Does Every Camera Have A Latent Root-Level Vulnerability?

Axis and Sony both had them for years on a large swath of their product line. Hikua, well you know the deal there...

So are there catatstrophic vulnerabilities, yet to be identified publicly, lurking in today’s ‘secure’ products?

When a researcher encounters a vulnerability and publicly discloses it, do you think that they are likely to have been the first to discover it?

Thoughts?

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** ******, ***, **** cameras (*** ********* ****** control ********) *** **** such ***************.

*** ************* *** ****** the ****** ** ******, including ******** (*** **** disabling) *** *** ****** servers (*******) ** *** devices ** **** ** near-impossible ** *** ***** access. ***** ** **** a *** **** *** be **** ** ****** the ******* ******* **** can ** *** ******* authorization, ***** ********** **** of *** ****** ***** and ******* ***** ** cameras ***** '***** ****' and **** *** ***** purposes.

** ******, ***, **** cameras (*** ********* ****** control ********) *** **** such ***************.

*** ** ********, ** you ******* **** ***** or ****** ***** ****** out ***** *** * root-level ****** ****?

*********, **** ** *** most **** ***** ** discovered, *** ***** *********, before ***** *************** ********** by *** ********.

****’* **** ***, ***/**?

*** ** ********, ** you ******* **** ***** or ****** ***** ****** out ***** *** * root-level ****** ****?

** ********, ********* ***, I **. *** ********** within ****** ****, ***** no-one ***** **** **** except *** *********** ******.

*** * ********** **** for **** **** *******, that ** *** *** to *** ****** (***).

*********, **** ** *** most **** ***** ** discovered, *** ***** *********, before ***** *************** ********** by *** ********.

**** **** ** **********, when ********** ** ****** and/or ****** *****. *******, due ** ************ *********** it **** ****** ** new ****** **.

** ** ****** *******, this ** ***** ******* process ** **** **** killed *** **** *** introduced.

****, ** *** ******* stop *** *********** *** kill *** ******** ***************, you ***'* **** *** new - *** *** are ****** ** *********** as *** ******* ** develop.

***** **

** ********, ********* ***, I **...

** ** ***** ****** has ** ***** *** unauthorized *** ** ****** root, (*** ******** ****), how ** ** ****** what ************ ** ***** the **** ***** ******** job?

** ***** **** ** might **** **** ** whatever ************ *** *********** are ************ *** **** will **** *** *****.

****, ** ******* ** matter *** *** ***, you *** ****** *** not ****** * *** deal ***** *** ***** you ***** ******** ***.

*****, ********* ****.

* ********** ***** *** manufacture *** ** *** most **** ** **** found *************** *** **** openly ******* *********** ** obtain **** ****** ** the *******.

**** ****** **** ** they *** *** ****** and/or ****** *****, *** if *************** ***** ** found **** **** ****** take ***** ************** ** fix *** ******* *********** for *** ****** ** their *******.

**** ** **** ** perspective...

****** ************ ******* ***** ****** **** ** *********** *** **********?

****'* ** ** *** manufacture, *** **** ******** they **** ***.

*** ******* ***** **** my **** ** **** looking ** ****** **** and ******* ** ************ binary **** *** **** different ******* *** *** code *****.

*******, * ******** ******* they ****** *** ***** open ****** ** ****, such ********** *** ***** *** legacy **** ** *** where ******.

**** ** ******** **** misc ************ ** ** today ***** *** ******** basic **********.

*** ******** ** ***** Open ****** **** **** Yocto ** **** *** this **** ** ************ investigated ** ******* ******* of ******** *********** **********/*********** - **** ** *** charges.

*** **** ****? ***. They ********* *** ***** by ******, **** *** hopes **** ****** **** bashis ***’* **** ****. Is **** ****** ** worse **** *** ************* is ******** ** ** there? ** ** ***** that ** ***’* ***** by *** ************? * have ******* ******** ******.

********* ******** *** ************* ****** *** *** *****.

*** *******,

****,*** ****** ** ******* ********, *** ****** *** ***** ****** to *** ****** *** ** **.

*****://***.****.***/**/**/*******/***/********

*********, *** **** *******, *** ******** ** ******** ***** - however **** ****** ***, *** **** **** *** ******* *** "protected *****".

*****://*********.***/*******/**-***-**-******-*********-**-*-*-*.*****/

(**** **** *** *** **** **** *** ** ******* ******** rules, ** *** ******)

*** *** ** *** *** ********;

*** ** ***** *** *** ***** ** *** **** *********** to ***** ?

*. **** - *** ****** ******* *********** ** **** ** telnetd ** ****** *** ******, *** **** **** ***** ** the ******.

*. ********* - *** **** *** ****** *** ******, *** give **** '***' (********* *****) ** *** ******?

*** ****** *****? *** **** ********?

********** *** ** ********** ** *** **, **** *** ** - ****** ** *****, ***** ** **** ** **** ** Montecryptos ********* ****.

************!

** *** ***'* **** ******** ** ****, *** ********** ** to **** ******* *** **** **** **** ****** **** *** to **** *** *** ********** ***************.

- ***'* ** ***, ** *****.

***, * ******* ***** *** **** *-****, *** **** **** and *****-*** ********.

****, * ******* *** ****** ** ******** *** ***** ******* to **** ***** ***** ********* ***** **** *******.

***** *** ***** ** youtube: ***** *** ****- Exploiting ******* ************ ******* like * ********* ******.

* ********* **** * network ******** **** ******* into ********* ******** ***** in *** ******** *******.

**** ** *** ** the **** ********** ********/*** I've ****, *** ** doesn't **** **** ** have *** *************** ****** the ******.

*** *** ** - Van ****** *** ***** - ******* ************ ******* through **** *******

****** **** ******... * ******* **** ****** ******** ******...

***** ** *** *** ;)

****. ** ***** **** **** ******** ******** ****** ** *** cable ** *******. ****** **** **** ** *** ***** **** is ******** ******.

**** ** *** ** limit ****** ** , and **** ****** ********* in ** ******* *** rooms **** ********* **********

*** **** ****** *** this ***.

***** ****** *** ******** personnel *** ****** ** and **** **.

**** *** **** ********... ;)

** *** ***** ************* vulnerabilities, *** ** ** identified ********, ******* ** today’s ‘******’ ********?

********** ****** ** ***.

**** * ********** ********** a ************* *** ******** discloses **, ** *** think **** **** *** likely ** **** **** the ***** ** ******** it?

**** ******** ***. (***** with **** ********** ** deep ****** *** *****)

**** ** *** ********** I **** ******** ** Cameras * **** ** terms ** ********. * remember *** ** **** referred ** ** ******* as "********* *** ****".

** *** * ******* there *** ***** ******** 0-days **** ** ** exploited. **** ****** **** it ***** ** ** overshadowed ** ******** **** Krack ***** ****** **** more **** **** *** industry.