IPVMU Certified | 09/08/14 01:56pm
The circumstance would also be difficult to detect.
Unless rigid 'antipassback' provisions are in place, or lucky video/guard verification of credential holders caught them, someone might be able to use a cloned card completely undetected for quite a while.
IPVMU Certified | 09/08/14 01:59pm
I anecdotally heard a story from a nearby HOA-owned swimming pool that one of the paying patrons had cloned magstripe cards to let a bunch of (unpaying) kids get access.
We have moved to IClass readers for the most part. Most of the cloning technology, not all but most, requires access to the reader. In my thinking, tampering the reader is one significant way to slow this down, and an up sale.
Nobody does tamper on readers as far as I can tell and therefore while meaning no disrespect to the tamper wiring in an average HID reader, "tamper doesn't work" and therefore attacking the reader seems viable.
People (typically down to earth ex-Law Enforcement) walk up to me at conferences frequently and claim they've heard of cloning cases. I believe you can find online a record of attempts at presenting this at conferences, suppressed by HID legal.
This is why you should be using some DESFire-based card. Yeah, it's (pennies) more per badge.
When you say "nobody does tamper on readers" what do you mean? Do you mean it is not available or that just no one bothers?
The "nobody does tamper on readers" matches my experience. In actual practice, I have found that many installers rarely use tamper switches on card readers or anything else.
In our specs, we require that all tampers be used when available and that additional tampers be provided on all panels, enclosures, and junction boxes containing splices. When conducting final inspections of systems, we often find that this requirement has not been complied with, making this one of the top five items usually found on our punchlists.
While it is true that IClass appears to have been compromised, you still need access to the reader to do it. Tampering and monitoring the reader can prevent that part. I must be honest and say I don't know DesFire that well. We are an HID house. Mifare was successfully and very publically hacked in 2008, Desfire was hacked in a lab setting in 2011. They are tougher to crack given the architecture, but even NXP admits customers need to move to the EV1. They all recommend card + pin as a second level of authentication. Customers don't want to hear that. Too much money.
The Desfire EV1 has not been cracked that I know of YET. But I am confident it will. That company owns 77% of the world wide transportation and vending market share and those are real dollars. They are targets of hackers all the time.
I'd have to agree that I've never done tamper on readers. On Edge controllers it was included and sent a discrete signal when it was triggered, but I don't recall ever connecting separate wires for tamper between reader and panel.
Though if I recall correctly, don't some HID readers have an optical tamper which, if activated, stops the reader from working? Though I suppose that's hardly the same as notifying personnel that someone is tampering with the reader.