOU, COMMISSIONER STARKS. COMMISSIONER SIMINGTON?

COMMISSIONER *********: THANK YOU. THE FCC RECENTLY ENGAGED IN A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF TELECOM PROVIDERS' CONNECTIONS TO CHINA. THE FCC OPENED INVESTIGATIONS INTO SEVERAL PROVIDERS, INCLUDING CHINA TELECOM, TO DETERMINE WHETHER THEY POSE A THREAT TO NATIONAL SECURITY. TODAY, WE TAKE THE FIRST STEP TOWARD COMPLETING ONE SUCH INVESTIGATION. CHINA TELECOM, A U.S. SUBSIDIARY OF A CHINESE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE, IS SUBJECT TO CONTROL OF THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT. IT IS LIKELY THEY WOULD BE FORCED TO COMPLY WITH CHINESE GOVERNMENT REQUESTS THAT SHOULD BE SUBJECT TO JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT. I SUPPORT THE DECISION TO REVOKE THE INTERNATIONAL SECTION 2014 AUTHORITY AND AUTHORIZATION. -- 214 AUTHORITY AND AUTHORIZATION. I THINK THE BUREAUS FOR THEIR HARD WORK. THIS HAS MY SUPPORT.

CHAIRWOMAN ***********: THANK, COMMISSIONERS. THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION HAS A LONG HISTORY OF WORKING TO OPEN AMERICAN MARKETS TO FOREIGN TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMPANIES WHEN DOING SO IS IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST. THESE CONNECTIONS CAN MAKE US STRONGER BECAUSE THEY HELP US SHARE OUR DEMOCRATIC VALUES WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. BUT WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT NOT EVERY CONNECTION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. SOME COUNTRIES MAY SEE TO EXPLOIT OUR OPENNESS TO ADVANCE THEIR OWN NATIONAL INTERESTS. WHEN THEY RECOGNIZE THIS IS THE CASE AND CANNOT MITIGATE THE RISK, WE NEED TO TAKE ACTION TO PROTECT THE COMMUNICATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE THAT IS SO CRITICAL TO OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AND ECONOMIC PROSPERITY. THAT IS WHAT WE DO HERE TODAY. WE TAKE AN IMPORTANT AND NECESSARY STEP TO PROTECT THAT INFRASTRUCTURE BY REVOKING AND TERMINATING CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS' AUTHORITY TO PROVIDE INTERSTATE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES IN THE UNITED STATES. THIS IS NOT A DECISION WE MAKE LIGHTLY. BECAUSE THE SUPPORT OF MY COLLEAGUES AND FROM ACROSS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT. LAST YEAR, A BROAD GROUP OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES INCLUDING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, AND THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE FORMALLY RECOMMENDED WE TERMINATE FCC AUTHORIZATION FOR TELECOM -- CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS IN THE UNITED STATES. AT ABOUT THE SAME TIME, THE SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS ISSUED A REPORT ON THE THREATS THAT CHINESE STATE OWNED CARRIERS POSED TO OUR TELE-COMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS. IN DOING SO, THEY HIGHLIGHTED A PROBLEM. ACROSS THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, THERE HAS NOT BEEN ENOUGH OVERSIGHT TO SAFEGUARD OUR NETWORKS AGAINST EVOLVING THREATS AFTER THE ISSUANCE OF A LICENSE. THAT BRINGS US TO THE HERE AND NOW. SINCE THE SUBCOMMITTEE RELEASED ITS FINDINGS, THE FCC HAS INCREASED ITS OVERSIGHT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS. FOLLOWING BOTH REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW, WE HAVE REACHED THE CONCLUSION THAT IT IS NECESSARY TO TERMINATE DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL SECTION 20 -- 214 AUTHORITY FOR CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS. OUR RECORD MAKES CLEAR IT OPERATES AS A SUBSIDIARY OF A CHINESE STATE OWNED ENTERPRISE, AND AS SUCH THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT HAS THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE AND CONTROL ITS ACTIONS. THAT CAN LEAD TO REAL PROBLEMS WITH OUR TELECOMMUNICATIONS NETWORKS THROUGH SURVEILLING INFORMATION, MISS ROUTING TRAFFIC -- MISROUTING TRAFFIC, OR RESTRICTING SERVICE. CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS HAS NOT BEEN FORTHRIGHT IN ITS REPRESENTATIONS TO THE FCC AND OTHER AGENCIES. AS A RESULT, MITIGATION METHODS ARE NOT ADEQUATE TO ADDRESS OUR CONCERNS, AND REVOCATION OF EXISTING AUTHORIZATIONS ARE JUSTIFIED. THIS IS NOT THE END OF THE STORY. THE RESPONSE TO THIS ONE PROVIDER THIS ONE TIME IS NOT ENOUGH. AS THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS POINTED OUT IN A REPORT, -- IN THE REPORT, WE NEED TO ENSURE OVERSIGHTS ARE IN PLACE. FIRST, NOW THAT WE HAVE COMPLETED OUR REVIEW OF CHINA TELECOM AMERICAS, WE ARE MOVING EXPEDITIOUSLY TO COMPLETE SECURITY REVIEWS FOR SIMILARLY SITUATED CARRIERS LIKE CHINA UNICOM AND CALM NET. -- COMNET. WE HAVE A PROCESS FOR REVOKING EXISTING AUTHORIZATIONS WHEN THERE ARE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS. FOR TODAY, THAT DID NOT EXIST. NOW COMPANIES WILL UNDERSTAND THE CIRCUMSTANCES UNDER WHICH AUTHORIZATIONS COULD BE REVOKED AND WHAT DO PROCESS IS AVAILABLE. CONSISTENT WITH THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS, THE FCC IS COORDINATING WITH EXECUTIVE BRANCH AGENCIES, WITH FORMAL REVIEW. THIS WILL HELP ENSURE WE CAN STAY ON TOP OF EVOLVING NATIONAL SECURITY, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND TRADE RISKS. THE FCC IS TAKING A CLOSER LOOK AT APPLICATIONS FOR SUBMARINE CABLES TO MAKE SURE THEY DO NOT RAISE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERNS. IT WAS THE PRACTICE OF THE AGENCY TO GRANT TEMPORARY AUTHORITY TO START BUILDING SUBMARINE CABLES WHILE APPLICATIONS WERE PENDING, EVEN IF THOSE APPLICATIONS REFLECTED OWNERSHIP BY STATE OWNED COMPANIES THAT COULD REPRESENT A NATIONAL SECURITY RISK. THAT IS NO LONGER THE CASE. REQUESTS FOR TEMPORARY AUTHORITY TO START CONSTRUCTION COULD RAISE NATIONAL SECURITY CONCERN'S -- CONCERNS. THE FCC NOW SENDS THIS TO THE COMMITTEE FOR COORDINATED SECURITY REVIEW. THANK YOU TO THE STAFF THAT HAS WORKED ON ALL OF THESE EFFORTS,

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